The Church and Social Responsibility: Contributions to Contemporary Social Ethics from the Ecumenical Social Method of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State of 1937 by MacDonald, Gary B.
Southern Methodist University
SMU Scholar
Religious Studies Theses and Dissertations Religious Studies
5-18-2019
The Church and Social Responsibility:
Contributions to Contemporary Social Ethics from
the Ecumenical Social Method of the Oxford
Conference on Church, Community, and State of
1937
Gary B. MacDonald
Southern Methodist University, gary.b.macdonald@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/religious_studies_etds
Part of the Christianity Commons, Ethics in Religion Commons, Missions and World
Christianity Commons, and the Practical Theology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Religious Studies at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious
Studies Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
MacDonald, Gary B., "The Church and Social Responsibility: Contributions to Contemporary Social Ethics from the Ecumenical





THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO  
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ETHICS FROM THE ECUMENICAL 
METHOD OF THE OXFORD CONFERENCE ON CHURCH, 









Dr. Robin W. Lovin 




Dr. Charles E. Curran 




Dr. Gary J. Dorrien 
Professor of Social Ethics 




Dr. Rebekah L. Miles 
Professor of Ethics and Practical Theology 
 
 
THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ETHICS FROM THE ECUMENICAL 
METHOD OF THE OXFORD CONFERENCE ON CHURCH, 
COMMUNITY, AND STATE OF 1937  
 
A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of  
Dedman College 
Southern Methodist University 
in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
with a  
Major in Religious Studies 
by 
Gary Bruce MacDonald 
B.A., Journalism, Northeastern University 













  I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Robin Lovin, Southern Methodist University’s Cary 
M. Maguire University Professor Emeritus in Ethics. As dean of SMU’s Perkins School of 
Theology, he invited one of his senior administrators to consider the possibility of graduate 
studies. Thus began a journey – albeit longer than planned – buffeted by tragic realities of life 
and the demands of administrative vocation, and tempered by grace and joy along the way. Dr. 
Lovin throughout has remained a steadfast teacher, interlocutor, mentor and confidant. 
 With such an extended journey, there is a multitude that has accompanied me. I regret 
that I cannot list them all, but I am in debt to each. I am grateful for my committee. Charles 
Curran, Elizabeth Scurlock University Professor of Human Values, and Rebekah Miles, 
professor of Ethics and Practical Theology, have been wise teachers, as has Gary Dorrien, 
Reinhold Niebuhr Professor of Social Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, who even 
consented to a serendipitous meeting on the New York City Subway. I appreciate the directors of 
SMU’s Graduate Program in Religious Studies – William Babcock, Charles Wood, Dr. Miles 
and Roy Heller – and the program’s awarding me the Schubert Ogden Fellowship for Academic 
Excellence in Theology, which – along with an academic grant from the Clan Donald (USA) 
Foundation and a subsidy from the Missional Wisdom Foundation – funded my research travels. 
Credit is also due to other teachers in the program, including Johann Elverskog, Bruce Marshall 
and Joerg Rieger, and to former Perkins dean William Lawrence, who allowed space for this 




Heath, former dean of the Divinity School at Duke University, and her insights into missional 
ecclesiology, were particularly helpful in the project’s final stages. Others who have provided 
insight include SMU’s William Abraham, Joseph Allen, and John Holbert; graduate program 
colleagues Kevin Carnahan, Peter Jones, Oleg Makariev, Joshua Mauldin, and David Watson; 
and students, clergy, and laity with whom I had the privilege of teaching and learning at Perkins 
and Trinity Theological College in Singapore. 
 I appreciate the staffs of Perkins’ Bridwell Library, Library of Congress Manuscript 
Division, New College Library at the University of Edinburgh, and Duke Divinity’s library. One 
gentleman at Geneva’s World Council of Churches Archives exceeded duty in helping me get to 
a hospital with a ruptured disc. Lonnie Brooks, Ricky Ho, and Herman Shastri arranged for 
presentations on this material in Anchorage and Kuala Lumpur. Ted Campbell invited me to 
collaborate on a related entry for the Oxford Handbook of Ecumenical Studies, and Dr. Miles 
provided opportunity to contribute to the Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics. Barry Hughes and 
Mark Chancey have read and commented on various pieces of this work. Judith Cannon, Craig 
Gilliam, Kathryn Peterson, and Gina Hiatt’s web group have provided valuable coaching. Wendy 
J. Miller paused her own writing to proofread drafts, along with Neill Caldwell. Thomas and 
Gayle Kerr opened their Cape Cod cottage for a winter writing retreat, and Tracy Anne Allred 
and Dr. Chancey welcomed me to their Dallas home as I prepared for my defense. 
  The longest list comprises colleagues and friends from SMU, Duke, the Brigid’s Porch 
community, and the “Neighborhood,” whose graces and gifts sustained my work in countless 
ways. Roberta Cox was there to push from the start, and proofread at the end. Todd Rasberry 
defined what it means to be a companion. I offer gratitude as well to Randy Bell, the late 




Pamela Goolsby, Cherice Graham, Dina Helderman, Pamela Hogan, Robert Hunt, Hillsman 
Jackson, Nathan Kirkpatrick, Sandra Mitchell, Connie Nelson, Blanche Overton, Rebecca Payan, 
Carol Sparks, Dan Struble, and Jeannie Treviño-Teddlie. I am also thankful for the formative 
grace offered by many United Methodist congregations including Massachusetts’ Covenant-St. 
Andrew in Worcester and Maple Street in Lynn; and Texas’ First in Red Oak, and Grace and 
Northaven in Dallas. 
My family also has been a constant support. My sons – Jeffrey, Jonathan, and Joshua –
grew up with this project and made many sacrifices. My stepson, Brynn Yoder, has now survived 
both his mother’s and my doctorates. My grandson, Maxwell, reminds me that all real life is 
meeting. Three of my greatest teachers did not live to see this project complete – my grandfather, 
Walter Bohmann, and my parents, Bruce and Carolyn. My extended family has offered abundant 
grace. Thanks for listening Danielle Davis MacDonald; Pamela MacDonald and Laurie Clark; 
the extended Miller family – Edmond, Paul and David, Mark and Wendy S., David and Julie, 
Scott and Laura, Judy, and Bonita; and Jean and Michael O’Leary. All this wisdom and 
encouragement – woefully unrepresented by the deficits in this work for which I remain 
responsible – were signs of God’s Kingdom come. 
 My deepest thanks goes to my wife, Heidi Miller, who has steadfastly endured with me. 
She has sharpened me with her Mennonite theology and buoyed me by her deep faith, 
embodying the reality of the responsive Thou by which I know and am known, love and am 





MacDonald, Gary Bruce        B.A., Journalism, Northeastern University 
        M.Div., Southern Methodist University 
 
The Church and Social Responsibility: Contributions to 
Contemporary Social Ethics from the Ecumenical 
Method of the Oxford Conference on Church, 
Community, and State of 1937 
 
 Advisor: Dr. Robin W. Lovin 
Doctor of Philosophy conferred May 18, 2019 
Dissertation completed May 1, 2019  
 
Cultural and political realities, and doctrinal differences among faith traditions challenge 
unified theological and ecclesial contribution to political dialogue. Within the work of the 
Oxford Conference of the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work on Church, Community 
and State of 1937, organized by Joseph Oldham, are elements of an applied understanding of 
social responsibility, offering resources to enable such contribution. Here, I call this “Oxford 
Responsibility,” defined as a society in which its members and institutions act in accordance 
with human value and freedom, in obedience to the will of God, toward the achievement of 
justice within the limits and contingencies of human finitude, culture and history.  
Contributors, threatened by secularism and totalitarianism, built upon the thought of Max 
Weber, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Martin Buber regarding ethics and responsibility, and were 
influenced by the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr. Drawing on Emil Brunner, they 
outlined a Christian anthropology positing dignity and freedom to the human actor. With Paul 
Tillich and others, the Conference countered the idea of progressive history, positing history as 




judged against the suprahistorical ideal of the Kingdom of God. The Conference bounded the 
church’s responsibility within society to the interpretation of the Gospel and the preparation of 
laity for responsible work within wider spheres of society. Discernment of action proceeded 
through an inclusive dialogical process toward what Conference participants called “middle 
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 THE PROMISE OF ECUMENICAL SOCIAL ETHICS 
Within the sweeping global cultural and political shifts in progress during these early 
years of the twenty-first century, the idea that Christian churches in particular and religion in 
general might together critically respond to the society’s issues and history’s crises would appear 
to many to be quaint if not idealistic. Doctrinal differences within and between faith traditions 
would appear to preclude any proper or relevant response. National and cultural differences 
would seem to further inhibit any valuable contribution to a global dialogue. The very nature of 
religious epistemology might call into question the claim that any ecclesiastical or theological 
response could be entertained by those outside the tradition from whence it came, particularly 
within a secular dialogue. Finally, within western Christianity in particular, the very existence of 
an applied social ethic as a component of theology is disputed.  
Can an ecumenical social ethic, in which churches collaborate around contemporary 
moral problems within their context, have any place in a postmodern world? The so-called 
“Christian Century” just past, which began with a confidence and optimism in unifying efforts 
for both church and state, is today followed by a world in which a search for common or 
comprehensive principles is found to be both suspect and ineffective. Yet at the same time, the 
realities of economic globalization and the transition of power within the system of nation-states 
that we face at the start of this century, both demand and set the stage for some type of unified 




 It is this paper’s contention that ecumenical social ethics is not bound for this century’s 
trash bin of anachronisms. Rather, resources for its rescue and continued relevance in the face of 
current crises can be found at the midpoint of the contemporary ecumenical movement, namely 
the 1937 Oxford Conference of the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work on Church, 
Community, and State, and its focus on the concept of responsibility. It was at this ecumenical 
conference – when religion, and the world, faced crises of totalitarianism on the eve of a second 
worldwide war – that the church in its diversity met to fashion a relevant response to the 
international threats and in the process provided a method of responsible ecumenical social 
ethics that offers us continuing lessons. This paper will explicate from the Conference’s process 
and output an understanding of a responsible society and the church’s particular responsibility 
within that society. We will call this understanding “Oxford Responsibility,” defined as a society 
in which its members and institutions act in accordance with human value and freedom, in 
obedience to the will of God, toward the achievement of justice within the limits and 
contingencies of human finitude, culture and history.  
 In this introductory chapter we will provide the context for the work of the Oxford 
Conference and identify some of the key themes for responsibility with which the Conference 
engaged. We will then examine the theories of responsibility that were operative in the 
theological context of the time, before studying within the documents presented and published by 
the Conference to identify further the theological foundations for the theory of Oxford 
Responsibility. We will then further outline the ecumenical method that worked to operationalize 
this theory, before we conclude with suggestions regarding how Oxford Responsibility might 




The Context of the Oxford Conference 
  Ecumenical social ethics has been defined recently as “the shared reflection on social 
questions carried on by ecumenically committed churches that are themselves part of the 
societies in question.”1 The contemporary work of such churches can be posited mainly within 
the immediate history of the post-World War II World Council of Churches (WCC) and its work 
among its member churches from the ranks of Protestant, Orthodox and independent 
denominations, and their work with the Roman Catholic Church. The definition is helpful, if not 
pointed, in approaching the present ecumenical milieu in which the Christian churches find 
themselves, and, in fact, is helpful in approaching the place of responsibility within the work of 
the Oxford Conference. It is, however, less well suited to encompassing the intervening 
ecumenical history of the latter half of the twentieth century. This history is marked by 
ecumenical efforts that have been defined less by deference to societal and confessional 
contextuality than by more universal and prudential directives, and on the other hand less by 
shared reflection than broad and dramatic pronouncements, that bordered on the idealistic. 
Ronald Preston, in particular has criticized the later work of the Council as driven by a 
simplicity of thought, shaped by apocalyptic worldviews, leading to “utopian attitudes, policies 
and strategies.”2 Likewise, in his classic critique of the WCC, Paul Ramsey, following the body’s 
1966 Geneva Conference, described its work as a “social action curia” with a “passion for 
numerous particular pronouncements on policy questions to the consequent neglect of basic 
                                                
1 Julio de Santa Ana et al., Beyond Idealism: A Way Ahead for Ecumenical Social Ethics, ed. 
Robin Gurney, Heidi Hadsell, and Lewis Seymour Mudge (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), ix. 
2 Ronald H. Preston, Confusions in Christian Social Ethics: Problems for Geneva and Rome 




decision- and action-oriented principles of ethical and political analysis.”3 In that text, Who 
Speaks for the Church, Ramsey reaches back thirty years to the conception of the WCC, 
suggesting, as does this paper, that texts and methods from those gathered at Oxford hold 
promise for the recovery of ecumenical social ethics, and particularly Christian social ethics. In 
speaking about Council pronouncements on war, for example, Ramsey writes, “I am suggesting 
… that ecumenical ethics needs to return to Oxford and begin again,” citing the Conference as 
providing, for example, the “more apt Christian characterization” of war than even the 1948 
statement that emerged from the Council’s inaugural assembly in Amsterdam.4 
While is not this paper’s intent to provide a comprehensive history of the Oxford 
Conference in particular or the ecumenical movement of which it was a part, it is important to 
place the Conference in its context in order to explore how the resources it holds might continue 
to be helpful. We will begin with an overview of the ecumenical context before exploring the 
Conference itself. 
The Oxford Conference can be placed along the timeline of twentieth-century ecumenism 
that begins with 1910’s World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh. From this seedling 
branched three principal movements within the ecumenical effort – the Continuation Committee 
of the World Conference on Faith and Order, the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work, 
                                                
3 Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks for the Church? A Critique of the 1966 Geneva Conference on 
Church and Society (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), 13. 
4 Ibid., n. 179:31,32. The Amsterdam statement claimed that “war is contrary to the will of God,” 
while the Oxford statement took a realist approach that claimed that “War is a particular 
demonstration of the power of sin in this world and a defiance of the righteousness of God as 
revealed in Jesus Christ and him crucified. No justification of war must be allowed to conceal or 
minimize this fact.”; Henry Smith Leiper, “Preface to the American Edition,” in The Oxford 
Conference (Official Report), American Edition (Chicago, New York: Willett, Clark & 




and the International Missionary Council. While the three would ultimately coalesce into what is 
today known as the World Council of Churches, each group had a distinct focus within the 
overall ecumenical effort. The Faith and Order movement worked to lead churches toward 
theological dialogue on issues of doctrine with the goal of unity between the churches of Jesus 
Christ. The Missionary Council worked to coordinate activities, research and meetings between 
denominational missionary bodies throughout the globe, and the Life and Work group, the 
auspices under which the Oxford Conference conducted its work, set for itself the lofty goal of 
explicating the content of Christian social action. 
The Life and Work council held its formative assembly in Stockholm in 1925. In the 
official invitation, organizers wrote, “No Christian can doubt that the world’s greatest need is the 
Christian way of Life not merely in personal and social behaviour but in public opinion and its 
outcome in public action. … In short, we hope, under the guidance of the Spirit of God, through 
the counsel of all, to be able to formulate programmes and devise means for making them 
effective whereby the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of all peoples will become more 
completely realized through the Church of Christ.”5 
 With Faith and Order, Life and Work joined together leading to the WCC’s first 
assembly in Amsterdam in 1948 after the conclusion of World War II. The International 
Missionary Council joined them at the New Delhi assembly 13 years later. 
While critics of liberalism, including Karl Barth, at the start of the so-called Christian 
Century heavily influenced the beginning work of the Council, the missionary zeal of the 
ecumenical movement reclaimed the ideal of Christendom, viewed within the lens of modern 
                                                
5 Nils Karlström, “Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work: 1910-1925,” in A 
History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948, ed. Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill, 




liberal thought in general and the Social Gospel movement in particular. At the 1910 conference 
in Edinburgh, for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Baron Randall Thomas Davidson, 
opened the gathering with the suggestion that there might be among those in attendance “who 
shall not taste death” until they witnessed on earth “the kingdom of God come with power.” 6  
With the years of World War I preceding their first conferences – Life and Work at 
Stockholm in 1925 and Faith and Order at Lausanne in 1927 – the optimism of the 1910 
gathering began to suffer fissures, yet the hope for a bulwark against further war continued to be 
represented by the vision of a united church. The vision mirrored that of the Western state, with 
the ecumenical effort viewed as providing the “soul” for President Woodrow Wilson’s ultimately 
doomed vision for a League of Nations. 
In the 1930s the political and theological optimism of the ecumenical movement 
confronted new and different disasters that demanded fresh thinking regarding the relationship 
between the church and the world. Liberal theology had placed hope in the historical progress of 
humanity and saw the work of the church as the accomplishment of the divine ideal within 
human history. New tragedies of the 1930s, however, forced a rethinking of such optimism. With 
the collapse of the global economy and the rise of totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia, 
liberal hopes of an ideal social order could no longer stand.  
The organizers of the ecumenical Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State 
saw in the political and economic situation of the 1930s evidence of the world “going to pieces,” 
with society and human life itself succumbing to disintegration as the foundations of community 
                                                
6 World Missionary Conference, The History and Records of the (World Missionary) 
Conference: Together with Addresses Delivered at the Evening Meetings (Edinburgh: Oliphant, 




trembled.7 The problem they sought to solve in the summer of 1937 was, in the words of a 
journal of the day, “how religion is to survive in single community which is neither church nor 
state, which recognizes no formal limits, but which covers the whole of life and claims to be 
source and goal of every human activity.”8 
The situation presented by the rise of fascism and communism was seen by members of 
the movement as a struggle for the future of Christianity and the church over against a so-called 
secularism that demanded for itself humanity’s allegiance. How was the church to survive in and 
beyond this crisis? And what, beyond survival, would be the church’s role in relating to 
community, society, and state? 
In the preconference text sent to delegates – The Church and Its Function in Society 
(CFS) – organizer Joseph H. Oldham, then secretary of the International Missionary Council, 
wrote, with a hint of earlier idealism, of the urgency of the task and the importance of the 
opportunity. His introduction is worthy of quoting at length to obtain a sense of the context as the 
organizers experienced it. 
There is a widespread sense, which finds expression in the writings and utterances 
of many serious thinkers, Christian and non-Christian, that we stand to-day at one 
of the major turning-points in history. The basal assumptions which have hitherto 
given a meaning to life, and unity and stability to civilization, have lost their 
unquestioned validity. An epoch in the life of mankind is drawing to a close, and 
we are on the threshold of a new age in which new conceptions of life still 
struggling in the womb of time will rule men’s minds and direct their conduct. 
We are not concerned here to enquire how far and in what sense these assertions 
are true. It is not the task of the Conference at Oxford to attempt to formulate a 
philosophy of history. What is important for our present purpose is the indubitable 
fact that we live in the midst of profound and far-reaching change. The relative 
                                                
7 Joseph H. Oldham et al., eds., The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the Conference 
at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community, and State, vol. 8, The Church, Community, and 
State Series (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1937), 67. 




stability of the world which existed before the war has gone. The foundations of 
human society are quivering. The fact itself none will dispute, but our minds 
become dulled by familiarity to its significance. We give it our indolent assent, 
and contentedly resume the tenor of our habitual attitudes. There can, however, be 
no true wrestling with the realities of the contemporary situation, except in so far 
as we allow their meaning to break through the crust of our customary thinking 
into those deeper levels of our being in which our experience is absorbed and 
organized, so that there will take place progressively, and to a large extent 
subconsciously, a reconstruction of our whole outlook, and a reorientation of our 
fundamental attitudes.9 
 
Convened by the Life and Work council in July 1937, the Oxford Conference on Church, 
Community, and State marshaled the resources of the church – lay and ordained, pastor and 
scholar – to provide, if not suggest, a responsible response to the worldwide crises facing the 
international scene and the catholic church. Confronted with the threats to its unity and its social 
task, the church would receive from Oxford neither idealist resolutions nor outlines of political 
programs. Yet Oxford would provide a realistic assessment of the role of religion in general in 
forming public commitments and action, while retaining missionary notions of Christianity’s 
particular place in shaping the world and its international relations. Oldham would later suggest 
in his introductory remarks to the Conference report that the crisis that the church faced was 
analogous to that faced by the early Church before the Roman world. In the face of 
contemporary “supra-mundane” authority that demanded allegiance, the church was locked in a 
“life and death struggle between Christian faith and the secular and pagan tendencies of our 
time.10 
                                                
9 Willem A. Visser ’t Hooft and Joseph H. Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, The 
Church, Community, and State Series (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1937), 13–14. 
10 Oldham et al., The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 




The Conference comprised 425 official delegates, the majority of whom came from the 
United States and Britain, with others from throughout the then undivided Europe, as well as 
from Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania, and South America. These represented both Protestant 
and Orthodox traditions, including what was called the “Younger Churches” of Asia and Africa. 
Physically absent from the Conference were representatives from the German Evangelical 
Church and Germany’s Confessing Church, who had been barred from attending by Adolf Hitler 
himself.11 Also absent was the Roman Church, which had officially declined invitations to 
participate. Significant among the delegates was the large representation given to Christian laity, 
“representing other departments of knowledge besides theology and possessing practical 
experience of public affairs,”12 as well as the large block of youth who were seated as associate 
delegates at Oxford University’s Sheldonian Theatre, alongside scholars, writers, diplomats, 
nobles and clerics including John Baillie, John Bennett, William Adams Brown, Emil Brunner, 
Henry Sloane Coffin, John Foster Dulles, T. S. Eliot, Georgia Harkness, Phillip Kerr, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, William Temple, Paul Tillich, and Henry Van Dusen.  
To prepare for the Conference, these and other scholars wrote and circulated advance 
papers on church and community, church and state, the economic order, education, and 
international relations, as well as the CFS volume by Willem A. Visser ’t Hooft and Oldham, 
which was provided to all delegates several weeks before the gathering. This text held within it a 
social method and ecclesiological framework that would permit the Conference to effectively 
                                                
11 Kenneth C. Barnes, Nazism, Liberalism, & Christianity: Protestant Social Thought in 
Germany and Great Britain, 1925-1937 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 
101. 
12 Oldham et al., The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 




complete its work, and provided the outline of a paradigm useful not only to a church at the 
precipice of a worldwide war at the second third of the twentieth century, but, as this paper will 
argue, to the church at the beginning of the twenty-first century facing questions regarding the 
future of the community and the place of religion in society.  
Influences on Oxford Conference Thought 
 The thought and method of the Oxford Conference was shaped in large part by the 
growing Christian realist response to the early twentieth-century idealism, exemplified by the 
work of Reinhold Niebuhr; other critics of liberal theology, such as John Bennett; as well as the 
Anglican social thought of William Temple. It was shaped as well by one critic of both 
liberalism and ecumenism who was absent from its proceedings. Karl Barth’s theological answer 
to the question of the Christian’s relationship to the world in history would both threaten and 
sharpen the Oxford effort. 
 Niebuhr had been one of a few tapped by Oldham in 1934 to define study topics and 
writers for the Conference. In his own essay on “The Christian Faith and the Common Life,” in 
the text of the same name (CFCL), Niebuhr provided the central position of the realist 
perspective that would influence the Conference. “The problem [of the Christian faith and the 
common life] is to relate the moral ultimate of Christian faith, the law of love, to the facts and 
necessities of daily existence. This is a difficult problem because the law of love is not a law at 
all. … Love is an ideal which transcends all law; but the sinfulness of the human heart threatens 
the common life of man with anarchy if it is not restrained.”13 
                                                
13 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Christian Faith and the Common Life,” in Christian Faith and the 
Common Life, by Nils Ehrenström, et al, vol. 4, The Church, Community, and State Series 




The demands of love over against the reality of sin could only present paradox for the 
Christian life. For example, elements of the common life such as family and nation – the 
Lutheran concept of the “Orders of Creation” – were establishments of nature that both 
expressed and threatened the law of love. This was made dangerously evident for Niebuhr and 
Conference participants, for example, in the nationalism of the decade’s German theology. The 
communities and societies in which humans lived with each other and loved God held both the 
promise of the Kingdom of God, but at the same time, encompassed the designs for its 
destruction.  
Of course, this danger within sin did not render the law of love irrelevant. While it 
remained a “transcendent impossibility,” the Kingdom of God presented both a challenge and 
judgment upon the human situation. The law of love, according to Niebuhr, continually 
presented new “possibilities of action higher than the conventional and traditional customs and 
habits of men” but at the same time these possibilities were placed under the constant judgment 
of prophetic religion.14 While he wanted to expose the “illusion” of liberal Protestantism for its 
theological idealism, Niebuhr at the same time worked to preserve the reality, albeit flawed, of 
reason and the natural law. This provided important justification for the continuing Life and 
Work movement through Oxford. A non-compromising Gospel ethics required this rational 
supplement in order to deal with the realities of common life. Coercion, resistance, economics, 
politics were the necessary mechanisms for this life. “It is one of the illusions of liberal 
moralism, both secular and religious, that these mechanisms of society are unimportant, 
compared with the right moral or religious attitudes among men.”15 The church, therefore, while 
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grounded in the transcendent history of God’s fulfillment of the Kingdom, Niebuhr claimed 
during a plenary session, also must realize that it is not lifted from immanent history. Rather, it 
takes on the burden and responsibility for the establishment of justice.16 
While this realist alternative evident in the Conference is often seen as a response to early 
twentieth-century idealism, this pre-war theological effort can also be seen as a response to the 
Barthian critique of liberal theology at the time. Barth’s crisis theology was well known to the 
Oxford Conference organizers. It was a theology that indeed loomed in the periphery as they 
worked to shape their own alternative.  
While Barth declared politics as inherent to the work of theology and the church, his 
concern was to maintain the distinction between the two. While the church has a certain interest 
in the civil community, and the state has a certain ecclesial character, the church can provide no 
details for Christian political action, without succumbing to accommodation and compromise of 
the Gospel.17 To turn a Gospel “shall” into a political “ought” exposes for Barth a zeal that is 
disobedience, positing sin on God.18 Yet the church can act provisionally in crisis as a witness to 
the Gospel, when God’s judgment on the world is revealed. Here the church does not act on 
principle, but retains the “freedom to judge each new event afresh,”19 distinguishing for the 
world the difference between justice and injustice, order and caprice, government and tyranny, 
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freedom and anarchy.20 In this very act of survival the church by its witness signals the failure of 
the totalitarian project. By its continued existence in crisis, the church exposes the futility and 
meaninglessness of fascism and communism’s demand for comprehensive loyalty, and remains a 
check on such power. 
For Barth, the crisis of the 1930s called for resistance from the Church, but not of the 
type that separated the questions of what must be done in the face of such crisis and how action 
is to proceed. In his polemic against Emil Brunner’s Nature and Grace, Barth warned that to 
separate these questions was to elevate human moral and sociological axioms to the level of 
divine commandment. 21 Such earthly- and culturally-bound principles and orders were necessary 
for the functioning of community, but none could be adequately codified and no one could claim 
adequate authority for their definition.  
Barth’s work contrasted sharply with that of the organizers of the Oxford Conference in 
particular and the ecumenical movement in general, for which Barth showed more than slight 
disdain. Barth was intentional in his absence from the 1937 summer conferences with trips to the 
British Isles at both ends of the gatherings’ schedule, first in March to deliver the Gifford 
lectures and again in September to accept an honorary doctorate. In a letter to Oxford organizer 
Visser ’t Hooft, Barth wrote of the ecumenical effort, “I am evidently not up to the particular 
logic and ethics and aesthetics of this business, and would prefer not to hear any more about it 
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for a long time.” In his later reflections he would dismiss the ecumenical effort as an exercise in 
compromise and accommodation.22 
Barth’s harsh denunciation of Brunner’s conception of natural theology in 1934 came as 
the preparatory work for the Oxford Conference was taking shape. It landed like a bomb in 
Geneva, where Life and Work staffers viewed Barth’s attack as a threat to the very continuation 
of the effort toward a Conference altogether.23 Yet rather than derail the effort, Barth’s continued 
criticism of the movement proved actually to sharpen an alternative response to the crisis that 
would emerge in the summer of 1937, over against liberal optimism and Barthian obedience.  
In his introduction in CFCL, Nils Ehrenström, then of the Life and Work research 
department, summarized the contrast. “The true line of demarcation … is not to be drawn 
between religion and politics, Church and State, but between a political life “in Christ” – and 
thus restored to its God-given function – and a political life which has its integrating centre in 
some mere segment of human existence, which, consequently, instead of checking fundamental 
disorder in the world, simply perpetuates it.”24 Rather than respond to the crisis with idealist 
resolutions, political programs, or separatist theologies, the Conference would work toward a 
realistic theological assessment of the role of religion in forming public commitments and action, 
while retaining missionary notions of Christianity’s particular place in shaping the world and its 
international relations.  
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In his CFCL essay, Niebuhr named the requirements of justice comprising “tentative 
harmonies” and “provisional equities” within a sinful world, yet under the perspective of the 
prophetic ideal of the Kingdom of God, thereby bridging the chasm between Divine judgment 
and imperative. Without the latter perspective, moralism is marked by romanticism and self-
righteousness. “It is a dangerous theology … which does not recognize how dialectically the 
Kingdom of God is related to the sinful world in every moment of existence, offering both 
judgment and a more excellent way in consideration of every problem of justice.” To do 
otherwise was to acquiesce to the order of the state and to mark as insignificant relative 
distinctions of justice upon which “the lives and welfare of millions may depend.” It was a 
mistake of greatest pride for theology, in seeking to counter the utopian myths of totalitarianism, 
to ignore these distinctions.25 
On the other hand, he claimed, in “Augustinian-Lutheran Christianity the relative 
requirements of moral standards are treated with a scant respect, and religion becomes, in 
consequence, too supramoral.”26 Among those who would ignore or reject such obligation, such 
as Barth and his sympathizers at the Conference, were those adherent to theologies that 
counseled Christians to an ascetic separation from the world, as well as those who were content 
with “eschatological judgments upon the sinfulness of all common actions.” These, he said, “are 
equally truant to the obligation of religion to morality.”27 The material that finally emerged from 
the Conference held that idealism, separatism and supramoral witness were inadequate to the 
contemporary crisis and to the daily function of the church and Christian theology.  
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Also influential in the preparation and execution of the Conference was Bennett, who, 
like Niebuhr, offered a critique of theological liberalism. Writing in 1933, John Bennett 
acknowledged the disintegration of liberal confidence in human reason and understanding as the 
revealer of religious truth, working to retain what was “cleansing” within liberalism while 
drawing from other sociological and political movements to begin to fashion an alternative 
grounding for theology. Among the contributions of liberalism, Bennett claimed, was the 
authority of individual insight in apprehending religious truth over against ecclesiasticism. At the 
same time, Bennett wrote that such insight did not develop “in a vacuum” but within continuing 
give and take with the ideas and commitments of others, with scripture and “all the materials 
which form the external authorities of Christians,” a point for ecumenism that would be 
vehemently disputed by Barth, but would be a critical point for Oxford Responsibility. Contra 
Barth, Bennett would also find helpful liberalism’s focus on historical criticism, arguing that the 
foundation of faith must include human’s rational apprehension of the experience of God over 
against “arbitrary” revelation.28  
Looking toward a new construction of theology, Bennett drew on Niebuhr’s 
understanding of social evil as addressed in the then recent Moral Man and Immoral Society. He 
also held the conviction that Christianity was in a unique historical position to unite persons from 
across diverse cultures and nations because of its ability to transcend national boundaries and 
loyalties, a theme that also would play out within the Oxford Conference.29  
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Here Bennett’s missional sympathies are exposed as he argues for a theology that 
recognizes an eternal, central and agential deity. “If there is a God at all he is not one reality 
among others which we discover after years of searching, but he is the all important reality upon 
which we depend at every moment of our lives and to which all the good in us is a response.” 
Here then a recovery of church tradition can counter the fragmentary and competing passions of 
the secular world, binding together citizens of the western world across national boundaries. 
Somewhat optimistically, Bennett continued, “There arises the earnest hope that this Christian 
movement, with all its divisions and it compromising alliances with states and privileged classes 
may yet say a decisive word to the spiritual confusion of the world and can moderate the 
possessiveness of the owning groups and check the fatal drift toward war.”30  
Besides the influence of the Christian realists, the specific mark of William Temple, then 
Archbishop of York, later to be named the Archbishop of Canterbury, can be seen on the 
Conference and its method. Of particular influence was Temple’s demand for, on the one hand, 
Christian social engagement, and on the other, deference to technical non-theological expertise in 
the process of such engagement.  
Temple’s passion for Christian engagement is evidenced by his own direct involvement 
in British labor disputes, as well as his scholarly collaboration as chair of the 1924 Birmingham 
Conference on Politics, Economics and Citizenship, commonly called COPEC. A precursor to 
Oxford, COPEC focused on the British Church, rivaling Oxford’s output, while reflecting some 
of Temple’s utopian tendencies, which would fade just a decade later under the influence of 
Christian realism. In an Oxford essay published in CFCL, Temple works to find a way between 
the extremes of “the pessimism of much religious orthodoxy” that views the world as beyond 
                                                




redemption, and the optimism of “modern and rationalistic philosophy.”31 This calls not for a 
compromise between the claims of God and the claims of the world, but to apply the Christian 
standard to “promote the greatest conformity to those standards.” As such, the “prevailing 
practice of the world” cannot be ignored.32 
Temple’s influence is also made explicit in his post-Oxford work Christianity and Social 
Order, which works to outline how the church is to “interfere” in matters of politics and 
economics. Temple claims that the church indeed must interfere in such matters, but how it 
interferes is subject to limits. “Religion may rightly censure the use of artistic talents for making 
money out of men’s baser tastes, but it cannot lay down laws about perspective or the use of a 
paint-brush. It may insist that scientific inquiry be prompted by a pure love of truth and not 
distorted by political considerations. It may declare the proper relation of the economic to other 
activities of men, but it cannot claim to know what will be the purely economic effect of 
particular proposals.”33 The avoidance of moving into matters of the prudential, against which 
Temple, and later Paul Ramsey argued, was, as we shall see, a key issue for Oxford, particularly 
around the issues of middle axioms, which attempted to find a provisional way between the 
general and the particularly prudential. 
Also key in Temple’s social thought, and in the work of the Oxford Conference, is the 
role of the Christian laity. Temple saw the Church influence on society as twofold. While 
prudential statements were beyond the bounds of proper church interference, Christian principles 
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could be discerned and used to illuminate conflicts of justice within society. It then fell to 
Christian citizens acting on the civic stage to act in a fashion that most closely approached these 
principles, as explained above. Such action, however, always involves technical knowledge and 
prudential judgments. “If a bridge is to be built, the Church may remind the engineer that it is his 
obligation to provide a really safe bridge; but it is not entitled to tell him whether, in fact, his 
design meets this requirement.”34 As Ronald Preston points out, Temple saw that information on 
ethical issues cannot simply come from the Bible or from doctrine, but through empirical 
evidence and a diversity of expert opinion and criteria. “Those who dispute (Temple’s method) 
want a clear-cut Christian ethical position. … They do not face up to the problem of dealing with 
contestable empirical evidence.”35 
The Oxford Method 
The theological themes presented by the Christian realists shaped the very structure of the 
Oxford Conference and its output. As we have mentioned, its delegates comprised not only 
clerics and scholars. Nearly a quarter of the delegates were laity. Furthermore, the Conference 
did not seek to find consensus on its various themes. Within the volumes produced by the 
Conference, official reports of the sections were accompanied by texts of collected essays that 
offered various positions on Conference topics. The key texts within Oxford’s “The Church, 
Community, and State Series” included eight volumes: The Church and its Function in Society, 
which, as we have named, served as a preparatory volume for delegates, and collections of 
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essays representing ecumenical thought, largely published following the Conference, within The 
Christian Understanding of Man; The Kingdom of God and History; The Christian Faith and the 
Common Life; Church and Community; Church, Community, and State in Relation to Education; 
and The Universal Church and the World of Nations. Research reports comprising the 
Conference’s official report were also published in British and American editions; the British 
version titled The Churches Survey Their Task. Henry Leiper’s “popular interpretation” of that 
summer’s ecumenical conferences in Oxford and Edinburgh, World Chaos or World 
Christianity, was also marketed in the United States as part of the official Conference texts.  
Other supplemental texts included William Paton’s Christianity in the Eastern Conflicts; a Study 
of Christianity, Nationalism and Communism in Asia and Adolf Keller’s Church and State on the 
European Continent. The Universal Christian Council for Life and Work also published a series 
of small study guides on the topics of Church and Community, Church and State, The Church 
and Economic Order, The Church and Education, The Universal Church and the World of 
Nations, and The Nature and Function of the Church for use in churches. 
The Oxford Method comprised three patterns of contributions that can be found in this 
output. First was a sophisticated understanding of the church as an ecumenical society, a Church 
within the churches, grounded in Christian mission, and offering a unity and transcendence that 
defied borders of state, culture, station and class. In what would become the watchwords of the 
Conference, Temple wrote that the duty of the Church was to “be in very deed the Church.”36 In 
so doing, the Church could stand outside the activities of political life, yet would find itself 
responsible for the illumination of such activities, placing political judgment under the scrutiny 
of divine judgment, but avoiding commitment to prudential political programs. Second is a 
                                                




theology that at its core established the sovereignty of God in creation, and positing within God’s 
creation the inherent freedom and dignity of the individual. Far from being simply an idea rooted 
in the modern project, freedom and human rights, the Conference declared, are rooted in the very 
structure of religion and the church. This focus on freedom undergirded the dialogical social 
method used within the Conference as well, and can be seen within the third theme, the concept 
of the middle axiom. These so-called axioms spring first from the recognition of the church’s 
function in the political sphere, with the intention of providing provisional and nonbinding 
guidelines for faithful response for a decision within a particular historical and cultural context. 
Regarding our first theme, the Oxford Conference expressed dissatisfaction with common 
characterizations of ecumenical ecclesiology. Branch theory in its attempt to define the church as 
a “symphonic harmony” of the parts – the various Christian traditions completing the whole as 
the church catholic – was rejected as sacrificing questions of truth for unity. Nor could the 
ecumenical effort result in either opportunism or compromise for unity’s sake. Rather, the 
Conference posited a “Church in the Churches,” that defied human definition but existed within 
the diversity of Christian expression. “We are therefore obliged to recognize the fact of our 
disagreement as to the nature of the Church as well as the fact of our agreement as to the reality 
of the Church. … Our present impasse is a sign that unity cannot be made by men, but can only 
be acknowledged and received when God actually gives it. … Unity is not achieved; but it 
happens when men listen together to God, and when He is willing to give it to them.”37 Unity 
then is found in fellowship and spiritual attentiveness, rather than agreement. 
Here was, first, the growing recognition that the formerly prevailing belief – sparked by 
the difficulties of reconciling Faith and Order issues – that the church could find fundamental 
                                                




unity regarding social ethics, if not doctrinal issues, was unhelpfully idealistic. Differences 
between the churches were considerable and often stark. Rather than soften the contrast or seek 
compromise, the Conference often let the conflicts stand. Writing on the topic of war, peace and 
national sovereignty, for example, The Marquess of Lothian, Philip Henry Kerr, advocated for 
the creation of a sovereign world federation, to replace the wounded League of Nations,38 while 
in the same post-conference volume Princeton’s Otto Piper outlined the impracticality of the 
idea, given, especially, the place of power relations.39 
Such paradox was allowed and encouraged by the relentless attention paid not to details 
of doctrine or ethics, but to the theological resonance across the delegation. In addressing the 
issue of the church and the nation-states, the podium on which the delegates argued recognized a 
unity that transcended ecclesial and international differences. The report on “The Universal 
Church and the World of Nations” stated, “This fact of the oecumenical character of the Church 
carries with it the important consequence that the Church brings to the task of achieving a better 
international order an insight that is not to be derived from ordinary political sources. To those 
who are struggling to realize human brotherhood in a world where disruptive nationalism and 
aggressive imperialism make such brotherhood seem unreal, the Church offers not an ideal but a 
fact, man united not by his aspiration but by the love of God.”40  
Thus, compromise was not lifted up as a goal, nor was there a call for political posturing, 
although both were likely in evidence, a fact historians would certainly illuminate. Rather, 
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among the church’s constitutive functions, modeled by the Oxford process, was the task to seek 
the realization of its essential nature as a fellowship united by common loyalty to Jesus Christ, 
rather than emphasizing divisions on politics, economics or doctrine. 
This claiming for itself an essential transcendence and unity raised two important 
ecclesiological characteristics relevant to our study. Through this unity that defied borders of 
state, culture, station and class, the church could claim unique insight into the questions of 
politics and economics even while failing to reach, or even trying to reach, any consensus on the 
problems in context. Indeed, the church could stand outside the activities of political life, yet 
would find itself responsible for the illumination of such activities. Preparatory documents stated 
that “The Church is a worshipping community in whose worship every relative political 
judgment is brought to the searching test and scrutiny of an absolute and divine judgment,” 
warning that to commit to a prudential political program would indeed abdicate this 
responsibility.41 The expression of political decisions, thus, was posited in the hands of the laity, 
with the church submitting its counsel to those with the responsibility and expertise to execute 
practical action. 
The Oxford Conference squarely placed responsibility for the public welfare with the 
church and with Christians. “The obedience of men to the will of God must have … immense 
and incalculable consequences in the social and political spheres. The Church, by the mere fact 
of its existence, is a political factor of cardinal importance.”42 Yet over against its later critics, 
such political responsibility posited within the church was undertaken within a clear missional 
priority. In one of the few comprehensive studies of the Conference, Graeme Smith claims that 
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the 1937 gathering was in the ecumenical missionary tradition, rather than on a parallel political 
track.43 Smith argues that missiology trumped ecclesiology at the Conference, if the latter existed 
at all. The role of missiology, however, does not preclude the centrality of ecclesiology within 
the Conference, but complements it. The church could function congruent to its essential nature 
only through its continued global expansion. For the organizers, Christianity was not only an 
answer to the crisis of humanity, but also the answer.  
Constituent of this response to the crisis of humanity was a theological conception of 
responsibility comprising human dignity and freedom, as well as concomitant historical 
possibility. This second theme from the Conference method would be vital to the church’s 
ongoing place in the social order and would manifest a decade later when some of the same 
principals from the Conference worked for the establishment of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. As John Nurser summarizes in his study, “Unless ‘Christian forces’ exerted 
themselves, it could be assumed that any [post-war world] order would be unjust – and therefore 
short-lived, and hostile to church – and especially missionary interest. To ‘write the peace,’ … 
would be critical for the future of the church.”44 The organizers of the Conference realized that in 
order for the Christian church to perform its function in society, the recognition and maintenance 
of freedom for the individual, and for the church, would be required.  
Furthermore, extended critiques of Marxism and Humanistic Modernism built upon 
preliminary statements regarding the value and dignity of humans. “In a world in which life 
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seems cheap, in which the individual often appears to be nothing more than a cog in a machine, 
and in which multitudes fritter away a trivial existence in a succession of new sensations and 
frivolous pleasures, men need to be saved from despair and an aimless existence by the reminder 
that they have been created for responsible selfhood as the children of God.”45 
In its process, its reports and its response to the situation with the German church the 
Conference made clear the responsibility of the larger Church to maintain freedom for its 
members and to respond to threats to Christian liberty by states, both those favoring of or 
antagonistic to Christianity. The report on “Church and State” claimed “The Church in its 
oecumenical capacity cannot remain indifferent while in various countries … the service of the 
Church is made difficult or almost impossible.” The report went further, recognizing that a threat 
to a religion was indeed a threat to all religion, renouncing all forms of persecution against both 
Christians and non-Christians.46 
This focus on freedom undergirded the dialogical social method used within the 
Conference as well, and can be seen within the concept of the middle axiom, popularized by the 
Conference. These axioms spring first from the recognition of the church’s function in the 
political sphere, with the intention of providing provisional and nonbinding guidelines for 
faithful response for a decision within a particular historical and cultural context. Ronald 
Preston, in his extended article on the concept, explained their attempt to address the tactical 
problems of moral decision making in which, on the one hand, churches “stick to basic agreed 
moral generalities or principles, which cannot be disputed because they have no specific 
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content,” and on the other hand, they offer “detailed recommendations” for issues that are “too 
involved and the details too uncertain to warrant such a prescribed conclusion.”47 Oldham 
provided its formulation.  
Such broad assertions as that Christians are bound to obey the law of love or 
strive for social justice do not go far towards helping the individual know what he 
ought to do in particular cases. On the other hand, there is no way by which he 
can be relieved of the responsibility of decisions in concrete situations. To give 
him precise instructions to be literally carried out is to rob him of his moral 
responsibility as a person. … Hence between purely general statements of the 
ethical demands of the gospel and the decisions that have to be made in concrete 
situations there is need for what may be described as middle axioms. … They are 
attempts to define the directions in which, in a particular state of society, 
Christian faith must express itself. They are not binding for all time, but are 
provisional definitions of the type of behaviour required of Christians at a given 
period in given circumstances.48 
 
  While these axioms have been interpreted as attempts to provide some universal principle 
as a middle way between the general and particular, they cannot be construed in this manner. 
They are, rather, at their core, provisional, reached through a cross-disciplinary reflection among 
theology, ethics and what one might call the practical disciplines, whether social science, 
engineering, economics, etc. They begin with a reflection on what is implicit in theology – 
agape, freedom, concern for the poor, for example, followed by an attempt to identify the 
technical and practical aspects of the problem. What facts are relevant to the situation? What are 
the likely consequences of various decision points? Preston elucidates the reality of the process. 
“If a church wishes … to develop middle axioms in any area they must get together a group of 
people from relevant disciplines and from those who have practical experiences of the issues, for 
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instance as householder, worker, or citizen at whatever level of income and power, privilege or 
lacking it, to work on the matter.”49  
 Thus the church does not simply make grand, authoritative resolutions, but must 
recognize both the freedom and expertise of the laity to respond to particular tasks in obedience 
to God while providing the theological resources so to do. In addressing the “directions of 
advance,” the Conference report stated, “ If the Church is to be a living force in the world its 
influence will be exerted through an endless multiplicity of ‘cells,’ consisting of persons who 
respond to a call to devote themselves to specific tasks in a limited environment.”50 The effort, 
while acknowledging the freedom to respond in obedience, recognizes as well the realities and 
differences of culture, history and circumstance that, without such recognition, work to limit both 
unity and freedom. 
 These themes – the reality of the church and its unifying transcendence, the roots of 
human freedom and dignity, and the concept of middle axioms, emerged in a time of crisis for 
the church and for the world. These themes offer resources for a church facing crisis today that 
can both contextualize and transcend the cultural battles with which churches are contending. In 
the face of economic globalization, the failures of nation-states, and the threat of environmental 
disaster, for example, these resources offer a method for the church and for religion to take its 
necessary place within the postmodern and pluralistic context in which we live.
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CHAPTER TWO  
TWENTIETH-CENTURY FOUNDATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In the years leading up to the Oxford Conference the concept of responsibility was 
receiving new academic attention as the West struggled to respond to the terrors of the First 
World War and the growing threats that would result in a second worldwide war. A variety of 
American, British, and European scholars, seemingly independent of each other, were wrestling 
with the concept, placing it within an ethical framework that would be further advanced by the 
Oxford Conference and the successive First Assembly of the WCC.  
These ecumenists, fearful for the future of the freedom of the individual and for the 
mediating institutions of society, including the church, would find in responsibility the root 
principle for a model of ecumenical social ethics that could defend the church, society and the 
individual from the political cancers besieging the globe. The concept of responsibility as it 
related to ethics was “in the air,” as writers on both sides of Atlantic worked to offer a relevant 
ethical framework for the time’s geopolitical framework.1 What role do virtue and principle, 
whether mundane or divine, play within ethics? How does responsibility operate in the reality of 
political life, if at all? What is the place of the self and the Other in society? What place does the 
church take in relationship to the state?  
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The demands of the times were not confined to theology and ecclesiology. The 
International Institute of Philosophy organized in 1937, the same year in which the Oxford 
Conference convened, would in its early years find it necessary to wrestle with the concept of 
responsibility, particularly with the concern of grounding philosophical interpretations on so-
called universal principles that could likewise be considered as ideological assumptions.2  
The primary actors we will examine in this chapter in this reframing of ethics in the years 
leading up to the Oxford Conference are German sociologist Max Weber; American pastor, 
theologian, and Oxford contributor Reinhold Niebuhr; theologian and Nazi-resister Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer; and Austrian philosopher Martin Buber. Their work would begin to elucidate 
themes regarding values, anthropology, sociology, politics, and subsidiarity, tilling the soil that 
would be sown further at Oxford on the eve of the World War II.  
The Development of Responsibility 
Before moving to this wartime framing of the notion of responsibility, we will briefly 
examine a broader sense of the term in the discourse of ethics. What is meant by the term 
“responsibility?” The word itself is a relative newcomer in moral discourse. Albert Jonsen points 
out that the term entered the western lexicon in the late seventeenth century and found its way 
into philosophical and political writing as a way to describe accountability and liability, and its 
scope. In the late nineteenth century, the term had established a place in philosophical discourse.3 
                                                
2 Richard McKeon, “The Development and the Significance of the Concept of Responsibility,” 
in Freedom and History and Other Essays: An Introduction to the Thought of Richard McKeon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 62. 
3 Jonsen notes that the term “responsibility” first appears in French, English and German writing 
in the mid-seventeenth century, including in the work of Blaise Pascal in 1656. Jonsen credits the 




Jonsen identifies two patterns in the development of the term in modern moral philosophy since 
its introduction. The first is that of attribution, the assigning of praise or blame. The second 
pattern is appropriation, in which a moral actor is able to take “self-possession” of obligation and 
principles.4  
As the concept developed, this pattern of accountability extended to the social and 
political, in which a community recognizes its obligation to the members that comprise it and to 
other communities that exist alongside it. In discussing this confluence of political and moral 
responsibility, Richard McKeon noted that the resulting challenge is to establish responsible 
dialogue within and between communities that advance human flourishing and secure values 
within and across cultures, a theme that would also engage the contributors at Oxford.5 
In both philosophical and common use, the theme of responsibility has found most often 
its place in a legal or juridical context, where it is used to assign obligation, accountability, 
blame and praise. Its etymology is rooted in the act of justifying or responding for oneself, or on 
behalf of another. We have obligations or duties based on our role or position. Parenthood 
involves certain responsibilities in regard to one’s children. It calls one to account. Who is 
responsible for the success of the military campaign? Who is responsible for the failure of the 
banking system? It can mean being aware of our choices, the consequences of our choices as far 
as we can know, and making prudent decisions based on our assessment. The student made a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Alexander Hamilton’s use of the term in Federalist Papers. The term was more firmly 
established in the mid-nineteenth century in the essay “The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility and 
its Connection with the Theories of Free Will and Determinism” by British philosopher F. H. 
Bradley and in French philosopher Lucien Levy-Bruhl’s L’Idée de Responsabilité. Albert R. 
Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington: Corpus Books, 1968), 3. 
4 Ibid., 70–71. 




responsible decision to spend the afternoon writing rather than spend the day binge-watching 
television. If governments do not come together to reverse the emission of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere, lower Manhattan in the not too distant future may be under water.  
The ubiquity of the term, however, has rendered it somewhat nebulous and unsystematic, 
if not neglected at times, particularly when deployed in ethical theory. Wolfang Schoberth 
suggests that the value of the term has grown to a level of self-evidence that has in effect emptied 
it of meaning both in academic discussion and in public discourse, allowing the resulting lacuna 
to be placed in service to whatever argument needs to be deployed. “Has ‘responsibility’ become 
an equivocation which allows one to stealthily go from one place to another, taking categories 
which gain their meanings from their direct interrelationship to one another and relegating them 
to anonymous, institutional structures that rob these concepts of their original meaning and yet 
allow them to retain their moral punch? Or even further: Has this inflationary use of the word in 
political and economic rhetoric led to its becoming practically worthless?”6 
In contemporary political rhetoric in the United States, for example, the term is invoked 
to insist on individual accountability over against government intervention on issues of social 
well being, leading to a political polarization regarding the role of government and the 
responsibility of the governed.7 In such a debate, the term itself has been put in service to 
partisan claims, effectively closing off its use by political opponents. For example, as one 
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Hamilton, Studies in Christian Ethics 22, no. 4 (2009): 424. 
7 Mark Brewer and Jeffrey Stonecash argue that there is “a fundamental debate occurring about 
how much we should rely on the norm of personal responsibility as an organizing principle of 
society” and if “widespread opportunity still exists, and whether it is appropriate to presume 
individuals can control their fate.” Mark D Brewer and Jeffrey M Stonecash, Polarization and 
the Politics of Personal Responsibility, Kindle (Oxford University Press, 2016), Location 170; 




examines the failure of the banking system in 2008, political rhetoric, on the one hand, lays the 
blame with borrowers who abdicated personal responsibility, taking on mortgage loans that 
could not be afforded. On the other hand, the banking system is blamed as establishing an 
exploitative system that maximized profits and shifted risks at the expense of individuals, the 
community and the nation. In such debate, the term becomes mutually exclusive; its use by one 
side or the other weaponized as affirmation of one’s own argument and the complementary 
assumption of responsibility, and negation of the competing argument and its complementary 
neglect of the value. In international politics, while the expansion of responsibility is unabated, 
the assignment and assumption of accountability is increasingly difficult among state and non-
state actors on issues of global import, such as climate change and trade.8 
German theologian Georg Picht in his elucidation of the concept of responsibility outlines 
for the term a “surplus of meaning” that extends its range beyond the merely juridical to the 
infinite. This move Picht attributes to the concept’s association with Christian eschatology, in 
which the human is subject to God’s judgment.  
It seems to me this alone explains why in German, English and French, 
responsibility moved from the law to ethics in general, a transition which is not 
found in the Latin language. Roman ethics knows nothing of the idea that the 
supreme judge can hold the individual responsible not only for his moral conduct, 
but for his very thoughts. Christian ethics, on the other hand, subordinates all 
human conduct to the maxim that “we must appear before the judgment seat of 
Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done 
in the body” (II Cor. 5:10). Only the Final Judgment could give rise to the idea 
that life as a whole must serve to prepare one for this Final Responsibility. As a 
moral concept, responsibility is therefore of Christian provenance. To put if more 
precisely: It is an eschatological idea.9 
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While an extended critique of Picht’s claim for the infinite nature of responsibility is 
beyond the purposes of this paper, his analysis helps illuminate at least three significant features 
of the view of responsibility that were foreshadowed at Oxford – the responsible possibilities and 
requirements of history, the sovereignty of God and the value of the human creature, and the turn 
to the Other as a response to the sovereign God. The formation of these themes for the concept of 
responsibility developed in the years leading up to Oxford in the context of global conflict. 
Oxford responsibility emerged within the shadow of what Conference organizers saw as a dual 
threat within that conflict – that of the rise of totalitarianism and the continued influence of the 
modern project on social and economic thinking. Oxford’s development sought to enable a 
realistic world in which religion would survive to ameliorate despotic and materialistic threats, 
and responsibility would be its organizing principle. 
Weberian Foundations 
The intellectual roots of Oxford Responsibility can be located in the work of sociologist 
Max Weber, who, in the early twentieth century, worked to elucidate a moral framework for 
politics that placed responsibility as the ethical norm. Weber’s ethics of responsibility provides a 
foundational structure for understanding the developments concerning responsibility in the 
decades leading up to the Oxford Conference. Two key themes that would be integral to 
Oxford’s work would be the place of the immanent and the divine in ethical theory, or more 
precisely, the reality of historical contingency and the authority of eschatology. The place of 
historical contingency concerned the ethical playing field upon which the responsible human 
agent operated. Weber would argue that responsible action required the accounting of 




could be received and foreseen, rather than as it could be perceived in its supposed perfection. 
Second, and in seeming contradiction to our first theme – a contradiction that we will examine –
is the use of religious reasons in the framework of ethics for provision of authoritative content 
for the concept of responsibility. I will claim here with others that Weber, while arguing for the 
elimination of the transcendent within an ethical theory of responsibility, actually leaves room 
for and requires such framework for his ethics of responsibility. A third theme, perhaps less 
pronounced, but which would find further explication in the work of the Oxford Conference, was 
that of the necessity of attending to the plurality of voices within society and culture in the work 
of responsibility. These three themes would become pillars of what we will define as Oxford 
Responsibility, which recognizes the limits of history, the ambiguities of human culture, and the 
will of God.10  
Did the organizers and contributors at Oxford draw from the work of Weber in their own 
shaping of a moral framework of responsibility? There does not seem to be explicit mention of 
the sociologist within the volumes nor in archival material, however scholars were certainly 
aware of his work. An English translation of his significant lecture on the topic – Politik als 
Beruf – was not widely available until more than a decade following the Conference, while a 
German pamphlet was first available in late 1919. Ronald Stone, in his historical work on 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich at Union Theological Seminary, points out possible 
influences. Both Niebuhr and Tillich were key contributors to the Oxford Conference. Stone 
writes, that as a pastor in Detroit in the late 1920s, Niebuhr was drawn to the work of Weber. For 
Tillich, at the University of Frankfurt, and later in his third volume of Systematic Theology, 
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  As we have said, our definition is as follows: Oxford Responsibility comprises a 
society in which its members and institutions act in accordance with human value and freedom, 
in obedience to the will of God, toward the achievement of justice within the limits, ambiguities 




published in 1963, the influence of Weber’s view of responsibility is evident in the realist 
approach to history and the Kingdom of God.11 The themes that emerge in Weber’s ethics of 
responsibility as presented in his essay are evident in and were developed further in the work of 
the Oxford Conference. 
Weber’s foundational work on responsibility progressed in the midst of World War I. 
Weber was asked by the rector of the University of Munich to deliver public lectures being 
organized by a “left-liberal” student group on the topic of vocation – geistige Arbeit als Beruf – 
translated as “intellectual or spiritual work as a calling.”12 Weber recognized in the concept of 
vocation both a sense of profession or work, as well as the theological element of a response to 
transcendent or divine instruction. He had worked out this concept in his The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism more than a decade earlier. For Weber vocation entailed an act of 
volition whereby the individual makes internal to itself that which was external. This 
understating would shape the ethical theories presented in the lectures.13  
The first lecture, “Science as a Vocation” was delivered in November 1917. The second 
lecture, “Politics as a Vocation,” which interests us here, was delivered in January 1919, 
following Germany’s surrender in World War I. As we have mentioned, the lecture, published in 
Germany the same year, was translated into English in 1946 following the end of World War II, 
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New York (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2012), 38, 296. 
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and has become foundational in the discussion of the concept of social responsibility within 
religious ethics since.14  
In their commentary on the lecture, David Owen and Tracey Strong place the text within 
the difficult context in which it was delivered. The lecture was given at a time of national 
malaise over the end of what would be World War I. German society had been divided over the 
execution of the war, with major parties to the division coalescing around positions of 
nationalism and pacifism. Further, the country was torn regarding the nation’s accountability for 
the war, with Weber decidedly defending the honor of the German fatherland. Weber was 
resistant to giving the lecture, yielding only when it appeared, that without other options in the 
heated political climate, the invitation would be extended to a critic of Germany’s sentiment and 
action at the start of the war to whom Weber was opposed and desired to discredit.15  
 Thus Weber delivered his lecture in a milieu of ambiguity and angst, where the very 
survival of the nation and humanity were being called into question. Weber’s lecture spoke into 
this contextual turmoil, providing neither certainty nor tranquillity, but an outline of the 
characteristics of the mature politician that would be required to navigate in such troubled 
waters. The organizers at Oxford would find themselves in a comparable contextual turmoil as it 
                                                
14 Writing for the Studies in Christian Ethics journal dedicated to the topic of responsibility, 
Wolfgang Schoberth claimed that Weber’s lecture “contributed like no other to this term’s 
political and ethical popularity.” Schoberth, “The Concept of Responsibility: Dilemma and 
Necessity,” 424. 
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on the role of German prime minister. Weber, The Vocation Lectures, xxxv; Wolfgang 
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were the result of his political agenda to discredit “a political rival whose goals Weber detested,” 
which included the publication of alleged evidence of Germany’s guilt for the war, the 
suppression of which aided in the myth of an innocent-and-attacked Germany. This, Schoberth 
points out, played a role in the eventual downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. 




fashioned a conception of responsibility for an engagement of political and social realities, and 
the church, a situation that was precipitated in no small part by the continuing German turmoil. 
We will say more about the particular relevance of this context below.  
Considered as the century’s introduction to the ethical framework of responsibility, 
Weber’s essay, in its final pages, contrasts an “ethics of conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) and an 
“ethics of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik), which are presented as alternatives to guide 
moral conduct. “(A)ll ethically oriented action can be guided by either of two fundamentally 
different, irredeemably incompatible maxims,” Weber claimed.16  
 Weber presents an agent operating under the ethics of conviction as interested in 
ensuring that his actions correspond with right value, principle or intention, and thus is 
accountable only so far as his actions are aligned with principle. While acknowledging the 
limitations and ambiguities of nature and humanity, the agent need not consider these limitations 
in moral action, and is relieved from responsibility for the consequences of his decisions and 
actions. It is helpful to retrieve the first English translation of Gesinnungsethik as the “ethic of 
ultimate ends,” which, while somewhat inadequate in capturing what Weber intended, does 
capture an eschatological undertone that would be critical in Oxford’s conception of 
responsibility and that would later be drawn upon by Picht in his work on the concept of 
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responsibility in 1969. This “ultimate end,” is, then, a transcendent value or principle on which 
the agent stands, and right actions must concur with this principle.  
The agent guided by an ethic of responsibility, on the other hand, holds herself 
answerable for the results of actions on nature and humanity as they can be predicted, and takes 
account of the limits and weaknesses of other actors in moral action. Unlike the actor of 
conviction, the responsible actor cannot absolve oneself with claims of good intentions in the 
face of bad consequences. He cannot claim, as might the former, that “… the responsibility must 
lie not with the agent but with the world, the stupidity of men – or the will of God who created 
them thus. With the ethics of responsibility, on the other hand, a man reckons with exactly those 
average human failings. … (H)e has absolutely no right to assume humankind’s goodness and 
perfection. He does not feel that he is in a position to shift the consequences of his actions, where 
they are foreseeable, onto others.”17 
Weber is clear in his argument that the responsible actor must consider the consequences 
of his actions as far as such consequences can be foreseen, which raises the question of the 
responsibility of diligent foresight and its limitations. To what extent can the responsible actor be 
absolved of the bad consequences that could not responsibly be foreseen, or as later writers, such 
as Hans Jonas and Wolfgang Schoberth, would address, how can responsibility be maintained as 
the borders of foresight expand?  
Setting the stage for these contrasting ethics required Weber to take seriously the realities 
of history and human life in general and the realities of political life in particular. Over against 
Machiavellian ideas of raw power for power’s sake, Weber sought to establish for the vocation 
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an appropriate moral framework that would allow the politician to act ethically within a morally 
ambiguous universe.  
The sense of ambiguity and anxiety comprising the context of Weber’s work and the 
resulting ethic was not simply the result of an acute crisis brought on by unique circumstances, 
but was a part of the nature of society itself, and the stage of politics in particular. Weber defined 
the political as that in which questions of the distribution and preservation of power are in play, 
either as a means toward certain goals, or as ends in and of themselves. While all political 
organizations – banking, labor, municipalities, private associations, and “even the political 
maneuverings of a shrewd wife seeking to influence her husband” – deploy power through 
coercive efforts, the state possesses particular authority to utilize physical violence in service to 
its goals. In what moral framework can such coercive and violent power operate? 18 
Weber acknowledges that this plays out upon an ambiguous historical playing field 
populated by human actors and institutions that are both principled and unprincipled, intelligent 
and ignorant, good and evil. On such a field interests and values must be navigated and balanced 
by political operators who combine passion for a cause, responsibility comprising a keen 
awareness of context and the ability to anticipate and account for consequences, and a sense of 
proportion that allows “realities to impinge on you while maintaining an inner calm and 
composure.”19 
Politics means a slow, powerful drilling through hard boards, with a mixture of 
passion and a sense of proportion. It is absolutely true, and our entire historical 
experience confirms it, that what is possible could never have been achieved 
unless people had tried again and again to achieve the impossible in this world. 
But the man who can do this must be a leader, and not only that, he must also be a 
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hero – in a very literal sense. And even those who are neither a leader or a hero 
must arm themselves with that staunchness of heart that refuses to be daunted by 
the collapse of all their hopes, for otherwise they will not even be capable of 
achieving what is possible today. The only man who has a “vocation” for politics 
is one who is certain that his spirit will not be broken if the world, when looked at 
from his point of view, proves too stupid or base to accept what he wishes to offer 
it, and who, when faced with all that obduracy, can still say ‘Nevertheless!’ 
despite everything.20  
 
The Oxford Conference would expand upon several fronts opened by Weber in this 
articulation of politics and history in relationship to a theory of responsibility. First is the 
requirement to address and respond to historical context as it actually exists rather than how one 
wishes it would be. To stand on conviction while refusing to see the world as it is to meet history 
as a child who insists on his own way without regard to the world around him. It is this 
immaturity and refusal to accept reality that apparently dooms the political efficacy of the ethics 
of conviction and its jettisoning of responsibility.  
In the distinctions he makes between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of 
responsibility, Weber’s refutation of the ethics of conviction makes substantial use of Christian 
sources, particularly Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, with its exemplification of the “absolute ethics 
of the Gospel” and the “unworldly imperatives” therein.21 The Christian is to do what is right 
and leave the consequences to God. Furthermore, the demands of Christianity as stated in the 
Sermon on the Mount render politics useless at best and evil at worst. On the one hand, the 
commandment to the rich man to give up all that he has must be applied without discrimination 
or distinction to everyone, resulting in a universal coercion. On the other hand the command to 
eschew violence and turn the other cheek contradicts a basic political axiom that “You shall use 
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force to resist evil, for otherwise you will be responsible for its running amok.”22 In the real 
world of politics, living by these religious demands is mere childish fantasy. The mature 
politician knows that achieving good ends may require dubious means, and possible evil side 
effects, for which the mature politician must account as far as perceivable.  
Furthermore, adherents of an ethics of conviction must as a matter of consistency 
renounce any morally questionable action, yet demonstrate their own hypocrisy as “chiliastic 
prophets,” – again Weber utilizes a religious reference – ready to use violence as the ultimate 
weapon to secure the content of their conviction. It is finally not possible to reconcile an ethics of 
conviction and an ethics of responsibility, as those who adhere to an ethics of conviction are 
“unable to tolerate the ethical irrationality of the world.”23  
Weber calls Christians to task for this inability, suggesting that they have forgotten their 
own foundations. Weber points to the early Christian tradition in which followers of Christ were 
aware and took account of a world governed by demons. The varied histories of world religions, 
including Christianity, view the world as comprising “unmerited suffering, unpunished injustice, 
and incorrigible stupidity” that point to mundane principles of “compensation and retribution … 
that we can interpret metaphysically or that are destined always to elude our attempts at 
interpretation. This problem, the experience of the irrationality of the universe, has always been 
the driving force of the entire history of religion.” The passion of religion within an ethics of 
conviction fails to honor its own tradition’s understanding of the world, failing to face the reality 
that politics, with its tools of power and violence, has made a necessary deal with the devil. “It 
follows that as far a person’s actions are concerned, it is not true that nothing but good comes 
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from good and nothing but evil from evil, but rather quite frequently the opposite is the case. 
Anyone who does not realize this is in face a mere child in political matters.”24 
Second, Weber acknowledges a cycle of politics that does not view history through an 
enlightenment lens of historical progression, but allows consequences that either advance or 
thwart political purpose. We will see that this finally requires a teleological viewpoint, but what 
is also required is a prudential way forward. This prudent action is never complete. Instead it 
demands a diligence, resilience and humility across a repeating cycle of hope, obduracy, and 
possibility in one’s own context and across generations. This is a theme to which Oxford would 
return.  
Following this extensive effort to position an ethics of responsibility and dismiss the folly 
of an ethics of conviction, Weber pivots to present the paradox that provides the moral 
framework for this repeating cycle. The two ethics are not as incompatible as one has been led to 
believe, but are, in fact, mutually dependent for authentic responsibility. Weber had 
foreshadowed the same at his very introduction of the terms. “This does not mean that an ethics 
of conviction is identical with irresponsibility or an ethics of responsibility with a lack of 
conviction.”25  
After building his case for the division between the two ethics, Weber makes this 
surprising move to diminish the division, using religious tradition as an example of how 
conviction and responsibility can and must coexist. Assumedly drawing upon Martin Luther’s 
well-known words at the Diet of Worms, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” Weber posits Luther 
as the example of not simply the prudent politician, but, more generally, the mature human 
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being, able to hold to both conviction and responsibility. Here then the impermeable wall of 
distinction between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility withers in the body of 
the prudent actor. Contrasting such an agent with “windbags … drunk on romantic sensations” 
who fail to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions and place blame at the door 
of a “stupid and nasty” world, Weber finds wonder in the “mature human being”  
… who feels the responsibility he bears for the consequences of his own actions 
with his entire soul and who acts in harmony with an ethics of responsibility [and] 
reaches the point where he says, “Here I stand, I can do no other.” That is 
authentically human and cannot fail to move us. For this is a situation that may 
befall any of us at some point, if we are not inwardly dead. In this sense an ethics 
of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but are 
mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they constitute the 
authentic human being who is capable of having a “vocation for politics.”26 
 
Here Weber allows that conviction, ultimate ends, intention, and consequences are 
integral to the ethics of responsibility, and utilizes an iconic religious event to illustrate the point. 
Earlier in the essay Weber had posited the Christian as the foil, who must abandon conviction in 
the face of reality, turning to other traditions and doctrines to redeem the abdication, whether it 
be a move to Millennialism or an appeal to original sin. With his pivot to the place of values as 
integral for the mature responsible human, Weber has opened the possibility of deploying 
explicitly religious values as the content of conviction, a theme that would take prominence in 
the Oxford’s conception of responsibility. 
After positing a seemingly unbridgeable gap between an ethics of conviction and an 
ethics of responsibility, Weber’s move to navigate the “abyss,” as he calls it, has raised questions 
for later interpreters. Weber has been criticized on the place of values in his thinking, and the 
evaluation of the provenance of the guiding norms allowable in responsible political calculation. 
                                                




D. Etienne de Villiers contends that Weber’s formal understanding of ethics “allows any cultural 
conviction, even if it is of an extreme nationalist or racist nature, to be elevated by the individual 
to an ultimate and thus ethical value.”27 At the same time, de Villiers sees frameworks in 
Weber’s ethics of responsibility that allow for the place of thick Christian moral values within a 
theory of responsibility that may accommodate and engage a plurality of moral and cultural 
value systems. The Oxford Conference in its wrestling with responsibility, we will see, worked 
to place explicitly Christian moral values at the center of its theory of responsibility, yet would 
be cognizant of how a responsible engagement with a plurality of moral and cultural values 
would be required, especially with a view to historical contingency, as well as to subsidiarity and 
the church’s social function in relation to various social spheres, such as the community, the 
state, economics, education, and international relations.  
Stepping back from this discussion on what values might be allowed entrance into 
Weber’s ethics of responsibility, one might ask how the irredeemable divide between conviction 
and responsibility is traversed in the first place. This bridging in which moral values take root in 
responsibility would be central in Oxford Responsibility thought.  
Bradley Starr argues for a way forward, writing that the distinctions made between the 
ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility have often been interpreted using Weber’s 
conception of rational social action comprising value-rational and instrumental-rational social 
action, thus making Weber’s argument internally flawed. Starr contends that the distinction 
instead lies in viewing the ethical frameworks as Weber presents them initially as comprehensive 
worldviews (Weltanschauungen). The worldview of the adherent of an ethics of conviction 
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comprises a proper cosmic order of values to which human behavior can cohere. The ethic of 
responsibility, as presented above, corresponds to a universe marked by unavoidable and 
intractable conflicts of values that continue to be navigated. This distinction, Starr argues, 
provides space for the apparent opposition between Weber’s ethics of conviction and ethics of 
responsibility, allowing for an ethics of responsibility to emerge as a coherent moral framework 
as Weber shifts the meaning of his terms from oppositional “ultimate Weltanschauungen,” to 
rational social action. Weber writes in Economy and Society, 
Value-rational action may thus have various different relations to the 
instrumentally rational action. From the latter point of view, however, value-
rationality is always irrational. Indeed the more the value to which action is 
oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more “irrational” in this 
sense the corresponding action is. For the more unconditionally the actor devoted 
himself to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute 
goodness or devotion to duty, the less is he influenced by considerations of the 
consequences of his actions. The orientation of action wholly to the rational 
achievement of ends without relations to fundamental values is, to be sure, 
essentially only a limiting case.28 
 
Starr contends that for Weber, the relation between these types of rational social action, 
rather than existing in complete opposition, is better conceived as a “supplemental relation of 
opposites” in which the relationship between value and instrumentality must be “brokered again 
and again without guidance from an overarching order of values.”29 This does not remove the 
notion of moral obligation nor conscience, but introduces a concept of responsible humility in 
regard to action within the finite limitations of human knowledge and deliberation and the 
context of historical contingency. Instrumental rationality and value rationality then must 
                                                
28 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978), 26; Cited in Starr, “The Structure of Max Weber’s Ethic of 
Responsibility,” 428. 




continually be brought into a deliberative process in which each is tempered by the other. This is 
not the case for politics alone, argues Starr. Rather, the complementarity of the ethics of 
conviction and the ethic of responsibility positions the latter as “more than just a political ethic,” 
but as a moral framework “relevant wherever values and strategies are brought together, and 
hence, in all areas of life,” including religion.30 Weber had explicitly named such 
complementarity as a necessity for the authentic political actor, when drawing upon the example 
of Martin Luther, cited above.  
Realism and Responsibility 
The theological and political challenge of the supplemental nature of the ethics of 
conviction and the ethics of responsibility would find itself played out in the years prior to the 
Oxford Conference by brothers H. Richard Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr, both of whom would 
shape the theological conversation around responsibility, and the latter whom would deeply 
influence the work of the Oxford Conference in his continuing development of Christian realism 
and his direct contributions to and participation in the assembly.31 HRN would continue to 
address the topic of responsibility in his work, most significantly in his posthumous text The 
Responsible Self, based on his Robertson Lectures at the University of Glasgow in 1960, and his 
eponymous essay written in 1946 prior to the formation of the WCC published in the collection 
“The Responsibility of the Church for Society” and Other Essays by H. Richard Niebuhr.32  
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In the well-known trio of articles in The Christian Century on March 23 and 30, and 
April 6, 1932, the Niebuhr brothers played out their disagreement over the operation of 
responsibility in regard to American foreign policy pertaining to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria 
the year before, which at the time outraged many throughout the globe as a case of imperial 
aggression. The first article was HRN’s “The Grace of Doing Nothing.” His brother responded 
with his article, titled “Must We Do Nothing?” This was followed by a reply, “The Only Way 
into the Kingdom of God.”33 In a broad sense, the articles addressed whether the United States 
should enter the conflict, yet for our purposes the arguments illuminate the Niebuhrs’ thoughts 
grounding a theory of responsibility. 
In his account, HRN set up the paradox between the sovereign activity of God in the 
midst of history, – reminding us that our actions as individuals and as nations fall under the 
judgment of God – and this over against the reality of uneasy, selfish and ineffective human 
choices we make in our actions. Americans, he said, and particularly the American government, 
were “chafing at the bit,” to do something to answer what was perceived as a great injustice 
within the fighting in northeast Asia.34 But given a lack of constructive options, as well as what 
he saw as questionable and self-interested American motives, there was little that America could 
rightly do, without consequences that could be worse than the situation itself. In such a dilemma, 
the responsible thing to do was what one might call an active inaction, or an active waiting for 
God and for God’s new possibilities for right action to emerge. For HRN, any action in the face 
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of such a crisis must always be secondary to the action of God in history. We don’t act without 
recognizing our place before God. This calls for, first, our repentance, in which we acknowledge 
our own falleness, limits, and our selfishness. And then we work to recognize our own 
complicity, our own faults, our own sin, which contributed to the crisis, and only then do we 
enter a period of discernment and awareness of what new, faithful possibilities might emerge for 
activity in the face of the crisis. The responsible Christian action is to repent and listen for God’s 
will. 
In his response, RN provided a theme that would find itself operative within the context 
of the Oxford Conference and would mimic the working of Weber’s mature and authentic 
political actor within an ethic of responsibility.  
My brother draws the conclusion from this logic that it is better not to act at all 
than to act from motives which are less than pure, and with the use of methods 
which are less than critical. He believes in taking literally the words of Jesus, ‘Let 
him who is without sin cast the first stone.’ … This is an important emphasis 
particularly for modern Christianity with its lack of appreciation of the tragic 
character of life. … A truly religious man ought to distinguish himself from the 
moral man by recognizing the fact that he is not moral, that he remains a sinner to 
the end. … All this does not prove, however, that we ought to apply the words of 
Jesus, "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone," literally. If we do we will 
never be able to act.35 
 
The brothers generally agreed about the place of God in the world and the reality of 
humanity’s falleness in relation to our attempts to do God’s will. But while HRN suggested that 
the answer was to wait, his brother’s answer was that responsible Christians must act in the midst 
of the ambiguity with the best knowledge that they have. 
An infinite God, RN believed, presents the ideal of agape, of uncorrupted, unconditional 
love, exemplified through the concept of the Kingdom of God. Over against this promise, the 
                                                




human can only respond in history within the creaturely context of the finite and corruptible. In 
this contrasted reality, the moral actor must make choices not only in full awareness of God’s 
pure love, but in recognition that the human and human community by nature fall short of this 
ideal in the context of human history, but still must choose and act.  
The reality of the world is that we do not simply make perfect choices between good and 
evil, but, as Reinhold Niebuhr scholar Robin Lovin puts it, we must make choices between 
“greater or lesser evils, a little more or a little less justice, a little more or a little less freedom.”36  
Eschatology and Responsibility 
While Weber’s ethic of responsibility clearly marked the space for a moral framework 
within the ambiguity and contingency of history, another of its main contributions that the 
organizers of the Oxford Conference reflected was the space Weber provided for particular 
religious values as a type of value-rational social action in conversation with instrumental-
rational social action. For Oxford, this space would be utilized to call the church to assume a 
mantle of responsibility not only to itself but its place in calling the world to a responsibility as 
would be sought at the inauguration of the WCC and its call for the Responsible Society. The 
place of religious, or what we might call transcendent, values became for Oxford a central piece 
of its theory of responsibility, allowing moral deliberation and action within the limits of human 
finitude and historical contingency while subjecting those decisions to the will and judgment of 
God without loss of moral authority nor requiring abdication of responsibility for consequences.  
In Politics as a Vocation, while Weber draws on the value rational social action or ethics 
of conviction as an element of his ethics of responsibility, he provides minimal guidance about 
                                                




where such values are promulgated. However, the allusions he uses are largely drawn from the 
world of religion in general and Christian tradition in particular. We have already mentioned his 
example of Martin Luther standing on conviction in the face of consequences at the Diet of 
Worms. Weber writes that what is operative and effective in politics is the “trained ability to 
scrutinize the realities of life ruthlessly, to withstand them and to measure up to them inwardly. 
“In truth, politics is an activity of the head but by no means only of the head. In this respect the 
adherents of an ethics of conviction are in the right.”37 The operation of responsibility then is 
attentive not only to self-interested consequences of political power players and to the historical 
context in which one operates but also to the conscience, the inner conviction, to matters of the 
heart. Weber is quick to warn that in even supposed matters of the heart, the risks are many. 
Convictions can be misguided, pedestrian, and fatuous on the one hand. On the other hand, they 
could be an insincere tool for self-interested power brokers. Furthermore, matters of principle 
and factors of responsibility are not universalizable, but subject to context, deliberation and the 
exigencies and capriciousness of human nature. Weber remains concerned about the maturity 
and authenticity of the responsible moral agent. 
But whether we should act in accordance with an ethics of conviction or an ethics 
of responsibility, and when we should choose one rather than the other, is not a 
matter on which we can lay down the law to anyone else. We can only say one 
thing. We live in an age of excitement, which you may think is not of a ‘sterile’ 
kind, though excitement is one thing, and it is not by any means always the same 
as authentic passion. Now in such an age, conviction politicians may well spring 
up in large numbers all of a sudden and run riot, declaring, ‘The world is stupid 
and nasty, not I. The responsibility for the consequences cannot be laid at my door 
but must rest with those who employ me and whose stupidity or nastiness I shall 
do away with.’ And if this happens, I shall say openly that I would begin by 
asking how much inner gravity lies behind this ethics of conviction, and I suspect 
I should come to the conclusion that in nine cases out of ten I was dealing with 
                                                




windbags who do not genuinely feel what they are taking on themselves but who 
are making themselves drunk on romantic sensations.38 
 
Weber draws upon the theological metaphor of making a deal with the devil as the 
necessity of responsible politics in which conviction and consequence are operative. Those who 
engage in politics, both in the necessity of daily life and as a profession, confront ethical 
paradoxes for which they must take account, entering into “relations with the satanic powers that 
lurk in every act of violence,” with violence understood as the coercive nature of political 
maneuvering, which we have described. Weber goes on to recognize the nature of the 
transcendent in responsible living. “The genius, or the demon, of politics lives in an inner tension 
with the God of love as well as with the Christian God as institutionalized in the Christian 
churches, and it is a tension that can erupt at any time into insoluble conflict.” In his contrast 
with the “God of love” and the institutionalized “Christian God,” Weber points to a transcendent 
source for the content of conviction. This moral actor must take account of this content as a 
guide to moral action, as a quota over against responsible compromise with coercion, and as the 
judge to which the actor remains responsible given the consequences of her action. For the 
institutionalized church that seeks to be anything other than completely otherworldly, Weber’s 
ethics of responsibility is an implication to make operative the transcendent values of the 
Christian God within an immanent political and historical landscape. The church, if it is to be the 
church in the world, with an interest in the matters of history, thus must take responsibility for its 
values and the consequences of implementing those values within the paradoxical tensions of 
actual reality. 
                                                




Weber’s ethic of responsibility made accommodation for a breadth of moral reasoning, 
and for the general and particular circumstances in which the responsible actor found herself. 
Within this realistic outlook, the diversity and particularity of cultures were to be considered. 
Again, Weber turns to religious example to make the contrast between the ethics of conviction 
and the ethics of responsibility, and the responsible place of “legitimate” violence within the 
purview of the state. “Religious ethics has made various accommodations with the fact that we 
find ourselves in different cultures [Lebensordnumgen], each of which is subject to different 
laws.” Here Weber contrasts Hellenistic polytheism, Hinduism, and various branches of 
Christianity – Catholic, pacifist and “Normal Protestantism,” the latter which Weber sees as 
particularly adept at making space for politics, absolving citizens for involvement in violence 
when acting on behalf of a “legitimate authoritarian state.”39 The burden of consequences is 
shifted to the politician, and, one can argue, to the church. “Whoever makes a pact with the use 
of force, for whatever ends (and every politician does so), is at the mercy of its particular 
consequences. The man who fights for his faith, whether religious or revolutionary, is 
particularly exposed to this risk.”40 
Bonhoeffer and Responsibility  
While Weber deployed religion as the compromiser of conviction, an exception that 
proved the rule of responsibility, the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer would solidify the notion of 
the religious centrality within the ethic of responsibility in the posthumously published Ethics. 
Bonhoeffer’s ethic posited religion – the Christ event in particular – at the responsible center, 
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displacing the focus on the “isolated individual” and placing responsibility ethics within the 
reality of history and human relationship. Bonhoeffer worked out his thought on the place of 
responsibility in ethics during his active resistance to Hitler and his imprisonment at the hands of 
the Nazi Party in Germany. Bonhoeffer exemplifies Weber’s mature and responsible human 
being who faces the ruthless facts of reality and is guided in his actions by conviction and 
submits his actions and the consequences of his actions to judgment, claiming, like Luther, “Here 
I stand, I can do no other.” This invites speculation regarding possible influence of Weber’s 
writing, although assigning such credit for the character of Bonhoeffer would be frivolous. That 
said, Bonhoeffer, as he worked out his conception of responsibility in the second version of 
“History and Good” did reference the work of Weber as an example of a robust explication of an 
ethic of responsibility.41 Yet Bonhoeffer sought to provide a “fuller meaning” to the concept, 
seeing in it the ground of a Christian ethic that could respond to the threats facing western 
civilization. 
Bonhoeffer’s unfinished Ethics was written in the years following Oxford, and the 
writings were not published until 1949, appearing in English in 1955.42 The work provides 
another example of the philosophical and theological wrestling with the concept of 
responsibility, as scholars, pastors and ecumenical leaders sought to respond to the evils of the 
time. One cannot claim definitively that Bonhoeffer influenced the Oxford organizers or how 
Oxford’s work influenced Bonhoeffer. However contact between the German theologian and the 
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Conference organizers was broad, deep and frequent in the years leading up to the Oxford 
Conference. As early as 1932 Oldham was reading, in German, Bonhoeffer’s relatively unknown 
text, Act and Being.43 It was likely George Bell, Bishop of Chichester and chairperson of Life 
and Work from 1932 to 1934, who personally introduced Bonhoeffer to Oldham in London, 
where they continued to meet. At the Universal Christian Council at Fanø, Denmark, in 1934, 
Bonhoeffer represented the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the 
Church as youth secretary, and it was there at Fanø that the Council acted to support the 
representation of the Confessing Church over that of the Reich Church, which would have 
implications for German participation at Oxford three years later. It was also at the meeting that 
the proposal to focus on the topic of Church, Community, and State at the second World Life and 
Work Conference at Oxford was proposed and approved, driven in no small part by the German 
situation.  
In the weeks before his return to Germany in April 1935, Bonhoeffer wrote Oldham a 
letter expressing optimism for the preparatory work for the Oxford Conference and offers thanks 
that his cousin, economist Charlotte Leubuscher, had been appointed to one of the Conference 
committees. He also expressed appreciation for Oldham’s work on behalf of the Confessing 
Church delegation and “for all you have done for me.”44 Bonhoeffer remained in regular contact 
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with ecumenical leaders involved in the Life and Work movement and was particularly close 
with Bell, who took deep and active interest in the work and situation of the German Confessing 
Church. It was finally Bell who orchestrated the Message to the German Church that was 
adopted by the Oxford Conference expressing support and solidarity with the Confessing 
Church.45 
That Bonhoeffer’s work and ministry shaped the work of the Oxford contributors in the 
years leading up to the Conference and beyond is beyond question. Keith Clements points out 
that efforts such as the work of the Oxford Conference paved the way for reception of 
Bonhoeffer’s work in the years following World War II. Reinhold Niebuhr published the first 
posthumous tribute to Bonhoeffer in Joseph Oldham’s Christian News-Letter in November 1945 
and Oldham had read the prison writings prior to their English translation, including reference to 
them in his 1953 text Life Is Commitment. George Bell delivered the sermon at a memorial 
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service for Dietrich and Klaus Bonhoeffer in London in July 1945 and wrote the forward to the 
first English edition of Bonhoeffer’s The Cost of Discipleship.46 
There appears to be no direct documentary evidence of the influence Bonhoeffer may 
have had around the issues that emerge as a theory of responsibility from Oxford, nor how the 
Oxford contributions may have influenced Bonhoeffer’s work with the concept. It is clear, 
however, that the scholarship and application of ethics in the period was focused on 
understanding the place of the concept of responsibility. Two significant themes emerge in 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics that would be central to the understanding of Oxford Responsibility. These 
themes, for which Weber laid the foundation, were the place of historical contingency and the 
centrality of transcendent values.  
Weber, after delineating between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility, 
had provided space for the complementarity of principle and instrumentality within a moral 
framework. Weber had also implicitly allowed for the possibility that the content of principle be 
provided from religious convictions. Bonhoeffer would share Weber’s rejection of an ethics of 
conviction as ineffective and dangerous, but would not equivocate regarding the centrality of 
religious understanding, and in particular Christian understanding, for the content of an ethics of 
responsibility. Bonhoeffer would also ground responsibility within the ambiguity and 
contingency of historical reality. Of his definition of the term “responsibility,” Bonhoeffer 
claimed for it “a fuller meaning than is the case in everyday usage and even in cases where it has 
become a highly defined ethical concept, as with Bismark and Max Weber.”47 
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As compared to Weber this fuller meaning emerged from Bonhoeffer’s positing 
responsibility as a religious response at the core of Christian discipleship. 
We live by responding to the word of God addresses to us in Jesus Christ. … This 
life, lived in answer to the life of Jesus Christ (as the Yes and No to our life), we 
call “responsibility” (“Verantwortung”). This concept of responsibility denotes 
the complete wholeness and unity of the answer to the reality that is given to us in 
Jesus Christ, as opposed to the partial answers that we might be able to give, for 
example, from considerations of usefulness, or with reference to certain 
principles. In light of the life that encounters us in Jesus Christ, such partial 
answers will not suffice, but only the complete and single answer of our life. 
Responsibility thus means to risk one’s life in its wholeness, aware that one’s 
activity is a matter of life and death.48 
 
Within Bonhoeffer’s responsibility ethics, Christ is the responsible man who through 
God’s “vicarious representative action” (Stellvertretung) empowers the human to assume the 
responsibility to answer to the will of God in heaven and to creatures and creation in history.  
As with Weber, Bonhoeffer outlined what he saw as the dangers and limitations of an 
absolute “adherence to principles” on the part of the immature moral agent. Applying principles 
without consideration of others -–what Weber referred to as consequences – leads to a 
privatization of life, ranging from a “retreat into the private sphere of bourgeois existence to 
withdrawing to a monastery.” Alternatively, such slavish obedience can lead to religious and 
political enthusiasm, represented at its worst “the crazy, pushy life reformers of every possible 
shade.”49 The responsible life, then, is the life that acts for relationship with other agents in the 
actual context of history in all its ambiguity. The good is not merely a principle to which one is 
obligated, but is a continually discovered through active historical engagement with life in its 
reality. 
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This engagement in the reality of history is by definition ambiguous. Responsibility 
thrusts the human into decision making that cannot coalesce with principle as the guarantor of 
the good, but engagement in which one must discern and act in response to the context in which 
one operates, and in relationship with the other. There is no guarantee of the rightness of one’s 
action and it must be submitted to the judgment of God. The same thinking emerged as a key 
theme within the Oxford Conference and its dialogical method. Bonhoeffer writes, 
Responsible action takes place in the sphere of relativity, completely shrouded in 
the twilight that the historical situation casts upon good and evil. It takes place in 
the midst of the countless perspectives from which every phenomenon is seen. 
Responsible action must decide not simply between right and wrong, good and 
evil, but between right and right, wrong and wrong. …This very fact defines 
responsible action as a free venture, not justified by any law; rather, those who act 
responsibly relinquish any effectual self-justification; indeed, in so doing they 
relinquish an ultimately dependable knowledge of good and evil. As responsible 
action, the good takes place without knowing, by surrendering to God the deed 
that has become necessary and is nevertheless (or because of it!) free, 
surrendering it to God, who looks upon the heart, weighs the deeds, and guides 
history.50 
 
Realizing that such a view of reality can lead to a relativity, Bonhoeffer warns that 
responsible action does not live at the extremes of neither conservative protection of the status 
quo, nor a revolutionary principle to disrupt the status quo, but connects the two. Ethics, for 
Bonhoeffer, are not grounded in principle, but in historicity, in all its contingency, in which the 
moral agent takes into account the circumstances and context in which she operates, considering 
the consequences of various actions, and the relationship with other actors in order to make and 
carry out a decision. Given the limitations of history and human finitude, the actor cannot know 
all the circumstances, nor consequences, nor can know if the action itself is justified, yet the 
action is empowered by the work done in Jesus Christ, and is submitted to God for judgment.  
                                                




Responsible action renounces any knowledge about its ultimate justification. The 
deed that is done after responsibly weighing all personal and factual 
circumstances, in light of God becoming human and God becoming human, is 
completely surrendered to God the moment it is carried out. Ultimate ignorance of 
one’s own goodness or evil, together with dependence upon grace, is an essential 
characteristic of responsible historical action. Those who act on the basis of 
ideology consider themselves justified by their idea. Those who act responsibly 
place their action into the hands of God and live by God’s grace and judgment.51  
 
We will see that Oxford plumbed this ground in its work prior to the war.  
Martin Buber and Responsibility 
Another prominent voice in the shaping of the concept of responsibility within moral 
theology in the years between the first World War and the Oxford Conference was Martin Buber, 
who contributed to a widening discussion regarding responsibility and ethics in his Ich und Du in 
1922. The text was, in the years just prior to the Oxford Conference, not widely known outside 
of Germany. Its English translation, I and Thou, was first published the same year of the 
Conference in 1937. The text, however, directly influenced the direction of the Conference, 
appearing in the work of key contributor Emil Brunner, and drawing the passionate interest of 
Conference organizer Joseph Oldham as well. Both before and after the time of the Oxford 
Conference, Brunner and Buber were mutual admirers of each other’s work, maintaining 
frequent contact through correspondence and visits.52 In his Divine Imperative, published in 
English in 1947, Brunner drew upon Buber’s concept of Thou. “It is the very essence of faith in 
the Word of God that man always understand himself as existing in responsibility and 
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indissoluble relation to a “Thou.” Man never learns what a “Thou” really means save when he 
understands what responsibility means and this means nowhere save in the word of God.”53 
Oldham had been introduced to the work of Buber through his colleague Karl Heim, a professor 
of theology and missiology at Tübingen University, with whom Oldham had worked as secretary 
of the International Missionary Council. At the Council’s world conference in Jerusalem in 1928, 
Heim had served as a German delegate and speaker. 
 Buber’s thought on responsibility and dialogue in the text sparked a radical change in 
Oldham’s thinking in how the Christian position might be restated in what Oldham saw as a 
civilization dominated by science and technology. Speaking at Oldham’s funeral in 1969, Visser 
’t Hooft commented that Buber’s work convinced Oldham that “It could be shown that the 
reality which the scientists described and the technocrats mastered was not the only, not even the 
most important, reality.”54 Writing in 1941 in his The Christian News-Letter, Oldham said of 
Buber’s I and Thou that it had “attracted far less attention than its importance deserves. I 
question whether any book has been published in the present century, the message of which, if it 
were understood and heeded, would have such far reaching consequences for the life of our 
time.”55 Oldham would later publish this and other essays in a text titled Real Life Is Meeting, 
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drawing from R. Gregor Smith’s English translation of Buber’s phrase, “All real living is 
meeting” (“Alles wirkliches Leben ist Begegnung”).56 
Buber’s admirers have described him as a scholar who embodied his philosophy. The 
influence of his work and its promotion of responsibility and dialogue in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, as the world was rocked by the first World War, the challenges of modernity, 
and the rise of totalitarianism, would shape the contributions and process of the Oxford 
Conference. In the years prior to his writing of I and Thou Buber developed and espoused an 
alternative to the Jewish nationalism that had been grounded in the establishment of Zionist 
political security. Instead, Buber began to call for a renaissance of spirituality that could form a 
community defined by mutuality and responsibility, themes that would be further developed in 
his seminal text. Such commitment extended to his advocacy in 1921 for a détente with Arab 
Palestinians, warning that an exclusive Zionist nationalism would force the development of an 
opposing Arab nationalism. This concrete embodiment of his philosophy opened Buber to 
increasing dismissal by the Zionist congress, leading to his own abandonment of the project with 
the organization in 1929. As Hitler rose to power in the years following, Buber lamented the 
ambivalence of the Jewish response. Buber responded to this dilemma by opening a network of 
adult education centers whose mission was to promote Jewish heritage and solidarity, before 
leaving Germany altogether in 1938 to teach sociology at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.57  
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 The foundation of Buber’s text is its description of the human attitude to the world. In 
the context of his writing I and Thou, Buber posited in modern humanity an ontological crisis 
between individuality and community in which the human was distanced both from itself and 
from the Other, whether it be another human, or with other creatures or creation itself. Buber 
defined two primary relationships that describe the nature of existence, the now well-known 
attitudes of I-It and I-Thou, understood as the relationship between persons and things, or 
subjects and objects.58 Simply put, I within these attitudes find its existence as subject through its 
relation to the Other, taken as subject or object, or, to be truer to Buber’s subtlety, taken as 
“relationship” or object. I can relate to an “Other” rendering it as an objectified It, in which the It 
is instrumental to I. Such a relationship is devoid of mutuality or responsibility and instead sees 
the Other as something to be experienced and used. The second attitude of I-Thou moves beyond 
the categories of subject and object into, in the words of renown Buber scholar Martin Friedman, 
the embrace of a relationship “characterized by mutuality, directness, presentness, intensity and 
ineffability.” While the human in relation to an object is not required to “go out of himself” to 
use and experience the object as It, I enters into relationship with Thou with one’s entire being 
and in so doing moves into being itself. “This relation means suffering and action in one, 
suffering because one must be chosen as well as choose and because in order to act with the 
whole being one must suspend all partial actions.”59 From this comes Buber’s iconic and 
frequent phrase “all real living is meeting,” as translated by Smith, or as “all actual life is 
                                                
58 Within this text I will follow the pattern of Ronald Gregor Smith in his first translation of 
Buber’s work, in which the eponymous “I” and “Thou” are italicized when referring to Buber’s 
conception of these realities. I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1937). 





encounter” as later translated by Walter Kaufmann.60 Buber writes, “The primary word I-Thou 
can be spoken only with the whole being. Concentration and fusion into the whole being can 
never take place through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become through my 
relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living is meeting.”61 
Responsive Existence 
Within Buber’s dense and poetic treatise, the ground of responsibility rests in the nature 
of the human as one who responds to the Other, or more specifically I that enters into the 
responsive relationship with Thou who addresses I. It is in this address from and response toward 
Thou that the I receives its own existence. The core of human existence is the responsive 
relationship to the Other who makes a demand, or a call, on I. Buber would expand on this 
anthropological/ontological theme in his Between Man and Man. There he outlines what 
Friedman calls a “two-fold principle of human life,” comprising “the primal setting at a 
distance,” the recognition of the reality of the Other, and the subsequent “entering into relation,” 
the embrace of the I and Thou.62  
Both this distance and relation is an embodiment of the nonreducible dignity of the 
human, an image of the eternal Thou, who is God, of which we will say more below. The 
subjective self-encountering of the Other as a self separate from oneself reveals in the Other 
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what Jeffrey Nealon calls “the other’s uniqueness and singularity.”63 The Other cannot be 
confined to a self-imaging I, but possesses its own dignity separate from the I which at the same 
time calls for a relational response. In this recognition and response, the human self, unique 
among creation, is realized. Comments Friedman, “An animal does not need confirmation 
because he is what he is unquestionably. Man, in contrast, needs to have a presence in the being 
of the other.”64 Oldham would acknowledge this in his post-war essay. “It is through our 
responses to other persons that we become persons. It is others who challenge, enlighten and 
enrich us. There is no such thing as the isolated individual. We are persons only in our relation 
with other persons.” 65 
This human dignity comprises a freedom that is unique to the human, and allows the 
human to respond to the Thou. Buber writes of the I as an unbounded subject over against the 
objectifying boundedness that defines It. “The human being is not He or She, bounded from 
every other He and She, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a 
nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. But with no 
neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that 
nothing exists except himself. But all else lives in his light.”66 
Key in the freedom of the I is the freedom for responsive decision when addressed by 
Thou. Within the relationship of I-Thou, in which the person becomes person, Buber saw the 
concept of address and response. The human, while remaining in a world of objects in which one 
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must use and experience, finds her humanity in responding to the address of the Other. “And in 
all seriousness of truth hear this: without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not 
a man.”67 Response, and thus, responsibility, rather than experience, is at the core of what it 
means to be human. The address and call of the Other is answered by what Oldham would later 
call the “responsible decision,” which moves the I from the objectified and bounded domain of It 
into the life-affirming and unbounded community that ultimately connects with the intention of 
God, the eternal Thou.  
The word “It” is a word of separation. The thing stands over against you in its 
separateness; you may take it, and use it, but it does not give itself to you. The 
word “Thou” is a word of union. When you utter it – when you are addressed and 
you respond – you are re-united with the pulsating life of the universe. For in 
every “Thou” that addresses us and calls us to a responsible decision, there speaks 
the voice of the eternal “Thou”, the source of all life, the creative, living spirit of 
God,” by which one is “re-united with the pulsating life of the universe.68 
 
Buber saw in this responsiveness the cradle of responsibility. In Between Man & Man, 
published in 1947, Buber described further the concept of responsibility, which he called to be 
“brought back from the province of specialized ethics, of an ‘ought’ that swings free in the air, 
into that of lived life. Genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding.”69 Buber 
was concerned to place responsibility as the free response to the real presence and address of the 
Other, over against, for example, the binding of religious dogma or the justification of an ethical 
precept divorced from lived reality, as demanded in Weber’s ethics of conviction. A person is 
not an It, a thing, simply to be used or experienced, but is to be one with whom one enters 
relationship in a free and alterable space. This Thou, this Other, to whom one finds oneself in 
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relationship, is the Thou to whom I responds. The I, in facing the address of the Other, moves 
from the subject-object association of the I-It to enter into the responsive, and thus responsible, 
relationship of I-Thou in which I in her freedom becomes responsible for the Other. 70 
Albert Jonsen in his study on the place of responsibility in religious ethics, would refer to 
the significance of Buber’s move of responsibility from a specialized ethical niche to that of life 
lived in reality, positing the concept within an ethical structure around human freedom, decision 
and action.  
When the responsible man is praised, when responsible decision is encouraged, 
when responsibility is proposed as a major ethical criterion, authors are not 
merely describing the necessary and sufficient conditions for ascribing praise and 
blame. They are exhorting men to live in a certain manner, to adopt a certain 
stance toward life and their role in it. They are shaping, with the help of this word, 
a new ideal of moral behavior. The responsible man is not merely one who is able 
to perform good actions; he is, in fact, the good man. His goodness consists 
precisely in his responsibility. This is responsibility in ‘lived life.’71 
 
The Context of Responsibility 
For Buber responsibility comprising the relationship of I-Thou did not exist as an 
abstraction nor operate as an obligation, but existed in and shaped reality. The address of the 
Thou brings with it a concrete present, a situation in which the I must come to responsible 
decision in relationship to Thou, through which reality, over against mere time, comes into 
existence. “The present, and by that is meant not the point which indicates from time to time in 
our thought merely the conclusion of ‘finished’ time, the mere appearance of a termination 
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which is fixed and held, but the real, filled present, exists only in so far as actual presentness, 
meeting, and relation exist. The present arises only in virtue of the fact that the Thou becomes 
present.”72  
The reality brought into existence by the responsible relationship of I-Thou presupposes 
both an integral freedom of responsible decision, as well as an equally responsive context in 
which decisions are made and deployed. Buber’s responsible relationship does not operate within 
a reality shaped by destiny or obligation, but allows for consequences, as with Weber’s ethics of 
responsibility, that continue to shape the situation in which relationships continue, addresses are 
made, responses are given, and further actions are undertaken. The call and response are made 
not in a static and immutable world set on an invariable course, but in a dynamic present that 
continues to be defined by the vagaries of relationships.  
Buber was particularly concerned with the modern belief in rationalism and historical 
progress and its valuing of technology. Such reliance he saw as an anathema to freedom and an 
abdication of responsibility, placing such belief in a historical line of idol worship, referencing in 
particular late Roman polytheism. “The quasi-biological and quasi-historical thought of to-day, 
however different the aims of each, have worked together to establish a more tenacious and 
oppressive belief in fate than has ever before existed.” Citing modern “gods” of philosophy, 
religion, social science, and culture, Buber warned against the loss of human potentiality and 
personality, sacrificed to irresistible forces of law and fixed progression. For Buber, such 
reliance made the human a slave, an object, in an inescapable realm of It. “The dogma of gradual 
process is the abdication of man before the exuberant world of It. He misuses the name of 
destiny: destiny is not a dome pressed tightly down on the world of men; no one meets it but he 
                                                




who went out from freedom. But the dogma of process leaves no room for freedom, none for its 
most real revelation of all, whose calm strength changes the face of the earth – reversal.”73  
As we have noted, Buber included in this critique the place of “specialized ethics,” that 
through adherence to “postulate” reduced responsibility to a “metaphor of morality,” placing 
limits on human freedom, and reducing the eternal Thou to the world of It, making finite an 
infinite God. While religion, when placing itself at risk by entering the present in relationship, 
brings humanity into relationship with the eternal Thou, and opening the possibility for concrete 
transformation, religion for its own sake obstructs and objectifies. “And if there is nothing that 
can so hide the face of our fellow-man as morality can, religion can hide from us as nothing else 
can the face of God. Principle there, dogma here … behind both there lies in wait the – profane 
or holy – war against the situations’ power of dialogue, there lies in wait the ‘once-for-all’ which 
resists the unforeseeable moment.”74 Human freedom, on the other hand, comprises the call and 
response of the I-Thou relationship in lived reality, unbound by conviction and open to 
consequence. The human, in this unbounded space, responds to Thou in the context of the 
situational realities with responsible decision, and in this responsibility to Thou, the human 
likewise responds to the call of the eternal Thou.  
In human freedom the I, responding to the address of Thou, enters into an engagement 
with the world. For the “religious” human, engaging the world and entering into relationship 
with God are complementary. The human does not turn to the world out of obligation, what 
Buber calls the “unrest of responsibility,” but engages the world in a fashion where responsibility 
emerges from relationship. By the very human existence, concrete reality is engaged. 
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Responsibility is engaged not in the abstraction of the objective I-It interaction, but made real in 
the moments of response and decision in the concrete reality of the world. It is in this 
engagement, that God, the eternal Thou, is found.  
Duty and obligation are rendered only to the stranger; we are drawn to and full of 
love for the intimate person. The world, lit by eternity, becomes fully present to 
him who approaches the Face, and to the Being of beings he can in a single 
response say Thou. Then there is no more tension between the world and God, but 
only the one reality. The man is not freed from responsibility; he has exchanged 
the torment of the finite, pursuit of effects, for the motive power of the infinite, he 
has got the mighty responsibility of love for the whole untraceable world-event, 
for the profound belonging to the world before the Face of God.75 
 
In Buber’s formulation, reality comes into existence through responsible decision and 
action, all with a framework of mutuality. The community exists as an active and responsible 
community. “The most powerful and the deepest reality exists where everything enters into the 
effective action, without reserve the whole man and God the all-embracing – the united and the 
boundless Thou.”76 The community, however, like the I, does not abandon or escape the world 
of It, which Buber readily acknowledges as necessary for “sustaining, relieving, and equipping of 
human life.”77 It is the disordering of It that is problematic – Buber would call it evil – in which 
the object takes the place of relationship, dispensing with concrete reality and responsibility. 
Those objects that humanity must use and experience, Buber warns, must not come to “have the 
mastery.” This includes, in particular the two components that Buber names as necessary for 
communal life, that of economics and the State, which Buber viewed as having taken up that 
very position of master rather than servant. “(T)he State is no longer led; the stokers still pile in 
the coal, but the leaders have now only the semblance of control over the madly racing machines. 
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And in this moment, as you speak, you can hear as I do that the levers of economics are 
beginning to sound in an unusual way; the masters smile at you with superior assurance, but 
death is in their hearts.”78 
The will to profit of the economy and the will to power of the State, Buber asserts, are 
“natural and proper” as they are aligned with the will to enter into relationship, “the living stuff 
of communal life” and the life of the spirit. Buber outlines a realist approach to this effort. 
The statesman or the economist who obeys the spirit is no dilettante; he knows 
well that he cannot, without undoing his work, simply confront, as bearers of the 
Thou, the men with whom he has to deal. Yet he risks doing it, not plainly and 
simply but as far as the boundary set from him by the spirit. … He is no fanatic, 
he serves the truth which, though higher than reason, yet does not repudiate it, but 
holds it in its lap. He does in communal life precisely what is done in personal life 
by the man who knows himself incapable of realizing the Thou in its purity, yet 
daily confirms its truth in the It, in accordance with what is right and fitting for 
the day, drawing – disclosing – the boundary line anew each day.79 
 
The responsible decision in the situation presented is made in the contingency of present 
concrete reality. It takes account of the world of Thou in its finite plurality, in acknowledgement 
of the address of the infinite eternal Thou. It likewise acknowledges the necessity and threat of 
the world of It, honoring the content of its utility, and remaining cautious of its power to move 
toward tyranny.  
Responsible Dialogue 
At the heart of Buber’s development is, then, the practice of “genuine dialogue,” in which 
humans, in a relationship of I-Thou, enter into the responsibility of address and response, not as a 
debate, but as a move toward understanding and decision. Such an understanding of interaction 
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would shape the process undertaken at Oxford. Oldham, in his post-Oxford essay, wrote, “The 
only way in which we can do justice to those realities [of society to-day] is to take … a ‘multi-
dimensional’ view of society. We must recognize … that there is not one focal point but several, 
and that the whole structure of society may be fundamentally affected by technical advances 
which may take place in the economic sphere, or in political power, or in administration or in the 
possibilities of psychological influence.”80 
As stated earlier, responsible dialogue requires the acknowledgement of Thou as unique 
Other, in which difference is honored and preserved. I does not receive the Other as a mirror of 
the self, but approaches the Other in its own alterity.81 To do differently is, in the words of one 
commentator, to reduce the Other into a “subjective colonialism, where all the other’s desires are 
reduced to the desires of the ‘home country,’ the self.”82 The dialogue requires the human to 
enter into mutual relation in which the human is addressed and answers, is answered, and 
answers again, what Buber called “the solid give–and-take of talk.” 83 While Buber outlines three 
spheres in which the I engages in dialogue – with nature, with living creatures, and with humans 
as distinguished from other creatures and creation – it is with humans that responsible dialogue 
resides.  
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Here language is consummated as a sequence, in speech and counter-speech. Here 
alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response. Only here does 
the primary word go backward and forwards in the same form, the world of 
response live in the one language, I and Thou take their stand not merely in 
relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk. The moments of relation are 
here, and only here, bound together by means of the element of the speech in 
which they are immersed. Here what confronts us has blossomed into the full 
reality of the Thou. Here alone, then, as reality that cannot be lost, are gazing and 
being gazed upon, knowing and being known, loving and being loved.84 
 
In this give and take, there is not one address nor one answer, but a plurality of perspectives that 
require reception/listening, response/answer, and, finally, responsible decision.  
For Buber these actions move between the worlds of Thou and It, requiring a repeated re-
engagement of mutuality and decision. “Every response binds up the Thou in the world of It. 
That is the melancholy of man, and his greatness. For that is how knowledge comes about, a 
work is achieved, and image and symbol made, in the midst of living beings.”85 Dialogue and 
responsible decision, here, are contingent, finite, and require constant attention. “(H)e will have 
to practise, till death itself, decision in the depths of spontaneity, unruffled decision, made ever 
anew, to right action.”86  
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CHAPTER THREE  
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF OXFORD RESPONSIBILITY 
As we have seen, the organizers and delegates of the 1937 Oxford Conference had come 
together that summer in an attempt to find some type of unified theological response to what was 
perceived as a global crisis. They alleged that that crisis, comprising the dual threat of 
totalitarianism and secularism, threatened to reshape the foundations of modern society in ways 
that endangered the very existence of the church. It is the author’s contention that a unifying 
principle underlying Oxford’s response to this grave situation was a conception of the notion of 
responsibility, or what we are calling “Oxford Responsibility,” and that such a unifying principal 
has continuing relevance in contemporary ecumenical social ethics.1  
We have seen that such focus on responsibility was not necessarily unique to the 
Conference, although formal connections with other particular theological thought are somewhat 
speculative. In the thought of Weber, Bonhoeffer and Buber we have uncovered themes 
regarding realist paradox between principle and possibility, exemplified in Weber’s ethic of 
conviction and ethic of responsibility. We have also explored the relationship between the 
transcendence of ethical ideals over against historical contingency, as explored by Bonhoeffer, as 
well as by Weber and Buber. We have placed the core of human existence within the nature of 
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dynamic relationship and dialogical response to the Other through the work of Buber, and we 
have placed these concepts within a developing ethos of Christian realism.  
In this chapter we will explore the theological foundations of this idea of responsibility 
emanating particularly from the 1937 Oxford Conference. We will first make a brief examination 
of the explicit ecumenical discussion of the concept that occurred subsequent to its own work at 
the WCC in 1948, before returning to the particular work of the Oxford Conference, focusing in 
this chapter on its work concerning human dignity, history, and the Kingdom of God as they 
relate to our theory of responsibility.  
The Ecumenical Turn to Responsibility  
In the wake of World War II, the first assembly of the WCC at Amsterdam in 1948 
sought to address the issues of post-war reconstruction by finding a way between the extremes of 
communism and laissez-faire capitalism. Finding such balance between complete state control 
and unchecked economic freedom required the identification of the mutual obligations shared 
across society, including the responsibilities of the church, the state and the individual. The now 
well-known term “responsible society” came to describe such effort, the phrase chosen prior to 
the assembly by organizers including Oldham, Visser ’t Hooft and Reinhold Niebuhr, repeating 
the central roles they played years earlier for the Oxford Conference.2 The Assembly defined a 
responsible society as “one where freedom is the freedom of men who acknowledge 
responsibility to justice and public order, and where those who hold political authority or 
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economic power are responsible for its exercise to God and the people whose welfare is affected 
by it.”3 
 As H. Richard Niebuhr would write in the years between Oxford and the advent of the 
WCC, the notion of responsibility comprised accountability and community. “To be responsible 
is to be able and required to give account to someone for something. The idea of responsibility, 
with the freedom and obligation it implies, has its place in the context of social relations.”4 
Responsibility presumed both agency and freedom, answerable to a transcendent authority, and 
exercised among other agents in which the actor assumes accountability for one’s choices and 
actions in the context of the common good. This definition worked to strike a balance between 
security and freedom, required by the historical context in which the Assembly labored.  
The question of responsibility for such a balance that shaped this post-war response was 
made explicit in the Assembly’s output. Both the Church and State bore responsibility for the 
relative disorder of the mid-twentieth century, due to, according to Reinhold Niebuhr, an 
“inability and unwillingness” of persons and nations to “establish and re-establish” social justice 
under contingent conditions. In contrast to the crisis theology of Karl Barth, here Niebuhr 
presented opportunities within history for the responsible achievement of relative justice made 
possible by “periods of calm,” when “conflicting and competing social forces reach a state of 
comparative equilibrium and nations arrive at comparative concord.”5  
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At the same time, Amsterdam worked to make it clear that vital issues were always at 
stake. “It is a complete abdication of responsibility to suppose that because everything human is 
relative there are no decisive turning-points in history. Where the highest values are at stake, to 
refuse to make up one’s mind and take a stand, because the issues are confused and there seems 
to be much to be said on both sides, may be a betrayal of humanity.”6  
Certainly Niebuhr and the organizers of both Amsterdam and Oxford bore no illusions of 
the perfection of society. The ever-present realities of injustice and corrupting power precluded 
any utopian schemes. Yet it was the historical possibilities that demanded the ecumenical turn to 
responsibility that began with Oxford Responsibility. While the ecumenical idea of a responsible 
society often is seen as birthed at Amsterdam, it finds its conception at Oxford. 
Transcendent Responsibility 
We have outlined that such a definition moves from defining responsibility in mere 
juridical terms toward a more transcendent understanding. Here the term comprises an ethical 
response to the question of to whom and for what we are responsible, as posed by H. Richard 
Niebuhr earlier. Returning to the work of Georg Picht, we have found that he explored the lacuna 
opened by the modern project’s attempt to account for the term, a gap that can be filled by 
theological reference, he claims with the Oxford contributors. Picht points to the term’s “surplus 
of meaning” that transcends legal limitations. To be responsible “to” someone “for” something 
                                                                                                                                                       
Disorder and God’s Design: An Omnibus Volume of The Amsterdam Assembly Series (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), 13. 
6 Joseph H. Oldham, “A Responsible Society,” in The Church and the Disorder of Society, by 
World Council of Churches, The Methodist Edition, vol. 3, Man’s Disorder and God’s Design: 





comprises an obligation that exceeds mere legal liability. Further, as we have said, Picht claims 
that this move has its provenance in Christian eschatology, in which the term is used within the 
context of the Judgment. For Picht, as for the twentieth century theorists and ecumenists, religion 
provides the form of an ultimate answer to the question of authority, revealing in responsibility 
its transcendent nature. Responsibility thus is not simply tied to a particular authority for a 
particular duty but to an unlimited, comprehensive authority that lies beyond oneself and beyond 
even one’s temporality. 
Picht’s analysis, along with the ethical foundations of Weber, Bonhoeffer and Buber, 
helps illuminate four significant features of the view of responsibility that were foreshadowed at 
Oxford – the sovereignty of God and the value of the human creature, the responsible 
possibilities and requirements of history, the immanence and transcendence of the relationship 
between history and the Kingdom of God, and the turn to the Other as a response to the 
sovereign God. 
 We have already mentioned the role of a transcendent authority in understanding 
responsibility. For Oxford that transcendent authority is the God made known in Jesus Christ, 
who is the creator of life, the giver of eschatological hope, and the one to whom the human is 
responsible. This conception of God leads further to an understanding of and respect for the 
transcendent value of the human person, created in the image of the sovereign and creative God. 
The recognition of inherent human value imputed by God calls forth a response toward the 
valued Other, through which the responding agent’s value can itself be fulfilled as a response to 
God. 
Second is the place of history – of both tradition and future, as well as the limits of one’s 




playing field, where one is both capable of being responsible, and accountable for being 
responsible. It is in history where the actions of the human person are effective. For human 
flourishing through human relatedness to take place, the human person must be both responsible 
and free to act for and with the Other, and that action must have the possibility of effectiveness 
within the context of action, that is, immediate history. Alongside this grounded playing field is, 
third, the realization and transcendence of the ideal of the Kingdom of God that serves to provide 
eschatological hope and historical judgment.  
Finally, we consider the nature of the community of responsibility-bearers who must 
respond to the unlimited tasks of responsibility. Here responsibility does not remain the domain 
of the individual but moves toward a common responsibility that demands response as well. Here 
one responds to the authority of the sovereign through response to the Other in history, as we 
have seen in the work of Buber. Within the contingencies of history and the limits of the human 
person, as explicated by the Christian doctrine of sin, and motivated by the Kingdom of God, 
such relational responsibility and historical action then assumes a dialogical aspect in order to 
achieve a responsible and relative justice for the flourishing of both individual and society. Thus 
a responsible society must allow for and encourage the repeated process of dialogue, leading to a 
repeating cycle of deliberation, decision and action, and judgment among its constituents and 
their institutions, inclusive of science, church and state, in order to define and enable relative 
justice.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we will explore more deeply Oxford’s contributions to 
the first three elements of this quadrilateral – that of human value, history and the Kingdom of 
God. In the next chapter we will explore the application of responsibility in the context of the 




A Christian Anthropology 
We have defined Oxford responsibility in part as requiring a society’s members and 
institutions to act in accordance with human value and freedom, in obedience to the will of God. 
The context in which Oxford labored, amid the threats of totalitarianism and secularism, raised to 
central concern the place of the human in society. At one end of this concern was the threatened 
loss of the primacy of the individual in relation to the state and the economy, where the human 
would be merely relegated as a means rather than an end. At the other end of the concern was the 
romantic promise of the modern project and humanity’s continued confidence in it, with its 
anthropocentric positing of humankind and the individual. Thus the notion of responsibility with 
which the Conference worked sought to renew an understanding of responsible anthropology, 
encompassing the perceived truths regarding the understanding of the human from science, 
philosophy and politics, while addressing the threats presented by these spheres.  
Oxford’s presentation of anthropology comprised scientific and philosophical accounts of 
humanity, but found them inadequate in meeting the threats against the personal individual. As 
suggested earlier, Oxford would claim that it is only the supernatural insights of religion in 
general, and Christianity in particular, complementing the insights of the human sciences and 
philosophy, which provide the necessary structure to respond. Oxford presented a critique of 
what it identified as three significant threats to an adequate and responsible concept of the 
human. These threats were what it called naturalistic anthropology, humanitarian modernism, 
and Marxist anthropology. While the insights of science, modernity and Marxism, far from being 
dismissed, offered necessary explications for human understanding, they were viewed as 
deficient at best, and detrimental at worst for the flourishing of humanity and human 




seen to reduce the human to mere material. The modernistic worldview was criticized as 
mistakenly positing with the human the power to understand and control the progress of history. 
Marxism was dismissed as denying the human a personal center, making the human a mere 
means in society rather than an end in itself. We now review each of these threats in turn. 
Scientific Anthropology  
Regarding the scientific account of the human, Oxford’s focus was on naturalistic 
accounts of anthropology, illustrated at the time by the work of Bertrand Russell. Russell held 
that the human is to be sufficiently understood by the explanations of the natural sciences, 
without appeal to the supernatural or to a higher ground for human significance or obligation. 
Such philosophy led to perceptions both in the scientific and religious communities, as well as in 
popular wisdom, that this was evidence of an incompatibility of natural and supernatural 
understandings – evolutionary theory being a prominent example for Oxford, as it remains today. 
Yet Oxford viewed such a separation as neither necessary or warranted, but instead the result of 
a “mutual trespass.”7 Oxford claimed that the scientific method remains valid for exploration into 
the natural world by humans. Religion, then, explores matters of an extra-scientific sort, 
including questions of value that are beyond the reach of science. 
What Oxford worked to outline was not a defeat of natural science for the sake of 
religion’s standing, but the discrediting of naturalism, which denied the fullness of human value. 
This philosophical outlook outlined at Oxford held that “the material universe needs nothing but 
material, at any rate purposeless, factors for its explanation; that man is simply the creature of 
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these factors and is completely destroyed by them; that his values are at best biological 
conveniences, entirely relative to his time and circumstance; and that every trace of his 
achievements will one day be annihilated. With such a philosophy no Christian can be friendly. 
This is the so-called science with which religion is and must for ever be in conflict.”8 An 
understanding of humanity required attention to the total human experience, both reason and 
emotion, sense and spirit. It also required a recognition of value, necessary for both the scientific 
and religious examination, yet denied within the naturalistic claim.  
Yet, in regard to the human animal, natural science indeed made a value claim, a claim 
that was in fact necessary for science’s continued validity. Wrote British philosopher Thomas 
Jessop, then the Ferens Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hull, value-claims are the 
“hidden presupposition of all discourse,” as necessary for the natural science as for 
transcendental interpretations of humanity.9 Without such a claim scientific epistemology 
disintegrates. In Jessop’s view, the value claim that natural science posits to the human is that of 
dignity, a term one might expect from later theological discourse. “The distance that divides the 
modern man from the Neolithic man of nearly ten thousand years ago, and the vaster difference 
that divides even the latter from the highest of the brutes, is a measure of our dignity within the 
natural order open to scientific investigation.” The ability for abstract thought, the presence of 
speech, the development of culture, for example, distinguishes and dignifies the human from the 
lower animal. Scientific confirmation of human dignity, however, is insufficient, for science is 
unable by its limits to find within human dignity the “cosmic significance” to move beyond 
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materialism.10 Such significance is to be explored in the arena of religious thought, and in the 
understanding of responsibility. 
Modernist Anthropology 
Alongside the inadequate naturalistic view of humanity, Oxford, secondly, outlined the 
Enlightenment’s resultant modernist worldview, which had come to shape conventional thinking 
that Oxford likened to utilitarianism and pragmatism. Such a worldview, Oxford contributor 
Robert Calhoun, then a professor of historical theology at Yale, labeled “humanitarian 
modernism,” understood as “an active, conscious preoccupation with the present, that is, with 
affairs in the forefront of one’s own time, and comparative disregard for their larger 
backgrounds. … The past, especially the obstinate urgent past embodied in living tradition, is 
disparaged; and the incessant sweep of temporal process toward the future is treated as though it 
were, in all essential respects, compliant to human understanding and control.”11 The 
“humanitarian” modifier concerned the religious foundations that Oxford saw forming around 
modernism, comprising persons whose faith was in themselves and their fellow humans, rather 
than a supernatural other, operating with the hope and promise of a “manifest destiny” for 
humanity and “a desire to make the world a better place” through charitable works, social 
welfare programs and political power.12 Fueled by not an insignificant factor of 
contemporaneous Christian thinking – as well as advances in the social sciences, expansion of 
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modern capitalism and democracy, and centuries of colonialism and social Darwinism – 
humanitarian modernism fostered an ethic of natural law, extolling the classical and theological 
virtues sans the realist concept of human finitude that would play a role at Oxford. “In its 
exultation of personality, and its efforts to adapt institutional patterns to human needs, 
modernism makes its closest approach to Christian faith. Its mistake is in taking human persons 
as ultimate.”13 Contemporary discussions of responsibility have raised similar concerns. Picht, 
for example credits modern ethics with distorting the concept of responsibility in which the 
reasonable self is seen as the ultimate moral authority, a move for which the groundwork was 
laid by the pre-modern church, with its understanding of the relationship between salvation and 
individual conscience. What such a conception has led to is a continued difficulty for theology to 
respond adequately to the modern project, which Oxford was attempting to do by grounding 
human nature in responsibility. Without such an effort, as Picht would warn three decades later, 
“the concept of ethical responsibility will serve merely as a superficial cliché, or a cheap formula 
for hastily reconciling the individualistic ethics of the past with social ethics.”14  
In an extended excursus on American pragmatism, Calhoun suggested that in a modernist 
worldview one might get close to responsibility through a self-interested and progressive 
utilitarian effectiveness in which “each self must take, subjectively, the roles of other selves, and 
identify himself overtly with those processes of change which make toward the harmonization of 
many interests, of many persons. The goal is progressive achievement of socially conditioned 
satisfactions for as many of these as possible.”15 The Christian anthropology proposed at Oxford 
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moved beyond the limits of modernism, however. The move to responsibility takes place within 
a system that posits within human “animality” a creatureliness “shot through with felt 
responsibility.” The human is responsible to its creator and responsive to the creator’s summons 
through nature and revelation, giving the human its distinctive, albeit fallen, status. “This 
Christian faith sees far more clearly than modernism, and by so much is more realistic about 
man. It sees him as at once less admirable in his present actuality, and more profound in his 
ultimate significance, than modernism takes him to be.” The allegiance of humankind thus 
moves beyond itself and nature toward a “faith-realist” responsibility to authority and to the 
Other, without which self and society is doomed to disintegrate. “That summons is partly 
conveyed, though by no means automatically interpreted, through the processes that go on within 
man, and in nature around him; which have their ultimate meaning not simply as being 
themselves, but as being vehicles for the divine word to which man is not merely subjected, but 
responsible, having therein his distinctive status as man.”16  
Calhoun works to expose modernism as sin itself, a denial of responsibility, as it tends 
toward “self-indulgence and self-glorification,” rendering the Christian perspective as irrational 
at best and insulting at worst. His explication is worth quoting at length. 
The conflicts which arise thence are among the most profound and most 
destructive with which we have to cope in ourselves. Not merely pain, nor 
frustration of particular desires, nor collision of individual wills, nor even social 
conflicts between competing groups. These can be endured, inside fairly wide 
limits, without essential disintegration of human selves; and within somewhat 
narrower limits, they can even be regarded as conducive to growth toward 
maturity. Of the really disruptive processes which break down human selfhood, 
… some spring directly from the self-contradiction which is sin – man’s vain 
attempt to deny his own humanity by denying his responsibility to God. Thence 
arise the destructive tensions within individual selves. … Thence arise also, in 
large part, the insidious treacheries, prides, and fears which take shape in the 
                                                




oppression of weaker groups by stronger; and … issue in the ghastly inhumanities 
of despotism and war. It is this profound self-contradiction in man, this denial of 
the responsibility which makes him human, that breaks down selves and societies 
from within. Natural disasters can be weathered, human struggle endured and 
turned to account, so long as men are true to themselves by acknowledging claims 
superior to their own wills. But when irresponsibility becomes the rule, both 
selves and societies disintegrate.17 
 
Here then responsibility comes to define the very nature of humanity and posits as a 
central organizing principle for a Christian ethic, implying, as William Schweiker recently notes 
for the theme of responsibility, “a distinctive, non-reducible outlook and orientation in life.”18  
Marxist Anthropology 
The third system to which Oxford contrasted its responsible anthropology was that 
represented within Marxist sociology. As with the critiques of naturalism and modernism, the 
Oxford writers worked to demonstrate the insights in and connections with the Marxist system of 
thought, presenting the Christian worldview not as a conquering alternative, but as the necessary 
component for humankind’s flourishing. Indeed, essayist Nicolas Alexeiev, who had taught 
philosophy of law at Moscow, Crimea, Prague and Berlin, would conclude that both Marxists 
and Christians were obliged not only to live together, but also to work together “in the 
reconstruction of the world and in the realization of social justice.”19  
In Alexeiev’s review of the historical developments of Marxist thought from Marx and 
Engels forward through their Leninist disciples, he finds frequent connections between Marxist 
                                                
17 Ibid., 76–77. 
18 William Schweiker, “Responsibility and Moral Realities,” Studies in Christian Ethics, no. 22 
(2009): 480. 
19 Nicholas N. Alexeiev, “The Marxist Anthropology and the Christian Conception of Man,” in 
The Christian Understanding of Man, by Thomas E Jessop, et al, vol. 2, The Church, 




and Christian thought, particularly in the areas of anthropology, eschatology and social praxis. 
From these points of connection he works to demonstrate further the divergence between 
Marxism and Christian thinking, illuminating the practical shortcomings of Marxism, as well as 
the folly of Christians’ unreflective acceptance and absolutizing of Marxist doctrine. 
“It is serious error, often committed by historical Christianity, to elevate any theological, 
philosophical, or social-ethical teaching to the position of an absolute truth which can never be 
surpassed; or to proclaim any one Christian teacher as alone orthodox; but it is this practice 
which Marxism has taken over from historical Christianity,” Alexeiev wrote, further suggesting 
that eastern religion’s “synthetic” process of dealing with diversity, rather than the western 
exclusive tradition of dealing with heresies, might offer a superior wisdom. In this approach to 
explicating anthropology, Alexeiev foreshadows Oxford’s dialogic process in which particular 
contingent truths and expertise of various social spheres engage toward the purpose of 
responsible action. “Thus if we agree that Christian philosophy does not necessarily contain 
truths which should be regarded as absolute, we should concede that other philosophical, ethical, 
and social ideas which have not sprung from Christian belief may be instructive.”20  
Regarding points of connection between Marxism and Christianity, Alexeiev 
acknowledges that anthropological similarities between the seemingly discordant systems of 
thought might surprise, yet he finds in early Marxist sociology an anthropology, in contrast to the 
materialistic cosmology of later Marxism. This anthropology he sees rising out of philosophical 
and theological debate in response to Hegelian idealism. For early Marxism, the human is not an 
isolated individual but still remains primary as a “man in society.” Here the emphasis on the 
social nature of man is similar to Christian thought, although only in a “second, derivative 
                                                




element,” he concludes. Drawing on Reinhold Niebuhr and Ernst Troeltsch, Alexeiev posits 
within Christianity the necessary dialectic of individualism and community, suggesting that the 
personhood of the individual finds its meaning in responsibility within society. “Christianity 
postulates such a mutual interpenetration of the individualistic and the universal elements that 
priority has to be given not to the individual but to the social whole: the individual personality is 
thus regarded as issuing from the human community.”21  
Within Christian anthropology, as opposed to Marxist thought, the person in community 
is not subsumed by the universal, but remains as a responsible agent. “(M)an in his relation to 
God, as being created ‘in the Word,’ is essentially a responsible creature, that is, a ‘centre’ of 
responsible and free decisions, being called upon to determine the direction of his own life. This 
sense of responsibility constitutes the real nature of man, but it is completely absent from 
Marxism.” Within Marxism, the human in society has no personal center, but is merely the sum-
total of those relations in society. In this the human does not function as an end in and of itself, 
comprising ultimate value, but is “only an instrument for the purpose of creating the society of 
the future; merely material to be operated on by society” in which the individual is shaped into 
the impersonal.22  
The Marxist rejection of an idealistic anthropology does hold with Christianity an 
understanding of a material nature of the human as well as the value of the creative human. 
However, the Marxist rejection of the transcendent human posits within its thought only the 
means for a class-ethic. This ethic is marked by vice whereas an ethic of virtues is placed within 
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Christian thought. “For this reason such ideas as an inner ethical imperative or responsibility to 
God or to one’s conscience are entirely foreign to Marxism.”23  
A second point of connection between Marxist and Christian thought is that of 
eschatology. In line with the realist influence of the Conference, the ideal Christian expression of 
the unity of the individual and the universal is posited beyond history in the Kingdom of God. 
Such eschatological doctrine Alexeiev finds comparable to Marxist theory’s presentation of the 
final collapse of society. Yet what Marxist theory is unable to abide is the Christian ideal of love 
inherent in Christian eschatology and its limited and practical implications as justice. While both 
Christian and Marxist apocalyptic imagery points to social disorder and dysfunction, and reveals 
the need for social solidarity, Christian doctrine stops short of social revolution, or even 
eschatological identification with particular social programs. Social programs “can only create a 
god-fearing life on earth: it cannot create the Kingdom of God.”24  
This however does not forbid any action or interaction of the part of the Christian. Both 
the Marxists and Christians “can to some extent work together in the same direction. The 
Christian should and can participate with the Marxist in the reconstruction of the world and in 
the realization of social justice.”25 But it must be approached with a realization of both the truths 
shared between the systems of thought, and the inevitable contradictions that will be faced in so 
doing.  
                                                
23 Ibid., 134. 
24 Ibid., 116. 




Brunner’s Responsible Existence  
With these threats and deficiencies from naturalistic, modernistic and Marxist thought, 
Oxford was thus poised to secure the responsible personality as the foundation for Oxford 
responsibility. The Oxford Conference outlines the idea of the human as an agent who is created 
as free, transcendent and independent and is endowed by its creator with value. Such attributes 
result in a “responsive actuality.” This comprises an understanding of the human as a responsible 
agent who can both conceive of his responsibility and make an effort to meet the responsibility.  
In his Conference essay Emil Brunner also reviewed the four common approaches to the 
anthropological question, approaches that Brunner viewed as foundational in the conflicts with 
communism and fascism.26 First is a naturalistic or materialistic anthropology that regards the 
human as merely part of the world in general and the animal world in particular, albeit a uniquely 
differentiated part, plumbed by Jessop and Alexeiev in the same volume. The second approach is 
that of idealistic anthropology, positing divinity or spirit as fundamental to human existence, 
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with the desire and ability to search for truth qua truth. The third approach is romantic, in which 
the human is distinguished by its creativity, and the fourth Brunner calls synthetic anthropology, 
an unsystematic view of the human comprising body, mind and spirit within a mysterious unity, 
upon which “all science, philosophy and religion” builds.27 Brunner found these “natural” 
doctrines, however, lacking in the resources to answer the primary question of human existence 
surrounding what he called “responsible existence.”  
In contrast to other elements of the natural world the human is distinguished by self-
awareness and self-determination. These are “the wonderful and dangerous privileges of human 
existence. Man is the being who understands himself and in this self-understanding decides or 
determines what he will do and be.” As with Jessop, Brunner claims that questions regarding the 
nature and destiny of the human can be answered only in part by empirical science. Ultimate 
origins and goals move the human by degrees into the realm of theology, for the human is “a 
‘theological’ being, that is, his ground, his goal, his norm, and the possibility of understanding 
his own nature are all in God.”28 
Brunner finds within the question of the nature and destiny of the human, with its 
contradiction surrounding what the human is and ought to be, the concept of responsible 
existence. More so than the differentiating abilities of creativity and intellect that science finds in 
the human, it is this responsible existence that differentiates the human from the rest of the world 
in general and the rest of the animal world in particular. “(T)he one characteristic which 
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distinguishes man from all other creatures known to us is not his intellect nor his power to create 
culture, but this simple and impressive fact: that he is responsible and personal.”29 
 Responsibility, then, is the distinctive and unique feature of human existence, prior to 
biology, rationality, spirituality and creativity. Inherent in this feature of responsibility is the fact 
that all humans are aware to one degree or another of his or her responsibility and its affect on 
his or her life and destiny. “(I)n all that he does he is responsible, even if he himself is 
‘irresponsible,’ that is, even if he acts without recognizing his responsibility, or even in 
opposition to it.”30  
Brunner claims that neither the naturalism that is indicative of Marxism nor the idealism 
that is indicative of Fascism is able to speak to the nature and destiny of the responsible human, 
for the former can find no source or authority for responsibility and the latter can provide no 
adequate account for the human contradictions of responsibility without damage to human 
personality. It is Christian revelation that provides the answer to the question of the source and 
goal of responsibility and the concomitant nature and destiny of the human.31 
The source of man’s responsibility is the same as its content, namely, unselfish, 
spontaneous love; it is this love which makes him responsible, and it is this love 
again which he owes to his neighbour. Further, the Christian answer, where it 
reveals the nature of true responsibility also reveals the actual depth of the 
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contradiction in man as he actually is. Finally, the Christian answer, by unveiling 
the secret of human personality, is able both to achieve the removal of the 
contradictions and the restoration on integral personality and union with 
persons.32  
 
 This content for responsibility is summed up in three statements of faith: that the human 
was created in the image of God – the doctrine of imago Dei; that through sin the human enters 
into a state of opposition to the human’s destiny – the doctrine of peccatum originis; and that in 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the original nature of the human and the human’s 
fallen state is both revealed and restored to its original unity – the doctrine of restitutio imaginis.  
 The concept of the imago Dei is key to the idea of Oxford responsibility. The gap left by 
science as described by Jessop in attributing dignity to the human is filled within this context, as 
suggested, as well, by Buber. Rather than using the concept of dignity, however, Brunner focuses 
on “the element of transcendence” in which the human seeks its ground and meaning, found 
ultimately in relationship to God. This is the distinctive characteristic of the human. The element 
of transcendence enables a relationship with God in which God speaks to the human and the 
human is able to respond. Such responsiveness entails responsibility. “In ordinary language we 
express this by saying that man is the being who is responsible. This is his distinctively human 
quality, to a being who is responsible to God.” Brunner names this human quality “responsible 
existence.” As a quality, responsible existence is inherent in human existence, distinguishing the 
human as a person, defined as the being created by God for relationship with God. “The 
anthropo-tropos theos – the God who is turned towards man – creates the theo-tropos anthropos 
– the man who is related to God.”33  
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 Given that the nature of God is love as described by agape, the content and aim of 
responsible existence is thus divine love. It is this divine love to which the human responds in 
faith in accordance with the human nature and destiny. “Man is not first of all a human being and 
then responsible; but his human existence consists in responsibility. And man is not first of all 
responsible and then in addition he possesses a relation to God; but his relation to God is the 
same as his responsibility. Therefore it is his relation to God which makes man man.”34 
The expression of the human’s responsive love to God can only be expressed in 
relatedness to others. Brunner calls this “responsive actuality” or “responsible love.” God’s 
agape posits value on the object loved, in contrast to the sense of eros, which loves that which is 
desired for its value. Because the human related to God cannot love God the way that God loves 
the human – value cannot be added to God through human response – it is the fellow-human who 
becomes the object of love. “Man’s love of God must therefore find concrete expression in the 
love of his neighbour. This is not stated as a command; it is the very essence of love to go 
‘downward,’ not ‘upward.”35 The human person, a totality of mind and spirit, is a social being 
who loves, not simply an isolated being who thinks. Brunner has developed this thought in his 
text published in English the same year as the Conference, Man in Revolt, drawing upon the 
thought of Buber regarding human existence as conceived in the relationship to the Other – that 
of I and Thou – which, as we have seen, heavily influenced Oldham and his organization of the 
Conference.  
This conception of what Brunner’ called “responsible existence” can also be seen at work 
in the companion essay by Walter Horton. Horton, at the time the Fairchild Professor of 
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Theology at Oberlin, posits human responsiveness as that which is the image of God. “The 
image of God, then, must be interpreted as man’s capacity to respond gratefully to the divine 
love that patiently seeks him out, and to show his gratitude for God’s patient mercy by exhibiting 
a similar magnanimity to his neighbours, even though they be his enemies.”36 
Sin, Relationship and Freedom 
 This “responsible love,” of course, within human history presents a paradox. If the source 
and goal of human existence is found in the love of the Other which comprises responsible 
existence, such existence is consistently negated, since the human in history, although aware of 
this responsibility, often proceeds in opposition to it, demonstrating that the awareness of 
responsibility is deficient in some fashion. Indicative of the realist thought at play at Oxford, 
Brunner finds in Christian doctrine of original sin more satisfying answers than those provided 
by naturalism or idealism. The doctrine of “naturalism,” Brunner claims, can not point to that 
which makes humans responsible, and, while “idealism” might posit authority “in some spiritual 
law or value,” it fails in explaining the human conflict with responsibility. The human is a sinner, 
an “existence-in-opposition” that is an “actual existence … diametrically opposed to his 
origin.”37 Such existence perverts the human relationship to God, neighbor and self, resulting in 
the loss of meaning into a situation of wrath, selfishness and divided personality. Such an 
existence makes the truly responsible existence ambiguous and impossible. It converts 
responsible love to an unmet obligation marked by guilt, and places the will in bondage, thus 
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requiring a legalistic morality. The human is thus understood as a contradiction, aware of 
responsibility, yet acting irresponsibly, moved by love to value the neighbor, yet placing the 
neighbor into service as an object for that which has no personal value – such as culture, the state 
or the market. 
A truly responsible human being would be one wholly united to God, truly 
humane. Our human existence always contains elements of inhumanity; and in all 
humanity there still exists a spark of humanity. It is the same with our existence as 
persons. We are personal; but our personal existence is always at the same time 
impersonal; we are dominated by abstractions; we make the human element the 
means of the impersonal – civilization, the State, the power of “something.” We 
seek to master God and man by means of ideas. We fall a prey to the world and its 
goods.38 
 
Both Brunner and his colleagues at Oxford worked to posit with Christian doctrine both 
the revealing truth of the human predicament and its supernatural reconciliation. They also 
wanted to ensure that the historical divide between the earthly and the divine remained realistic, 
accounting for human institutions and the Christian’s place within them. Wrote Pierre Maury, a 
former secretary of the World Student Christian Federation, “The communion of grace always 
transcends national frontiers like all human frontiers; it is communio sanctorum; but it is lived in 
the national community where God has brought us into the world. It is in our earthly fatherland 
that we await the true fatherland, which is heavenly. Because God has ‘put us in our place,’ we 
do not hold this place to be indifferent, and we love our people with a love which gratefully 
recognizes a Divine intention in it and which is responsible, and engages our Christian 
loyalty.”39 
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Such existence in contradiction manifests itself in contrasts between single and the plural, 
the general and the particular. The human, having lost his or her center of meaning, swings 
between the extremes of individualism and collectivism, the former emphasizing personal 
independence and freedom, the latter connection to the wider community. Furthermore, as 
evidenced by the totalitarian battles of the day, the place of human differentiation is perverted. 
At one extreme, human differences are emphasized so that what unifies humanity is thoroughly 
discounted. Here the Germany of the 1930s is the example of the racial state. At the other 
extreme, Brunner cites rationalistic humanism with the deification of human reason over against 
the emasculation of human particularity, as evidenced by the communist implementation of 
Marxism with its idea of a world State. It is responsible existence as understood within a 
Christian anthropology that retains the differentiated individual as a responsible social being. 
“(F)rom the point of view of the Christian faith we accept neither abstract cosmopolitan 
humanism nor a view of race which denies the essential unity of all men. But the point of view of 
differentiation, of individuality, is subordinate to that of unity. The fact that every human being 
is responsible, that is, is called by God to be a personal being, to communion with Himself and 
with his fellow-men, is incomparably more important than the fact that human beings differ from 
one another in individuality, sex, nation, and race.”40 The responsible human knows himself, 
engages the Other as a responsible self, and remains responsible to God.  
The responsible existence required a maintenance of the balance between the individual 
and society. Drawing upon Aristotelian sociology, Horton added to Brunner’s analysis regarding 
the careful balance necessary between the extremes of individualism and collectivism, writing 
that while the human is a social animal and requires society for flourishing, the individual cannot 
                                                




thrive in a totalitarian society that threatens to “swallow him up in the mass.”41 Horton warns as 
well against the “anarchic individualism” possible within democratic and capitalist systems, 
suggesting that the truth of the church as a community of free individuals offers a check toward a 
mean between the extremes.  
Indeed, the plurality of humankind is indicative of the human’s social nature. It is the fact 
of such plurality that imposes the human destiny in relationship. Austin Farrer, author of the 
1957 Gifford Lectures on the freedom of the will, wrote at the time “The plurality of men 
belongs as much to our existence as the unity of God does to His, and the end of man must be a 
social one.”42 This social end comprises a responsibility to justice as impartiality and a “loving-
kindness,” understood as support for the protection and achievement of the neighbor’s good, a 
responsibility that is open to discovery by reason. The presence of these two aspects of 
responsibility – fairness and charity – require, however, a third element, according to Farrer; that 
of liberty of the human will.  
“(M)en’s attainment of their good must come through the exercise of their own choice 
and will.”43 For an intention toward a good to have meaning for the human, the freedom of the 
will is required. Indeed, for the will to be considered functioning as its end presupposes the 
freedom of volition. Yet such a presupposition is not sufficient. The healthy will comprises more 
than the free movement of volition, but also the freedom to act on the voluntary choice. Thus, the 
function of the will minimally understood posits with the human the ability to recognize its 
highest aspiration in either absolute or particular circumstances through earnest reflection and to 
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act upon this reflection through the movement of the will. Acknowledging the realist paradox of 
goals and limits to human aspirations, he continued that neither would have any meaning “unless 
man were an aspirant and, therefore, a free creature: if he had not a power to aspire after his end 
and to conform his actions to his aspirations.”44 
Freedom of the will has two important implications for responsible existence in general 
and Christian practice in particular, that is the articulation of the good upon which the will 
reflects and chooses, and the concomitant dialogical necessity for adequate clarity for such 
action. Regarding the articulation of the good, Farrer writes, “No man will be a hero in the 
service of an ideal he has but faintly seen, nor in that of the most luminous vision, if his will 
power is slight.”45 Here he points to the fact of the divided will which finds its salvation in 
Christian revelation. 
The prior understanding behind this perversion of the will, however, is the general – 
albeit limited – ability of the intellect and will to receive a conception of the good to be sought 
and to choose to act to accomplish the object of that good. Regarding the goods of justice and 
kindness, Farrer asserts there can be reasonable agreement. There is less agreement, however, 
about the particular goods one must obtain for self and the Other to meet such responsibility, a 
concern suggestive of Oldham’s middle axioms. 
Thus while two of us may coincide exactly in our definitions of these great social 
virtues, our views of their practical application may be poles asunder, in so far as 
we differ in our estimation of the goods to be distributed by justice or sought by 
loving-kindness. So the practical meaning of our social morality will depend on 
our individual morality – on our opinion about the hierarchy and balance of 
activities, but also on our belief in supernatural goods.46 
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Even with the optimistic presumption regarding definitions, the plurality of perceived 
goods to be pursued would seem to make any agreement beyond the individual improbable. Even 
for the human will that aspires to obedience to God as the highest good, made known through the 
revelation of Christ, there is plurality presented both by the limitations on the will and the 
contingencies of history. The goods to which one responsibly aspires and pursues within the 
greater goods of justice and kindness thus cannot be identified either through individual intellect 
and will, nor, once identified, can their place be held in perpetuity. The details of responsibility 
are promulgated through the human relation to the Other in history. The responsible will is 
exercised in meeting.  
For the Christian, the fact of human free will comes to define as well as be defined within 
an ecclesiology in which doctrine takes on a dynamic character within the responsible church. In 
his concluding remarks on the topic, Farrer writes, “(T)he codified experience of the true 
conscience in Christ cannot be treated as an oracle which will answer all questions. History does 
not wholly repeat itself, and a new situation will require a new decision, which cannot be 
deduced simply from established principles. Such a decision, if it is right, cannot indeed be out 
of harmony with the mind of the Church hitherto: but harmony is a difficult thing to dogmatize 
upon: it cannot be settled by syllogizing.”47 Instead, in a continual process of settling, unsettling 
and resettling, judgment of the good and the “ethical expediency” of its practical pursuit emerge 
from a responsible dialogue within human existence. It is this responsible dialogue, built upon 
the foundational understanding of the valuable and transcendent human, that finds responsible 
                                                




existence in engagement with the Other, that would drive the Oxford Conference’s explication of 
the church’s social function and place within the responsible society.  
The Concept of History  
We have seen in the work of the Oxford essayists the placement of responsibility at the 
core of an understanding of Christian anthropology that recognizes human dignity, finiteness, 
and freedom engaged in a turn to the Other in community. This work, including Farrer’s work on 
the autonomy of the human will and action, further points toward the place of history in Oxford’s 
theory of responsibility, addressed in the Conference series’ third volume, The Kingdom of God 
and History.48 Here, Oxford contributors worked to counter modern and contemporary 
understandings of progressive history that threatened human freedom and responsibility and the 
role of the Church over against the State.  
Undertaking this particular effort was a significant challenge for the Conference 
organizers. Throughout the first several months of 1936, Oldham labored over the list of 
contributors, going so far, to the consternation of his North American counterpart, Henry Van 
Dusen of New York’s Union Theological Seminary, as to shift Paul Tillich from his work on 
Christian anthropology to the third volume. Oldham had lamented that the very project could be 
intractable given the nature of historical interpretation. Writing to Van Dusen in April of that 
year, Oldham worried that the distinctions between non-Christian and Christian interpretations of 
history might come across as too slim, given that “so-called non-Christian interpretations to a 
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considerable extent derive from Christian ideas and the Christian interpretations incorporate 
elements of truth that find expression in the other doctrines.”49  
Each contributor, then, was asked to submit an essay on the Christian interpretation of 
history as a lens in which to view contemporary challenges, holding in perspective particular 
non-Christian interpretations, providing distinctions that exposed the implications of various 
secular theories, which, they viewed as effectively removing from humanity both freedom and 
responsibility for social progress, as well as the subsummation of the Church into the State. 
Running throughout the seven essays was a critique of the idea that history progressed in either a 
fixed movement toward an inevitable conclusion, particularly toward an ideal fulfillment. The 
introductory essay was written by Herbert G. Wood, then a director of Studies at Birmingham’s 
Woodbrooke Settlement and later a dean at the University of Birmingham, known for his work in 
form criticism and arguments for the historicity of Jesus. Wood called for a reexamination of the 
view of history as an irresistible force, particularly in light of the political upheavals of the time. 
Such a view rendered impotent the idea of free will, removing responsibility from the nature of 
humanity, resulting in a “moral relativism” exemplified for the organizers in the “idealism of 
Hegel and the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx.”50 To be responsible, the human, and 
humanity’s institutions, including the church, required a concrete platform or playing field on 
which to enact free agency, rather than a stage on which a script is directed by material or 
spiritual forces.  
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The “essential” theme running through the Conference writings on the topic, as 
summarized by Wood, was “the distinctive character of history as the sphere of human 
responsibility. History is not the mere continuation of some natural process.”51 Rather, history 
operates with the consequential reality of human action resulting in tangible progress or decline.  
Alongside the work to disavow an understanding of history as subject to comprehensive 
fixed forces, the Conference contributors also worked to posit history’s ultimate meaning within 
a Christian worldview. In his introduction, Wood continued, “Indeed apart from Christianity it is 
difficult to discover any meaning in history.”52 The Christian view of history, Wood explained, 
could be summed up in two significant conclusions. First, drawing upon Augustine, was the 
reality of the conflict between “the unalterable character of fundamental moralities” and 
“political immoralism,” otherwise described in realist terms as the “community of charity and the 
community of self-will.” The second conclusion he drew from the essays was an understanding 
of the positive contribution of the church to “historical life,” – a contribution that he saw rejected 
by rationalists and idealists alike. Here Wood pointed to both the European foundations of 
medieval Christianity – political power justifying itself before a divine ruler and an eternal law – 
and in more contemporary effects, such as democratic movements and manumission.53 
Wood’s summation of Conference thought on the topic places the Oxford Conference in 
a unique position in the history of the ecumenical movement. As a Life and Work conference 
concerned with the intersection of faith, culture and politics, the emphasis on the centrality of 
Christ within historical understanding, and history’s relationship with the Kingdom of God, 
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places the Conference within a missiological stream, as argued by Graeme Smith in his research 
on the Conference. Smith claims that the reports of the Conference finally recommended a 
process toward an “ongoing inculturation of Christianity.”54 While it is not the intent of this 
paper to argue whether the Oxford Conference can be considered part of the missionary stream 
of contemporary ecumenism, we will argue that in the face of the modern and totalitarian threats 
to the voice of the Church, the organizers viewed its rescue and protection as imperative to the 
overall flourishing of human society, understood as a society shaped by freedom and 
responsibility.55 
Each of the contributors worked to counter various foundations and theories of history 
that abetted advancing state control over against human freedom and responsibility. Their output 
provided an understanding of metahistory, critiquing relevant secular and political views of the 
nature of history and its meaning in contrast with a Christian understanding of history as 
illumined by the doctrine of the Kingdom of God and the prudential relationship required by the 
intersection of history and the eschatological Kingdom. Wood’s reference to Hegel and Marx 
recognized within their thought the idea that history moved in a defined fashion with progressive 
or inevitable result. What particularly troubled the organizers about the implications of 
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Enlightenment and Modern thought, particularly Marxist or Hegelian theory, was the 
subsummation of religion and humanity into the state.  
History, Progress and Human Agency 
Within the essays, two professors then at New York’s Union Theological Seminary – 
Eugene W. Lyman and Paul Tillich – provided extended discussion of the concept of history. 
Lyman was at the time a professor of the philosophy of religion, and Paul Tillich, who, after his 
censure by the Nazis while a professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt, had been 
brought by Reinhold Niebuhr to Union in 1933 as an associate professor of philosophical 
theology. 
In his broad examination of historical theory, Eugene W. Lyman described the prominent 
view of history antithetical to religious thought and action as “the evolutionary optimistic view” 
in which, he claimed, the idea of progress and the idea of development had coalesced into a 
general natural law of development that served as the fundamental force in human history and 
progress. Examining the influence of the work of Herbert Spencer, Georg W.F. Hegel, Friedrich 
Nietzche, John Dewey, Émile Durkheim and others, Lyman wrote that the evolutionary 
optimistic view of history, its contributions to intellectual advancement notwithstanding, had 
brought civilization to a crisis point, leaving “human thought in a dilemma between a relativism 
which is equally available [he would otherwise call it “rudderless”] for any form of power 
politics or economic exploitation, and a complete pessimism, if absolute ethical and spiritual 
standards are somehow maintained.”56 
                                                
56 Eugene Lyman, “The Kingdom of God and History,” in The Kingdom of God and History, by 
Herbert G. Wood, et al, vol. 3, The Official Oxford Conference Books (Chicago: Willett, Clark 




What were the particular sources of this hopelessness? The side of progress found its root 
in eighteenth-century rationalism, exemplified by the Social Darwinism of Spencer, which 
Lyman described as the view that human institutions and individuals progress from lower to 
higher forms through free competition, particularly laissez faire economics. In application, such 
an understanding of history “led to the view that progress will come to pass slowly but surely, no 
matter what ends are pursued by individuals or social groups. Political states may practice power 
politics and individuals may conduct business for profit only, without reference to the welfare of 
mankind.”57 Regarding the “injurious consequences” of this theory’s application, Lyman quoted 
John Dewey, naming it as the most “vicious and demoralizing ethic” in the history of 
humanity.58  
Here the human actor, while maintaining some agency, forfeits the responsibility for the 
results of his or her actions beyond their contribution to the inevitable progress of “survival of 
the fittest,” the phrase coined by Spencer in 1864 within Principles of Biology. While the theory 
could lead to a “reverent agnosticism,” it served, in the Conference’s view to empty religion of 
its motivating value, leaving “little … to fulfill man’s deeper longings for eternal reality and for 
spiritual transformation, or to motivate him for resisting the mounting evils of economic 
individualism and unrestrained nationalism.”59  
Lyman also posited to a Hegelian-inspired theory of development a self-referential 
authority, leading to a dangerous historical relativism. He discussed Hegelian thought’s 
contributions to the rise of nationalism, critiquing the spiritualization of historical development, 
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combining a historical relativism with an ethical relativism in which ethics is divorced from a 
transcendent source and lodged in the social structure or state, thereby providing sanction for 
nationalism. While the theory did comprise a strong social emphasis and idealism that could lead 
to efforts for reform, such efforts would likely be bound by conservative limits defined by the 
status quo, with responsibility lodged with the state. 
Alongside this critique, Christopher Dawson, an independent Christian historian, and one 
of the few Catholics involved in the Conference, addressed the apparent meaninglessness of 
history inherent in Romanticism. While it had introduced the concept of historical sense, in 
which humanity acknowledges the organic and social nature of culture at the expense of “noble 
self-sufficiency and maturity,” Dawson would counter with Catholic arguments that this 
historical consciousness, rather than leading to the relativity of, quoting from Nietzsche’s Beyond 
Good and Evil, “access … to the labyrinth of imperfect civilizations and to every form of 
semibarbarity that has at any time existed on earth,” history finds its meaning in religion and 
metaphysics, particularly through a Christian understanding of history.60 “Catholicism … 
showed little sympathy to the idealist movement. … Its attitude to history was at once more 
traditionalist and more realist than that of Protestantism and it did not readily accept the idea of 
an inevitable law of progress.”61 
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Tillich and Historical Responsibility 
Tillich, as he would later develop within the third volume of his Systematic Theology 
nearly a quarter-century later, worked to counter the liberal idea of historical progression with an 
understanding of history and its religious interpretation as bi-polar, arguing finally from that 
point that this understanding required from the church a responsibility for political engagement 
in their context of both time and geography. The churches, he wrote, could only dismiss the 
questions about the relation of eschatology and history “at the cost of a complete withdrawal 
from the life of the present day. They are summoned to reflect upon the great solutions of their 
past and to seek for a new solution, expressed in some powerful symbol, which will meet the 
need of the humanity of the present day in its questionings and its despair.”62 That symbol would 
be the Kingdom of God. 
In his Oxford essay, Tillich argues that history, rather than being governed by nature or 
its own independence, finds its content in free human social activity. He makes four points about 
the concept of history. First, history comprises a “remembered” history, with both a subjective 
element – historical consciousness or memory – and an objective element – historical tradition or 
event. In regard to the subjective element of this “bi-polar” understanding, Tillich describes 
history as a contribution unique to the human, for it is only the human who can bring to history 
historical consciousness. This consciousness, which occurs through the human’s free purposive 
activity, in turn creates the objective historical tradition. Given Tillich’s understanding of the 
relationship between essence – being – and existence – nature, natural progression is removed 
from the historical process, given that the natural is a result of its essence, while human existence 
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is in opposition to human’s essence.63 Tillich’s argument that nature, while having a share in the 
making of human history, has no history of its own, given that its existence is a result of its 
essence, requires for history existence’s free purposive activity, thus making history dependent, 
not on a natural progression, but upon human freedom. Tillich expands on this in the second 
volume of his systematics. While nature is finite necessity, and God is infinite freedom, the 
human is finite freedom, making possible the move from essence to existence.64 Tillich argues 
that this transition is denied by both idealism and naturalism, particularly in naturalism’s denial 
                                                
63 While an extended description of Tillich’s theological conception of the relationship between 
essence and existence is beyond the scope of this paper, it is helpful to briefly elaborate for our 
particular purposes some definition from his Systematic Theology. Drawing from the Platonic 
concept of form or idea, Tillich, after admitting the general ambiguity of the terms, lists possible 
definitions of essence. In part, he writes, “The basic ambiguity … lies in the oscillation of the 
meaning between an empirical and a valuating sense. Essence as the nature of a thing, or as the 
quality in which a thing participates, or as a universal, has one character. Essence as that from 
which being has ‘fallen,’ the true and undistorted nature of things, has another character. … Why 
has this ambiguity persisted in philosophy since Plato? The answer … lies in the ambiguous 
character of existence, which expresses being and at the same time contradicts it – essence as 
that which makes a thing what it is (ousia) has a purely logical character; essence as that which 
appears in an imperfect and distorted way in a thing carries the stamp of value. Essence 
empowers and judges that which exists.” In his list of the possibilities for the meaning of 
existence, he writes that “It can mean the possibility of finding a thing within the whole of being, 
it can mean the actuality of what is potential in the realm of essences, it can mean the “fallen 
world,” and it can mean a type of thinking which is aware of its existential conditions or which 
rejects essence entirely. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), 202–3. 
64 Describing the historical implications of finite freedom, Tillich writes, “Man is free, in so far 
as he has language … which liberate(s) him from bondage to the concrete situation to which 
even the highest animals are subjected; … as he is able to ask questions about the world he 
encounters; … as he can receive unconditional moral and logical imperatives which indicate he 
can transcend the conditions which determine every finite being; … as he has the power of 
deliberating and deciding, thus cutting through the mechanisms of stimulus and response; … as 
he can play and build imaginary structures above the real structures to which he, like all beings, 
is bound; … as he has the faculty of creating the world of technical tools and products, the world 
of artistic expressions, the world of theoretical structures and practical organizations. Finally, 
man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature. Man is 
free even from his freedom; that is he can surrender his humanity.” Paul Tillich, Systematic 




of the human predicament as represented in the doctrine of original sin. Naturalism “does not try 
to answer the question of why man is aware of negativity as something that should not be and for 
which he is responsible.”65 While negating naturalism, Tillich does not remove nature from 
neither human existence nor its responsible character. The human responsibility inherent in finite 
freedom is bound with the element of what Tillich names human destiny, comprising the 
biological, psychological, sociological and geographical foundations of nature that influence 
human action.66 Humans have the freedom to act and to make history, and, even with the limits 
of finite freedom and nature, are responsible for the consequences of those history-making 
actions.  
In an accompanying chapter by Edwyn Bevan, a then fellow at Oxford’s New College, 
the argument for human volition alongside Divine intention was further presented. Positing 
natural processes’ essences as the domain of the will of God, Bevan writes of the individual 
encounter with history as an encounter with both the essence of the natural and the consequences 
of the totality of human volition that has come before, on to which the human in the new context 
performs. Drawing upon the realist philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann that posited within the 
human the unique attribute within nature of purposive activity, Bevan writes, “(W)e, by our 
voluntary choices each in our own measure, determine what the next moment in history is to be. 
The future will be different according to what men decide now.”67  The responsible human acts 
within the context of the consequences of human action come before, and with the present 
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consequences of his own actions for which he is responsible, and that responsibility extends to 
consequences in the future, although, as contemporary discussions of responsibility point out, the 
scope of that responsibility is contested.68 
Tillich describes a responsibility that is inherently social, expressed as a consciousness of 
“special vocation” within historical groups that are unified by particular meaning and value.69 
Tillich expands on this in his systematics, explaining, like Buber, that individual humans become 
actualized in encounter with others in a community. It is these communities that are the “direct 
bearers” of history and vocational responsibility, yet this responsibility does not exist as a reality 
independent of the individual humans that comprise them. It is the individuals in their sociality 
who remain the responsible center for “willing and acting.”70  
Tillich also argued that historical time is qualitative rather than quantitative, over against 
physical or biological time. Historical time has a beginning, a center – which he would later 
define as the Christ event – and an end. Thus historical time has the possibility of innovation 
enabled by the action of free purposive human activity that can break through the cyclic time of 
nature and biological evolution. Rather than a steady progression, each historical time period 
exists with its own character and contribution within the totality of history. “Billions of years 
before and after man appeared on the earth neither continue nor frustrate the meaningful 
direction of history. Neither the end nor the beginning of history can be designated on the place 
of physical time.”71 With this argument, Tillich establishes history as the concrete, real playing 
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field for free and consequential human social action, for which the human within the context of 
their community and of their time is responsible.  
The Kingdom of God 
With the ideas of progressive history set aside, along with its concomitant positing of 
ultimate meaning in a final stage of history, the contributors to the Oxford volume drew upon 
Christian doctrine as the interpretive methodology for history, particularly Christian eschatology 
and the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. In this thinking, the finite human acting in freedom in a 
contextual history is responsible to an infinite meaning beyond history.  
While the preceding Life and Work discussion at Stockholm drew upon elements of 
Social Gospel thinking regarding the Kingdom of God, despite attempts to bracket doctrine, the 
discussion at Oxford picked up the theme directly, placing it in a new and transparently central 
position for ecumenical thinking for social ethics.72 In the Christian concept of the Kingdom of 
God, they argued, historical existence found its meaning while leaving with human agency the 
responsibility for consequential action. The Kingdom of God provided a content for history in 
which a final realization, rather than moving progressively toward its end, remained 
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transcendent, beyond history, but at the same time provided an immanent aspect that operated 
within history. The Kingdom of God pointed toward God’s activity within concrete history, 
inviting human agents to take responsibility as co-creators within history. The Kingdom of God, 
likewise, provided not only the objective aim for historical action, but also provided the 
evaluative criteria for the exercise of responsibility. Within this interpretative framework 
emerged the social method for the Oxford Conference in which the free human agent is 
responsible to God; is responsible for her actions, which are historically consequential; and those 
actions are evaluated by what Lyman would call “the moral will of God,” and Tillich would 
name the “ultimate criterion.”73 
Covenant, Revelation and Existence 
The writers of the volume drew upon Christian eschatology as the counterpoint to 
inadequate modernist systems. Contrasting the Christian interpretation of history with his outline 
of the evolutionary optimistic view, Lyman drew upon three characteristics of the Christian 
interpretation of history that comprise, finally, the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. These 
characteristics are covenant, revelation and existence.  
First is the Judaic conception of “ethical monotheism” as represented in the tradition of 
God’s covenant relationship with the people of Israel. In this covenant, a historical people are 
provided a divine deliverance and are held to a responsibility to a divine criterion. “The covenant 
relation involved the obligation of obedience and loyalty to the moral will of God.” Drawing 
upon the prophetic writings of the Hebrew Scriptures and beyond, history is provided the 
                                                





meaning that ancient paganism and modern rationalism are unable to deliver, in which the 
covenantal relationship “rests back on God’s moral will and in which men bear a responsible and 
active part.”74  
The second element of the Kingdom of God as the methodology for the interpretation of 
history is the fact of divine revelation in which divine “eternal values” can be promulgated and 
received. Such values provide the basis of history’s meaning and the content of responsibility. 
Furthermore, the eternal values move within history, providing basic foundations and new truths 
contingent on time and context, judged by tradition. “Each of the special divine acts in history 
involves a further revealing of eternal values with no diminution in the significance of those 
already revealed. … And when one sees [in other historic events] further divine acts and new 
revealings of eternal values, these can only be acknowledged when they are in harmony with the 
supreme religious value which is revealed in Jesus Christ.”75 
Finally, Lyman squarely posits within history’s meaning a Christian conception of what 
this author would call “dynamic existence,” understood as events in history that are “concrete 
realities with reference to which eternal values are decisive norms, or structural principals, and 
apart from which those values have only abstract logical significance.” As Tillich would contrast 
essence and existence, Lyman posited a historical existence within Christian thought in which 
events themselves have consequence and meaning over against “illusory appearances or 
shadowy and confused expressions of eternal essences,” which he credited to Indian and Greek 
thought. Within this dynamic existence, the moral will of God is made known through 
embodiment in historical agents who not only have an obligation and responsibility to God but to 
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one another, creating a “spiritually dynamic community” in which the will of God is further 
promulgated and enacted. 76 
These characteristics – covenant, revelation, and dynamic existence comprise the concept 
of the Kingdom of God as both the immanent ground of history while transcending all that 
encompasses history, providing history with its direction and meaning. In his description of this 
interpretation, Lyman moves toward the homiletical. 
Since history is the realm of man’s purposeful activity and moral responsibility 
in dependence on the moral will of God, its ultimate explanation can never be in 
terms of naturalistic determinism but must always be in terms of the activity of 
the living God – saving men, holding men responsible, … and binding men 
together in an organic unity. … History thus has a direction determined by the 
eternal values of God’s nature and by his active willing toward their realization, 
and it has a goal in the community of love which it the body of Christ. The goal 
of the community of love is itself transcendent-immanent. It cannot be 
completely realized in history, since God and the meaning of his love transcend 
history, and hence it implies an eternal life which is beyond the bounds of this 
earthly existence. But no other limits can be placed to its realization in history.77 
 
  In his essay, Tillich posited the concept of the Kingdom of God as a “symbolic 
expression of the ultimate meaning of existence,” relating the “unconditioned meaning of 
existence to actual existence.”78 Rather than pointing exclusively toward a final fulfillment, the 
Kingdom of God gives meaning to the actions within concrete history, while at the same time 
never allowing these actions at any one time to lay claim to fulfillment of the concept. Tillich 
points to the Augustinian tradition of the contrast of the two Kingdoms to understand this active 
relationship. “The Kingdom of God is expected to triumph over the kingdoms of this world; it is 
a dynamic power acting in history, materializing itself in history although never becoming 
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identical with history.”79 For Tillich, the Kingdom of God as the suprahistorical interpreter of 
history restored the distinction between human existence and human essence that progressive 
theories of history erased, securing to the human the characteristics of agency and responsibility. 
“There is no progress with respect to the creative works of culture or with respect to the morality 
of mankind. The first is impossible because creativity is a matter of grace, not of growth; the 
second is impossible because morality is a matter of free decision, and consequently not a matter 
of delivery and tradition.”80 Likewise, theories that reduced history to the level of nature, Tillich 
claimed, erased distinctions of truth and goodness, reducing the human to an autonomous self. 
Idealistic theories, such as those of Plato and Neo-Platonism, positing meaning in an eternity 
severed from historical activity, emptied history of meaning, and thus the human from 
accountability. The human, accountable to the meaning of history, remains free and responsible. 
History as Applied Theology  
In regard to the methodology of the Christian interpretation of history, Tillich employed 
his idea of bi-polarity, placing the responsibility for political engagement as constitutive for 
historical existence. These poles comprise the Kingdom of God, which provides the subjective 
“religious-transcendent” interpretive root, alongside the objective “political-immanent” root, 
which involves political action in the broader sense, understood as those reflective activities the 
goals of which are the formation of community. The criteria and values for historical 
interpretation are provided by the concept of the Kingdom of God, while the immanent root 
provides the material for the dynamic and concrete action that participate in and are measured by 
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the religious-transcendent root, but are not constitutive of it. “This bi-polar method … does not 
… mean that the theological decisions are subjected to the political ones, neither does it mean 
that political decision acquired theological dignity. It rather means that the divine claim over the 
world is not kept within an abstract transcendence but is used for evaluating and molding actual 
reality. Religious interpretation of history is applied theology.”81 Here, Tillich worked to ensure 
the integrity of the suprahistorical meaning of history, while allowing for its embodiment in what 
would necessarily be the conflicted space of historical existence.  
 In the third volume of his Systematic Theology, Tillich would expand on this conflicted 
space, particularly with his discussion of historical ambiguities, in which the goals of human 
activity in their contingent and finite limitations both reach and fall short of the ultimate aims of 
the religious-transcendent root.82 Historical actors, or interpreters, operating within historical 
context, engage in concrete action and reflection on that action in historical context, not abstract 
reflection apart from history. This immanent reflection draws the actor into engagement with the 
Other, revealing both the transcendent values governing the action and the values’ judgment 
upon the action. “The purpose of this process of reflection on the part of one who is acting 
historically is to help him to perceive the spiritual presuppositions on which his action is based 
and further, by the ‘give and take’ of discussion with those who hold views, either to justify, or, 
if necessary, to alter his own basic principles, and thus to give spiritual weight and the power to 
create community to historical action.”83 Responsible historical action both requires and creates 
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historical community, in which actors acknowledge and engage each other, and are responsible 
to each other, and to God, for their dialogue and action. 84 
 This responsible community, in which ideas are exchanged, values are delineated, 
decisions are implemented, and consequences are judged operates within a historically 
contingent and contextual field. In the historical continuum, progress and decline are achieved in 
dynamic circumstances in which settled tradition and the status quo of power are continually 
contested and submitted to the community. In his opening address, Reinhold Niebuhr, who had 
not contributed directly to the Oxford volume on the topic of the Kingdom of God and history, 
pointed to this contested space. He addressed the relationship between the Kingdom and history, 
emphasizing the finite and contingent characteristics of culture and time, and the Kingdom of 
God’s positing of responsibility for the world on its historical actors. “While the gospel which 
we preach reveals a world which in its ground and its fulfillment transcends human history, it 
does not abstract us from this present history with all of its conflicts and tragic disappointments 
                                                
84 In discussing Tillich’s writing on historical ambiguity and the role of demonic in secular 
history, it is appropriate to note the ongoing reevaluation of his work in light of longstanding 
revelations regarding his sexual promiscuity; his relationship with his wife, Hannah; and his 
general treatment of women, a critique of male theologians that is not confined to Tillich. In an 
essay working to redeem Tillich’s theology in light of critical dismissals resulting from his 
sexual attitudes and behavior, Russell Re Manning of Bath Spa University suggests that Tillich’s 
focus on ambiguity may point to a subversion of the liberal modern project in favor of a 
commitment “to the embrace of difference and to the fractured – and fracturing – polyvalence of 
life, in all its forms, conditioned and unconditioned.” An extended examination of ambiguity, 
sex, and history as it relates to Tillich’s theology is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the 
notion of immanent historical ambiguities comprising the failure of finite and contingent human 
activity in reaching its ultimate – represented in the values of the Kingdom of God – as well as 
Tillich’s attention to the role of the demonic forces of history as destructive of meaning, inform 
the notion of Oxford Responsibility, which does not allow the reality of Tillich’s thinking and 
action to proceed untouched. Russell Re Manning, “Life, Sex, and Ambiguity,” in Les 
Ambiguïtés de la Vie Selon Paul Tillich: Travaux Issus du XXIe Colloque International de 
l’Association Paul Tillich d’Expression Française, ed. Marc Dumas, Jean Richard, and Bryan 




of arrogant hopes.”85 Cultures across geography and across time carry the ongoing responsibility 
for moving from the abstract to the concrete. “Every human civilization is a compromise 
between the necessities and contingencies of nature and the Kingdom of God with its absolute 
love commandment.”86 What Niebuhr would call “the law of love” inherent in the concept of the 
Kingdom of God posits within our concept of Oxford Responsibility obedience to the will of 
God discerned and exercised in political engagement toward the repeated achievement of justice 
within society. 
 In his essay on the topic, Heinz-Dietrich Wendland, who at the time was moving from 
Heidelberg to Kiel, argued for the centrality of Christian responsibility for the interpretation of 
history, recognizing it as a consistent operation. “(W)e have to speak the concrete Word of 
Christian interpretation which changes with each change in historical existence.”87 Wendland 
warned against conceptions of Christian interpretation that posited the Kingdom of God as 
“purely transcendent,” with no responsibility for the task of the interpretation of contemporary 
realities, as well as a “secularized Christianity” that submitted the Gospel to political and 
philosophical expediency. He acknowledges the challenges inherent in avoiding such 
misconceptions. 
The transition to the concrete theological statement which interprets the present 
always brings with it some elements of secular historical existence; these 
elements are drawn from the connection of this existence with space and time and 
the life of a particular people; they spring from the distinctive quality of the 
historical consciousness. … This procedure is necessary, because we can only 
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form our judgments by starting from the concrete historical position in which we 
stand.88 
 
Politics and political decision making was, for Wendland, a key historical element in play 
within Christian interpretation, and one that could not be avoided theologically. Responsibility 
for the political could not be escaped. “Even in a theology which lies quite beyond politics and 
historical realities this is in some sense present, though concealed; for there is no one who does 
not take some part, be it only by negations, in the political world. Even the person who rejects 
every political decision within the state system to which he belongs commits himself by that very 
fact to a decision.”89 
While Wendland was careful not to minimize what he saw as the boundary between the 
Kingdom of God and secular historical existence, he maintained for the human actor in 
community the freedom and responsibility for historical action, subject to the judgment of God. 
Like Tillich, Wendland recognized the ambiguities inherent in historical action, rising from the 
intersection of the divine and the demonic in human activity, neither of which can be definitively 
ascribed to historical events in binary fashion.  
Both Wendland and Tillich addressed the issue of the demonic as an operative force in 
history, seeing in these forces, the call to historical responsibility. Wendland defined the demonic 
as a will opposed to God, creating an illusion of power and autonomy for the historical actor that 
must be confronted. Tillich used his notion of bi-polarity to find in the demonic the push toward 
responsible historical action. This bi-polarity comprises the kairos, containing the ultimate 
meaning of history, and the context of Christian historical action which itself is bi-polar, 
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containing both demonic elements – defined as “that destructive, blind, chaotic element which is 
implied in all powerful creating movements and drives them toward final dissolution” – and the 
situational demand of the kairos.90 Here the demonic is the creative element of history that must 
be responsibly engaged in its bi-polarity, or the action is emptied of its meaning. For Tillich, the 
demonic threats of the present time were autonomistic capitalism, nationalism, and 
authoritarianism, for which “the protagonists of the Christian view of history” were responsible 
to confront.91 
In these two significant volumes – The Christian Understanding of Man and The 
Kingdom of God and History – the Oxford contributors had established the ground for Oxford 
Responsibility, which we have previously defined as a society in which its members and 
institutions act in accordance with human value and freedom, in obedience to the will of God, 
toward the achievement of justice within the limits, ambiguities and contingencies of human 
finitude, culture and history. This responsibility was shaped by their explication of the dignity 
and agency of the human; the rejection of progressive history for an immanent historical 
existence in which actions have consequences within a contested space; and a historical space 
imbued with meaning, delivered by the transcendent values of the Christian doctrine of the 
Kingdom of God, that calls the responsible agent into engagement for the common good. The 
work of the Conference and its subsequent volumes would work to define the applied 
particularities of this responsibility.
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE APPLICATION OF OXFORD RESPONSIBILITY 
In this chapter we will examine the practical foundations of Oxford Responsibility as 
applied within the ecumenical social method of the Oxford Conference. We have seen that the 
social method followed by Oxford found its foundation in its understanding of the nature of God 
as creative, loving and relational, who has revealed as the goal of creation the values of the 
Kingdom of God, exemplified by the law of love. Further we have examined Oxford’s 
understanding of theological anthropology positing the human as possessive of an inherent 
dignity and autonomy that makes humans at their core responsible. At the same time, Oxford 
understood that human dignity, freedom and value that support responsibility existed alongside 
human finitude, exemplified by the limits of human knowledge and the reality of sin, yet these 
limits made the human no less responsible. Further, we have seen that this responsibility is 
enacted within a history open to the consequences of human culture and action. We have further 
shown that, within Oxford Responsibility, the subjective exercise of this responsibility to the 
Other comprises the realization of authentic human existence through engagement with the 
Other.  Finally, we have seen that the values of the Kingdom of God expose human existence 
and action as present in historical context and contingency, and thus are under the judgment of 
the Kingdom of God and its demand for political engagement in history.  
In the following pages we will see how the Oxford Conference both applied and 




of how the Conference conceived of ecclesiology, answering the question of where a living 
responsibility resides. We will posit within the very nature of the church the responsibility for 
engagement in history and particularly how this responsibility largely rests not in its direct 
responsibility to various societal spheres, such as the state or the economy, but in its 
responsibility to the laity. We will also show how the Lutheran concept of “Orders of Creation” 
and the Roman Catholic concept of subsidiarity influence the location of social responsibility, 
further accentuating the responsibility of the church toward the empowerment of the laity. 
Further we will identify key actors of responsibility – the “who” of responsibility. We will see 
how the Oxford effort was relentless in its justification for and inclusion of laity within the 
responsible decision-making process. We will also show how, housed within this decision-
making process, Oxford Responsibility operates with the demands and limits explained by 
Christian realism, which, at the same, time posits on the human actor continuing responsibility. 
These understandings then lead to the development of the concept of middle axioms, as the 
applied ethical fulcrum between general ethical directives and partisan specificity. We will then 
conclude with a deep look into the further application of the Oxford method, using as an example 
the Conference’s sectional work on “Church and Community.”  We will find in Oxford 
Responsibility the possibilities of ecumenical social ethics that may find a dynamic unity in a 
common faith that, at the same time, moves Christian communities deeper into an incarnational 
reality of God active in an ambiguous history. Within this process, finite differences toward 




Joseph Oldham and the Vision for the Oxford Conference  
 In his preparatory work for the Oxford Conference, Joseph Oldham was at pains to 
position the work of the Oxford Conference as the beginning of a continuing process of 
engagement that would move the church in its ongoing responsibility within society and culture. 
In his extensive correspondence and collaboration with his co-organizer in New York, Henry 
Van Dusen, in the years leading up to the Conference, Oldham belabored the point that the work 
of the Oxford Conference would not find its completion in the summer of 1937, but would have 
“any real meaning only if it is thought of in terms of the next twenty years. If we think we have 
to complete our job by the Oxford Conference, it just has no sense at all, since the thing cannot 
be done. We are only at the first beginnings of what must necessarily be a long and continuing 
process.”1 Van Dusen saw in Oldham’s strategy an impediment to gaining support for the work 
of the Conference, both intellectually and financially; writing that such a process would not 
“quicken interest in the total undertaking”2 Oldham was steadfast. For him, the responsibility of 
the Conference was in the end the responsibility of the Church to engage the vital issues of the 
time in the context and contingencies of history, through a broad and continuing dialogue 
comprising the church and wider society, toward the achievement of long-term justice. This task 
was not the lone responsibility of a church comprised of clerics and academics, but was, at its 
core, a responsibility of the laity. The angst, passion and felt urgency was evident in Oldham’s 
correspondence, where he lamented the condition of the church in face of global threats to its 
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existence and the need for a reorientation toward responsibility for the church and for Christians 
who comprised it.  
(T)he issue with which I am fundamentally concerned is one which … makes an 
appeal to all who sincerely desire to face the realities of life. Just in proportion as 
it is fully and honestly faced will the Oxford Conference count for something real 
in the life of the world. What is most fundamental in my attitude in regard to this 
issue is the result, to a very large extent, of contact with the type of man both here 
and in America, who is taking on his shoulders the load of responsibility for 
world affairs. More and more as I come into contact with people of this kind I feel 
that they are getting down to their job much more seriously and effectively than 
many of the people in the churches. We religious people are so ready to be 
satisfied with what is merely a talking shop; if the Oxford Conference is allowed 
to be only that – and there is a real danger that it may not be much more than that 
– the men who matter most in the world today are going to have very little use for 
it. If those who come to the Conference, or at least a considerable proportion of 
them, are resolute and determined men who are free from all illusions and who 
realise that the most that the Oxford Conference can do is to give some guidance 
and direction in the carrying out of tasks which will claim the dedication of their 
whole lives, it will be abundantly worth holding.3 
 
 The tension between Oldham and Van Dusen continued up until the very start of the 
Conference, with Van Dusen concerned about the essays and the process that would be followed 
at the Conference, complaining that papers were too lengthy, diffuse and analytical, and lacking 
adequate conclusion and recommendations. Van Dusen was also generally concerned that the 
diversity of contributors and participants might also prove problematic.4 Yet Oldham was 
confident that an organic process of dialogue respecting the peculiarities and sensitivities of the 
various contributors would result in significant and important dialogue during the delegates’ time 
together. The goal was not to move into the Conference with predetermined outcome, but to 
equip persons with the thought and data necessary for dialogue and decision in ambiguous 
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circumstances. “I feel about the reports that whatever their defects enough hard thinking has 
been done and enough clarification of the issues to make possible during the days at Oxford a 
good bit of work (if the people are there to do it) which would have been quite impossible 
without the preliminary thinking. … The permanent value of the work of the Oxford Conference 
will depend on whether it can provide a starting point for thought in the future.”5 Oldham saw in 
the process not only an urgency, but a spiritual humility that was open to the movement of God, 
which both revealed historical limitations and human finiteness without abdicating responsibility 
for action, especially on part of the Church. “It may be part of God’s dealing with the Church 
that we have said something significant and impressive but knowing our own weakness and 
setting ourselves humbly to learn how we may serve God’s purpose in our generation.”6 
 Oldham stubbornly insisted on this organic process that saw cultural context, historical 
contingency and human finitude not as obstacles to be circumvented or jettisoned for sake of 
agreement, but as integral to what we are calling Oxford Responsibility. In a letter to Rev. 
Henry-Louis Henriod, joint General Secretary of the World Alliance for International Friendship 
and Life and Work, Oldham insisted that the Conference be organized as to be nimble and able 
to respond and refocus the agenda as issues emerged in the unpredictable context of the time. 
“This is not going to resemble any ordinary conference for which the programme can be planned 
in advance. It is going to be a meeting of the Churches at a critical moment in human history and 
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in the history of the Church, when the whole future of Christianity may depend on the right 
decisions being reached in regard to vital issues.”7  
A Responsible Ecclesiology  
  Within the twentieth century ecumenical movement, the debate and divide between 
doctrine and praxis in general, and ecclesiology and ethics in particular, had been a steady theme, 
as illustrated by the continuing divisions between the Faith and Order, and Life and Work areas 
of the WCC. The Oxford Conference, building upon the foundations of its immediate 
predecessors, however, had within it an ecumenical vision of ecclesiology that did not simply 
complement or coexist with its social ethics, but rather presented a mutually dependent 
relationship between the pair. 
 Recent commentators have claimed, however, that ecclesiology was not a major point of 
discussion at the Oxford Conference, pointing to organizers’ later attempts supposedly to backfill 
an ecclesiological foundation to the work done there.8 Indeed, Ehrenström, in his recollections of 
the Conference, acknowledges that its purpose precluded the development of “any coherent and 
unified conception of the Church.”9 Yet the motto, “Let the Church be the Church!”, which, 
while not appearing in the Conference’s published material, did become the Conference’s 
defining cry, leading one to inquire of the “controlling insights” that participants and those 
influenced by its work placed and found within the Conference’s output.10 It is the author’s 
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contention that with this central operating ecclesiology, delegates constructed a process for 
responsible social ethics that ignored neither the nature of the church nor its mission.  
 Preparations for Oxford proceeded without the unrealistic notion under which delegates 
of 1925’s Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm began deliberations. 
The Stockholm gathering had deliberately been scheduled to meet apart from that year’s 
Washington meeting of the World Conference on Faith and Order, despite suggestions to the 
contrary. It began with the motto, “Coummunio in adorando et serviendo oecumenica,” with the 
underlying optimistic organizing principle that “doctrine divides, but service unites.” By 
focusing on the church’s response to contemporary issues at the exclusion of concerted doctrinal 
discussion, it was hoped that Life and Work could advance the aims of Faith and Order through 
social cooperation, breaking down the “walls and prejudices” between denominations.11 
Subsequent proceedings disavowed delegates of the notion that churches could easily transcend 
doctrinal disagreement through a focus on praxis. In his history of the Conference, written three 
decades later, Ehrenström credited Stockholm with beginning a tense evolution of Life and Work 
in struggling together with Faith and Order to move beyond doctrinal, denominational, and 
national interests, laying the groundwork for Oxford and its concept of responsibility.12 The idea 
of ignoring differences in order to reach consensus was neither tenable nor warranted. Rather, 
any progress toward ecumenical unity and effectiveness would require attention to the nature and 
mission of the church itself. Lutheran Archbishop of Sweden, Nathan Söderblom, a key 
organizer of the Stockholm Conference, reminded the delegates in his closing sermon of the 
urgency of the task. Drawing upon the remarks of a layperson who had earlier addressed the 
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Conference, Söderblom claimed for the church the duty to offer “confidence in the inner light 
and its attending moral courage” to those distressed “men and nations” who seek “safety where 
experience … shows there is no refuge.13 Söderblom, who died in 1931, and members of the 
continuation committee that led to Oxford, realized a keen connection between confession and 
action, as well as the realistic urgency of the ecumenical task in bringing the two together. 
 The Oxford Conference’s focus on Life and Work did indeed work to provide an answer 
to a three-fold question of ecclesiology – what is the church, what is the church for, and who or 
what comprises the church? – without jettisoning or trivializing confessional issues, a charge that 
the Life and Work section has long endured since the formation of the WCC begun soon after the 
Conferences of 1937.14 While the history of the ecumenical movement’s interpretation of 
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ecclesiology is beyond the purpose and scope of this paper, it is its contention that the Oxford 
Conference supposed and developed an ecclesiology regarding the nature and composition of the 
church that was not merely instrumental, but integral to its conception of the social function of 
the church.  
The Streams of Ecclesiological Thought 
 In CFS, the preparatory text provided to delegates by Visser ’t Hooft and Oldham, 
organizers took as their fundamental starting point a “fresh consideration of the meaning of 
Church and the nature of its mission.”15 They did not seek to answer the question from the 
perspective of an end in denominational reunion, which admittedly was the “special 
responsibility” of the Conference of Faith and Order. Rather, they sought to develop a realistic 
understanding of the church’s nature that accounted for its divine esse as well as its paradoxical 
life in the penultimate earthly kingdom. Two parallel streams of this ecclesiological thought flow 
through the Conference’s output, converging in the idea of a Church within the churches with a 
particular responsibility for ecumenical dialogue and contextual action.  
 The first stream takes serious account of the diversity of ecclesiological thought across 
the denominational spectrum. Indeed, the first section of the foundational text written by Visser 
’t Hooft outlined common and individual doctrinal conceptions of the Church including those of 
the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Reformed and other Protestant 
churches, as well as modernist conceptions that “attempt to adapt Christian truth to the findings 
of science and to the contemporary secular philosophies.”16 This stream proceeded with neither 
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the intention of minimizing any differences, nor finding path to compromise. Instead the 
Conference posits this diversity of thought as integral to the nature of the church within the 
tension of the ideal and actual. To claim the ability to do otherwise – to conceive of an 
ecclesiological standpoint beyond the existing viewpoints of the various denominations – was to 
create an ecumenical utopia. Preparatory material stated “a standpoint which transcends the 
actual standpoints of the Churches does not exist.” To construct such a standpoint would create 
“a new and different Church.” The ecumenical effort could not progress unless ecumenists 
recognized the permanent reality of the churches’ very lack of unity on the topic of the church. 
“It is a conditio sine qua non of any oecumenical work that each Church, and the oecumenical 
movement as a whole, should realize this fact, and not try to cover it up by ambiguous language. 
… It is only by a frank facing of real differences that advance can be made.”17 
 The tenor of the document echoed that of Karl Barth’s essay for the Edinburgh 
Conference that would follow Oxford. Both rejected a branch theory that held each individual 
church as a composite ingredient of the Church as a whole. Such a conception paid scant 
attention to the actual and fundamental differences existing between denominations that could 
not be reconciled without rejecting some in favor of others, or crafting a wholly new 
formulation, which would effectively deny “the validity of those conceptions of the Church 
which claim to be true, and not merely to be aspects of a many-sided spiritual harmony.”18 Here 
the ecumenical effort maintained as fundamental the freedom and imperative to make claims for 
Christian truth without compromise. As Barth wrote, “If we listen to Christ, we cannot believe in 
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one of the alternatives and hold the other also to be Christian; our life is lived within the 
differences which divide the churches, and not in a region which transcend them.”19  
 The search for unity did not call for agreement or compromise, nor idealistic “doses of 
love, patience, and tolerance.” Barth pointed out that while necessary and effective in other 
aspects of earthly life, within a church striving for unity such sentimental methods were futile, 
hopeless and anathema to the Gospel, “unless the churches are dead already” in their weak 
efforts to obey God.20 The fact of the church in the differences was for both Barth and the 
Oxford organizers the result of human finitude and sin, “the impossible thing which has intruded 
itself, as guilt which we must take upon ourselves, without the power to liberate ourselves from 
it,” wrote Barth.21 These themes regarding the reality and imperative of this paradox would be 
taken up more specifically in CFCL by writers including William Temple, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
John Bennett and others. Perhaps with a glance to Stockholm, Visser ’t Hooft and Oldham 
concluded, as well, that the “present impasse is a sign that unity cannot be made by men, but can 
only be acknowledged and received when God actually gives it.”22 This dynamism, then, 
eschewed any attempt to provide a static conception of the church. Rather, it saw the church as 
finding its being and mission within historical reality. In his review of the history of the 
Churches, making distinctions between the Roman Catholic Church; the churches in Great 
Britain, Europe and the United States, and the “Younger Churches” of Asia and Africa, Visser ’t 
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Hooft emphasized the perpetual need to attend to the historical context of the church, claiming 
that “it is impossible to understand a Church apart from its concrete setting.”23 
 According to Barth, this did not, nor could not, require that an ecclesiological space be 
found apart from the reality of divided churches in order to settle doctrine or ethics. Barth, not 
surprisingly, insisted that churches, individually when necessary, but together as well, ask 
themselves if they are indeed following the voice of Christ, “or just some magical, aesthetic, or 
rationalist bent?”24 In wrestling with this question and confronting the mundanely inevitable 
differences and contradictions between the churches that would be made evident in the exchange, 
the true church, the church in the churches, would be made visible. This ecumenical 
understanding was the ground for the work of the Oxford Conference, recognizing the reality of 
a unity that is the church within the churches, but refusing to attempt the task of concretizing the 
nature of the church, which would risk obscuring the reality of the true, unified church. As we 
have cited earlier, Visser ’t Hooft wrote,  
The position is, then, that we believe together that there is a Church in the 
Churches, but that we cannot say together how and where it exists, or how and 
where it functions. … It is … humanly speaking, impossible to discover how out 
of [the] different approaches we may come to one common conviction as to what 
the Church in the Churches really is, and how it should be concretely expressed in 
oecumenical form. There is no “way out” of this situation. For every so-called 
“way out” proves in fact to be an element which complicates the situation even 
more. We are therefore obliged to recognize the fact of our disagreement as to the 
nature of the Church as well as the fact of our agreement as to the reality of the 
Church. … Unity is not achieved; but it happens when men listen together to 
God, and when He is willing to give it to them.25 
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 The reality of both unity and diversity, requiring a consistent engagement across 
divisions of culture and doctrinal understandings, in which men and women listen to God and to 
each other, constituted a responsible ecclesiology. The very nature of the church, as is the nature 
of the human, is responsible. Within this understanding the church is the responsible church 
when it acknowledges through its words and actions the value and dignity of the human actor, 
and the reality of God’s presence within the Other.  
 The second ecclesial stream we find within the Oxford Conference work is grounded in 
the church’s obedience and responsibility to God, and its responsibility to discern the will of God 
and proclaim the Gospel. The Conference then would be more than an attempt to study and 
illuminate the contrasts of the churches within the Church on matters of social ethics, but to “be 
ready, if God wills, to speak on behalf of the Ekklesia Theou.” The Conference output would 
provide guidance to members of the Church, a Church transcendent of human-made boundaries 
of the state and the churches, in meeting the challenges of the world that resisted solutions from 
the “pagan or semi-pagan philosophies and principles” that totalitarian political schemes 
presented.26 The Conference would not define how it would be used, but would be ready to be 
used as a witness to the reality of the reign of God.  
 Such a move would affirm the Barthian demand for obedience to the Word of God, in 
which political action moves from and analogous with the Gospel, but proceeds further into the 
reality of political history, grounding the temporal work of the church in a Christian 
anthropology and the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. We have seen that within this stream, 
Conference writers explored the relation of the Kingdom of God and history, grounding there the 
ongoing social function of the church. Prominent here is Paul Tillich’s essay, in which he writes 
                                                




of the Kingdom not as a completion, a restoration of an original position, or a “unity of eternal 
essences,” but a “becoming” within the historical struggle.27 
Analogous to this line of thought, the Conference saw its own effort for unity as a light to 
the church’s nature and potential in history, illuminating not only the reality of differences and 
commonalities, but of the effects of culture and sin on that very perception of reality. “In its light 
we become troubled in our consciences about the self-satisfaction and complacency of our 
Churches, and learn to pray that God may give us the unity which we ourselves are unable to 
realize.”28 
A responsible ecclesiology at Oxford thus moved beyond what Barth could abide, as we 
have mentioned earlier, with contributors insisting that the Church, in its responsibility, must 
engage historical context and contingency through a dialogue that comprised church and society, 
recognizing the possibility of God’s revelation within the process. The process would deeply 
engage the whole of the church, beyond the academy and the pulpit.  
The Ordering of Society 
The concepts of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty provided foundation for what would 
be Oxford’s unyielding commitment to the role of the laity in its theory of responsibility. While 
the church had its particular role in and of itself within overall society, it also maintained a level 
or responsibility for the proper social functioning of other segments of society. This included the 
equipping of laity for their responsible work within these spheres, which were, in fact, the prime 
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area of historical action for the laity over against the formal representatives of the church, as we 
will address further below. 
Systematic theologian Werner Wiesner of Halle, Germany, wrote in CFCL of the role of 
the church in regard to the social spheres that comprise human culture. While humans could not 
dispense of the cultural institutions of gender, family, nation and state without being 
irresponsible, responsibility required attention by the church in moving persons to shape them 
according to divine will. “For as social institutions give a form to our intercourse with each 
other, they cannot be regarded as ethically neutral territory; we are as responsible for the 
institutions in which our intercourse is carried on as for that intercourse itself. Hence, all 
quietism which would leave the social order to itself, and forget our responsibility to shape it 
according to the Will of God [sic] must be rejected.”29 
Where the church abdicated its responsibility in this function was in assuming the role for 
itself, rather than addressing the responsibility of equipping laity, in the field, so to speak, for the 
work of vocation informed by Christian values. Oldham decried the “lack of clarity” on behalf of 
the church that “impeded and paralysed” laypersons in their responsibility for historical action in 
their context. For this work, laity certainly required a depth of theological scholarship and 
needed such thought to be placed in service to the contingent and contextual demands of history. 
To be responsible however, theological thought required conversation with sister components of 
society. Drawing from the work of Cambridge’s C. H. Dodd, who would contribute to the 
volume on The Kingdom of God and History, Oldham cited the need for the church to “grasp the 
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whole first-century Gospel in its temporary, historical, and therefore actual reality, and then 
make the bold and even perilous attempt to translate the whole into contemporary terms.”30 
Theological thought, Oldham argued, required engagement with voices beyond the field, 
not simply as sources, but as equal partners in the endeavor. This did not mean simply cross-
disciplinary academic cooperation, but “living and direct” engagement beyond the church and 
academy. “Theological thought will acquire a new relevance to the actual life of our time, if 
opportunities can be created for theologians to meet in personal conference with those 
responsible for the conduct of public affairs and of industry, with representatives of labour, with 
educators and members of other professions, and learn from them at what points Christian 
doctrine is relevant to their responsibilities, experience, problems, and needs.”31 
Orders of Creation 
To support this engagement of the church with wider society, Oxford worked to 
recognize the sovereignty and activity of God in God’s creation, drawing on concepts such as the 
Lutheran concept of Orders of Creation. Brunner, publishing in 1932 Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen, which would be translated as The Divine Imperative, outlined in his ethic the 
concept of the created “Orders”, which he defined as general laws of creation for the 
preservation and continuation of life that confront and engage the human in a communal context. 
These orders are more than laws, but are “those existing facts of human corporate life which lie 
at the root of all historical life as unalterable presuppositions, which, although their historical 
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forms may vary, are unalterable in their fundamental structure, and at the same time, relate and 
unite men to one another in a definite way.32 It is in these “spheres of life” that order the 
common life where God’s will meets humanity. In his Nature and Grace, that had received such 
repudiation from Barth, and had so rattled the Oxford Conference organizers, Brunner described 
the ordinances as “the constant factors of historical and social life.” Particular orders, such as 
marriage, Brunner distinguished as an “ordinance of creation,” as it was divinely instituted. 
Others he placed in the category of “ordinance of preservation,” which he saw as a theological 
response to the reality of sin, such as the ordinance of the State.33 Within these two 
classifications Brunner identified the orders as marriage and the family; labor and economics; 
law and state; culture comprising science, art, education and ‘free forms of community;” and 
faith and church.  
The Orders played a significant role within the Oxford Conference, not only by providing 
some structure around the discussion of the nature of society to which the church engaged, but 
also the occasion for the Conference’s opposition to the rise of German nationalism and its 
impact on the German church and the Jewish people. Within CFCL, several contributors 
addressed the nature of the Orders as instituted or willed by God, with the volume leaving the 
matter unresolved by design. Reinhold Niebuhr, in his extended discussion of natural law, called 
the “undue religious reverence for the ‘order of creation’ … particularly dangerous, because in 
human history the partial loyalties of the natural world always contain an element of sin which 
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does not belong to the order of nature.”34 Heidelberg’s Martin Dibelius affirmed Brunner’s 
distinctions, differentiating the orders of historical life, and, with Niebuhr, acknowledging the 
ambiguity introduced by sin within created life, which, he pointed out, “some German 
theologians call it demonic.”35 In contrast, while recognizing the historical limitations on the 
Orders, Wiesner argued that God had given “to historical and personal powers the authority to 
rule and judge us. It is not to ‘the State’ and ‘the nations’ as impersonal institutions that we are 
subject. The only question for the Christian is: Who has the power and, therefore, the divine 
authority? – whether a king, or a dictator, a national leader or a parliamentary majority.”36   
The tensions and differences in interpreting the Orders and the relation of responsibility 
to them were evident and were allowed to stand, with a realist lens taking a prime place in 
interpretation. While Oxford did not explicitly identify them as such, its research sections can be 
aligned with Brunner’s delineation of the Orders. As we have outlined, the research sections 
focused on Church and Community; Church and State; Church Community and State in Relation 
to the Economic Order; Church, Community and State in Relation to Education; and The 
Universal Church and the World of Nations. In its work in these areas, the Conference was 
organized so as to illumine in process and content the responsibility of the church in relation to 
the so-called ordinances. As part of this process, the organizers labored to delineate these 
responsibilities in a fashion that redeemed and confirmed the role of the church, while respecting 
and empowering the particular purviews of the various orders. This did not mean, however, that 
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the church would be neutral in these relations, but would in its responsibility attend upon the 
ordinances of God to hold the ordinances of society accountable to God’s will, empowering 
those Christians in their vocations outside of the church to take their freedom and responsibility 
to work for justice within creation and history.  
Subsidiarity 
Such an effort resonated with the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity, described in 
the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno from Pius XI in 1931 during the years in which the Oxford 
Conference was being planned.37 Subsidiarity is generally understood as a principle in which 
responsibility flows through a hierarchy of societal groups and institutions to the lowest or most 
foundational level that can reasonably be expected to achieve a particular social good. As 
Charles Curran points out in his work on Roman Catholic ecclesiology, there is a tendency that 
the church at its highest levels usurps roles and responsibilities better left to lower levels. 
Subsidiarity would instruct that “the higher level should help the lower level do all that it can and 
only take for itself that which cannot be done properly on the lower level.38  
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The principle would contribute to Oxford’s contributions, particularly regarding issues of 
the State. Ehronström, in a text originally intended for distribution to Conference delegates, but 
not published until after the Conference, draws on the concepts of orders and subsidiarity, 
particularly in relation to the state. Citing Luther’s concept that “God wills the diversity of 
institutions and associations” as a “universal Christian conviction,” Ehronström acknowledges 
Protestant wariness regarding Catholic doctrine regarding subsidiarity and the state, yet works to 
draw the two concepts together, quoting at length from Brunner’s work. “The functions of 
marriage, of the family, of economics and technique, of culture and education are not primarily 
concerned with the purpose of the state at all save in the fact that the state creates the framework 
for these institutions. Since, however, all these functions are menaced by evil, the state 
intervenes in order to compensate for the disintegration in fallen human nature. But so far as all 
these orders are concerned its function is clearly a subsidiary one.”39  
Likewise, Conference contributor William Temple, writing in the years following the 
Conference, would affirm the constructive nature of the relationship between societal groups and 
institutions, suggesting that “wider loyalties” are put to use to check the more narrow 
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commitments.40 These narrow commitments would include those “organic” cultural institutions, 
such as economics and religion that developed in human society, which, according to 
Ehronström would retain their “ontological purity” over the wider loyalties, such as the state.41 
While shaping the parameters of the Conference’s research sections and published output, 
the influence of the concept of subsidiarity also informed the work of the Conference in two 
other significant ways. First, it demanded that the scope of involvement move beyond the 
church’s mere internal reflection on the various spheres toward the inclusion of persons outside 
the church with particular expertise in the areas of concern, which we will discuss below. 
Second, it posited that such inclusion was not merely instrumental for the work of the church, but 
was integral to the church’s self-understanding and responsibility.  
Sphere Sovereignty  
Along with the work done with the Orders, the Oxford organizers would also resonate 
with the work of the late nineteenth century Calvinist theologian Abraham Kuyper, who 
developed a less hierarchical explication of “sphere sovereignty,” further developed by 
philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd in the mid-twentieth century. Dooyeweerd’s work sought, in 
part, to maintain for the concept its religious foundations. “Sphere sovereignty guarantees each 
societal sphere an intrinsic nature and law of life. And with this guarantee it provides the basis 
for an original sphere of authority and competence derived not from the authority of any other 
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sphere but directly from the sovereign authority of God”42 Sphere sovereignty recognized in the 
distinct orders this divinely-created responsibility for a unique social contribution for the right 
ordering of the social structure, along with an interrelationship between the spheres that, when 
operating responsibly, both enabled and respected the unique position of the respective sphere. 
Writes Kuyper, “All these spheres interlock like cogwheels, and precisely in acting upon one 
another and in meshing with one another, they produce the rich, multifaceted variety of human 
society. But this also brings with it the danger that one sphere may break in upon another like a 
jerky cogwheel that shears off one cog after another until the operation of the entire machine is 
disrupted.”43  
 Conference organizers saw in Kuyper’s work the foundation for the necessary work of 
the church across various societal spheres, particularly in regard to the relation between church 
and state. In its commission study prepared for the Conference, the Ecumenical Council in the 
Netherlands noted, for example, what they viewed as Kuyper’s rare “stand for a more organic 
social order, but as State and Church as such have held aloof,” noting the exception of the 
Roman Catholic encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno. Critiquing what it saw as 
the State and the Church’s acquiescence to the individualistic doctrines of economic freedom, the 
Dutch delegation heralded the labor movement, unsupported by the church, as an example of 
bridging “the gulf between Christianity and the further development of economic relations.”44 
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Within society, the church had a responsibility and an authority to engage with other spheres of 
society, placing upon them the church’s finite and dynamic discernment of the will of God for 
justice. Those Christians in the labor movement, equipped with the values of the Gospel and the 
church’s best discernment, would, in their respective vocations, take their responsibility and 
authority for the application and advancement of that justice through their relationships and their 
technical decisions and actions toward the achievement of justice.  
Responsibility and the Laity 
For Oldham, the church’s responsibility within the Oxford Conference was to mobilize 
“the best Christian thought of the world” that would intentionally include lay voices along with 
the input of the theological elite, which he saw as a unique and providential opportunity.45 
Oldham expressed such hopes in correspondence with Francis P. Miller, who was at the time the 
chair of the World Student Christian Foundation, and would go on to help found the Council on 
Foreign Relations. Responding to Miller’s critique of the Conference preparation and supposed 
lack of American participation, Oldham wrote of those involved in the preparatory work. “I am 
not disposed to limit this inner circle of collaborators to academic people. We are definitely 
trying to make links with people who are concerned with the active life of the world, with the 
younger generation and with the working man.”46 In this effort toward a wider conversation 
Oldham saw not only as a corrective to a narrow academic view, but a necessary starting point to 
make the work of the Conference effective and applicable on national and global scales. To not 
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include such voices was an abdication of responsibility on behalf of the church, and, as Oldham 
had indicated, a waste of time.  
 From the beginning of the preparations, Oldham was ever vigilant in working to expand 
the circle of contributors beyond the ecumenical elite comprising theological scholars and 
dominant ecclesial leaders. In a letter written to Archbishop Temple in July of 1933 Oldham 
sought to organize a meeting at the archbishop’s office in York that would specifically bring in 
lay persons for the planning of the Conference. In the letter he suggested among others the 
American-born British writer and poet T.S. Eliot. “He has the essentially lay mind and would, I 
think, make a contribution which we are not so likely to get from any of the others.” Oldham was 
particularly concerned with breaking from the norms of ecumenical discussion bound to 
conservative frameworks. He recounted his first meeting with Eliot in which he mentioned the 
name of the prominent ecumenist and missionary movement leader John Mott, himself a 
layperson, to which Eliot reportedly asked, “Who is John Mott?” to which Oldham replied “You 
have delighted me by your question since it shows that I have at last really got outside the 
religious world.”47 Eliot would serve on the Oxford Conference’s Advisory Council in Great 
Britain, along with other prominent laypersons, and go on to serve as a delegate to the 
Conference, presenting on the church as an ecumenical society. He would later be part of 
Oldham’s The Moot in the years following.48 
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In the introduction to the report of the Conference, Oldham emphasized what he sought 
to embody in the composition of the Conference, namely a diversity of thought from throughout 
the church and society, that would include a significant number of laity, for it was within the 
laity that responsibility and the mundane power for the transformation of society resided. Any 
mission that the church would accept would be first, from God, but, second, would be carried out 
by the laity. Along with delegates appointed by the various Churches, the Universal Christian 
Council had consulted for additional delegates from among the laity, representing “other 
departments of knowledge besides theology and possessing practical experience of public affairs. 
It would have been absurd for the Conference to have considered the relation of the Church to 
the common life, to government, to the economic order, and to international questions without 
the help of those who had expert knowledge and experience of actual responsibility in these 
fields.”49 
A review of the Oxford volumes published following the Conference confirms Oldham’s 
relative success in including laypersons at the core of the effort. These contributors, while not 
necessarily representing the “working man” of Oldham’s rhetoric, but comprising a cross-section 
of largely western male elite, they offered viewpoints beyond the appropriate boundaries of the 
church institutionally, ecumenically and ecclesiologically. These voices included academics 
from the United States, Great Britain and throughout Europe, from fields including education, 
international relations, law, pedagogy, philosophy, political science, and psychology. Three of 
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the five research sections were chaired by laypersons with vocations outside the church and 
theological academy.50 
The Church’s Function in Society 
As we have seen, the concepts of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty provided 
foundation for Oxford’s unyielding commitment to the role of the laity in its theory of 
responsibility. While the church had its particular role in and of itself within overall society, it 
also maintained a level of responsibility for the proper social functioning of other segments of 
society. This included the equipping of laity for their responsible work within these spheres, 
which were, in fact, the prime area of historical action for the laity over against the formal 
representatives of the church. The Oxford Conference argued that the it was the laity to whom 
responsibility moved in regard to God’s activity in public affairs, and it was the Church’s 
responsibility to equip the laity for that work through an inculcation of Christian values, spiritual 
formation, and a commitment to historical action.  
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In discussing the Church’s function in society, Oldham made three distinctions, first, 
between the Church of faith, and the Church as an institution; second, as a congregation in 
worship and as acting in the world; and third, the distinction between clergy and laity.  
Over against the Church as comprising persons active and united in discipleship to Jesus 
Christ, the Conference also understood the Church as a cultural institution, albeit connected to 
the divine, organized for worship, education, support and service. Drawing upon Troeltsch’s 
distinctions between “church” and “sect,” Oldham described the established western Church as 
one in which tensions with the world had largely relaxed, bringing forth Churches that, in the 
words of Reinhold Niebuhr, were “mixed bodies” in which “the Christian name becomes little 
more than ‘a quasi-religious and quasi-cultural enterprise, which is frequently content to add a 
pious phrase to whatever values, cultural, social, and political, the community may be 
pursuing.’”51 
The Church comprised persons that were a worshiping community with various degrees 
of commitment to the principles, commitments and responsibilities inherent within the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ. At the same time among those persons were “a company of redeemed persons 
transplanted into a new sphere of life in which their actions are determined by new principles” 
and a commitment to “a God who has a will and purpose for the world.”52 The Church then 
existed for the world and fulfilled its mission as it was attentive to God’s mission within the 
world. That mission would be achieved through the equipping of laity to act out of their own 
freedom and historical context for the transformation of society.  
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(I)f the Christian faith is in the present and future to bring about changes … in the 
thought, habits, and practices of society, it can only do this through being the 
living, working faith of multitudes of lay men and women conducting the 
ordinary affairs of life. The only way in which it can affect business or politics is 
by shaping the convictions and determining the actions of those engaged in 
business and politics. It remains inoperative and unproductive except in so far as 
it becomes a principle of action in the lives of those who are actually carrying on 
the work of the world and ordering its course in one direction or another. Obvious 
as this truth is … it does not, in fact, fill any large place in the picture called up in 
our minds when we use the word Church. The word does not in the least suggest 
the work of the world. It suggests Sunday, and what happens on Sunday. We can 
hardly exaggerate the loss resulting from this restriction of meaning.53 
 
The Oxford Conference interpreted this restriction of meaning as an abdication of 
responsibility that threatened to subsume the Church to State and secular forces that further 
threatened human freedom and existence.  
While recognizing the Church’s “constitutive functions” – the proclamation of the Gospel 
and the administration of the sacraments – the Conference warned that the Church’s attempt to 
protect its authority in regard to these functions at the expense of wider expressions of the 
Church contributed to this abdication. Oldham lamented a growing clericalism that shifted the 
responsibility of the laity to that of benefactors for the institution of the church, rather than for 
the transformation of society in service to God’s will. “Insistence on the essential, constitutive 
functions may lead too easily in practice … to a disastrous ecclesiasticising of the Church, so 
that it becomes primarily an affair and interest of the clergy and pastors and theologians rather 
than a community of redeemed men and women joyfully serving God in the ordinary concerns of 
the common life.”54 The Church as an organized institution was not an end for itself, but existed 
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for the sake of the world and was operative in the work of the laity, to whom it had the 
responsibility of equipping for that work.  
 In his chapter on “The Witness and Action of the Church in the Corporate Life” in CFS, 
Oldham drew from Brunner’s The Divine Imperative. “‘Retreat from the actual world would 
mean that ‘real action would be entirely withdrawn from the influence of the Christian ethic. It is 
here, in this borderland between technical action and ethics – in economics, in politics, in public 
life – that the great decisions are made. If the Christian ethic fails at this point, it fails all along 
the line.’”55 The theme set for the Conference rooted Christian ethics in actual history to create a 
bulwark against a view of religion as a retreat into personal piety or eschatological idealism, that, 
while offering balm for the capriciousness of life’s vagaries, worked as a diversion from the 
responsible task of entering into the struggle for human freedom and community. Instead, 
theology and ethics served to move the church into the concrete experiences of the common life 
through its equipping of the laity for the mission of God in the contexts in which they lived and 
worked.  
 This equipping was not necessarily about empowering isolated action, but action 
resulting from Christian fellowship and solidarity, and obedience to the will of God. For the 
church, in this responsibility, Oldham outlined three “lines of advance,” themes to which the 
Conference worked to facilitate. These lines included, first, the integration of the church’s 
spiritual and pastoral ministries to the contingent and contextual tasks of the common life; 
second, concrete ethical guidance regarding the sphere of public conduct, not only through 
didactic measures, but in an increase in intentional mutual support and discernment, and, third, 
building upon the two former themes, the increase of the utilization of small groups, including 
                                                




groups based on geographic context, that could address issues at the neighborhood and 
community level, as well as groups organized by vocation, much like professional guilds. This 
advance would, Oxford claimed, lead to societal transformation from within, saving it from “the 
“aridity and shallowness of secularism” through the inculcation of responsibility in the daily 
tasks of common life, described by pioneering psychologist William James as “invisible 
molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in through the crannies 
of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, and yet rending the 
hardest monuments of man’s pride, if you give them time.”56 
 These tasks were not the tasks of the organized church. The task of the organized church 
were to provide the thought and tools necessary to discern the will of God and to empower acts 
in accordance with the Gospel of Jesus Christ such that laity might act with responsibility in their 
context. The church in its responsibility was to equip the laity with the moral imagination to 
enter into the vocation of ministry within the context and contingencies of history. It was in this 
role that the power of the church would be released. “It is not the function of the clergy to tell the 
laity how to act in public affairs, but to confront them with the Christian demand and to 
encourage them to discover its application for themselves.”57 At the core of this responsibility 
was the prophetic and teaching office of the church, which the organizers of the Conference saw 
as particularly urgent in the situation in which the church found itself on the eve of World War 
II.  
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The Education and Responsibility of the Laity 
 In its social responsibility the church’s attention is not given over to the establishment of 
a social program or the control of political structure, but on the inculcation of responsibility to 
the laity which comprise it. In the volume concerning the role of the church and education, 
Oldham wrote “Because of the indissoluble unity of the human person the Church must hold 
unwaveringly to the truth that the Gospel is something that is beyond human control and, hence, 
outside educational processes, and at the same time be profoundly and actively interested in 
those processes, lest they interpose insuperable hindrances to the understanding and receiving of 
the Gospel.”58 Writing with Visser ’t Hooft, he places on those receiving the Gospel the 
responsibility for affecting the world. “(I)f the Christian faith is … to bring about changes … in 
the thought, habits and practices of society, it can only do this through being the living, working 
faith of multitudes of lay men and women conducting the ordinary affairs of life.”59 
Here then the church assumed a responsibility for education, not only to provide the 
necessary “disciplined sense of obligation” but, more importantly “the unfettered development of 
the individual’s capacities” especially concerning the preservation of liberty, obedience to God, 
and the concomitant responsibility to one’s neighbor and the conditions that make such service 
possible.60 The Oxford Conference sought to embody this responsibility in its production of post-
conference volumes and study guides, meant for the consumption and discernment of the 
churches and the laity who comprised them. 
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This points again to the role of the church in working to discern the will of God in the 
context of history. Ehrenström writes, “(I)t is imperative for the Church to gain a clearer sense of 
the meaning of her own ethos, its central affirmations, main criteria, and its practical 
implications, both for the ordinary pursuits of daily life and for the exercise of Christian 
responsibility towards the larger issues of a changing society.”61 This clearer sense of meaning 
would come through the processes such as that being engaged by the Conference, which 
demanded that differences in Christian thought and conviction be made apparent in continuing 
dialogue, with goal of not simply finding commonalities or solutions, but to maintain an 
openness to the issues in the face of the reality of human history. Ehrenström noted for example, 
the conflicts within the papers collected for CFCL, including contributions from William 
Temple, Reinhold Niebuhr and John Bennett. 
The reader will soon become aware of the great, and to some extent 
irreconcilable, differences, which emerge in these papers; they reflect the tragic 
divisions in the Body of Christ which also exist in the social realm, divergencies 
[sic] which are not only conditioned by legitimate differences of judgment on the 
actual situation and its demands, but also by the central convictions of faith. … 
But it is impossible to discover what the authentic Christian ethos is and what it 
means for the present world by concealing these divisions; it can only be done by 
an honest facing of facts and by bringing all these difficulties out into the open.62  
 
These differences included Reinhold Niebuhr’s discussion of rationality in relation to Christian 
faith and ethics over against Wiesner’s opposition to Natural Law thought in theology.63 
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 In his essay, Dibelius posited that such a dialogue required both a recognition of the need 
for “radical obedience” to the will of God in a context in which all that is “relative and 
provisional.” Thus, Dibelius argued, the character of the Christian ethic is dynamic, developed in 
the context of historical contingency and human finitude. “For [the Christian ethic] there is no 
absolutely binding static doctrine of values or goods or virtues. God speaks ever afresh to men, 
by bringing them into new situations. The preaching and teaching of the Church must 
accordingly seek to understand the radical obedience of faith ever anew, and to teach its 
application to changed situations.”64 The work of Christian formation and the discernment of the 
will of God in history was an ongoing task of the church. 
In the Oxford Conference volume, Church, Community, and State in Relation to 
Education, contributors addressed the overall threats to education in general presented by 
totalitarianism and secularism, as well particular threats and opportunities in relation to Christian 
education in particular. In addressing the perceived crisis in Christian education, James W. D. 
Smith, then general secretary of both the Scottish Sunday School Union for Christian Education 
and the United Council for Missionary Education, illuminated the lacuna that opened up within 
education in relation to the spiritual within human existence through the particular focus on the 
object of the human as a political, economic and biological entity. He saw this as evident within 
a Russian ethos of atheism, as well as in a repudiation of Christian ethics in Germany. True to 
the contributions of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism, Smith posited with the responsibility 
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of the church the need to recognize these contextual forces in which religious or spiritual 
worldviews were minimal or absent.  
The Church does not exist to create a social Utopia nor can it ally itself with 
political or social groups. But is should act as a ferment within the life of society, 
cleansing and re-creating the social and economic fabric by the proclamation of 
Christian values and by the thought and life of its members. This demands a high 
standard of spiritual sensitiveness, for the pressure of current standards is subtle 
and persistent. The prophetic note is constantly in danger of being stifled by the 
weight of tradition and the Church is apt to respond too slowly to the ethical 
implication of social and industrial changes.65 
 
The emphasis on Christian formation beyond theological inquiry for its own sake as an 
urgent responsibility for the survival of the church in society was echoed by Philipp Kohnstamm, 
then director of the University of Amsterdam’s Institute of Education. Trained in 
thermodynamics and philosophy, Kohnstamm warned against the intellectualization of 
Christianity over against faith formation. “Far be it from me to deny the importance of 
theological formulation, as though one should claim that Christian living, and therefore Christian 
education, are possible without knowledge and so without instruction. But the more I have 
studied, not only children and young people, but adults as well, the clearer has it become to me 
that doctrine can only really mould life when it is itself the expression of an experience that is 
anchored deeper in our personality than any purely intellectual knowledge of understanding.”66 
While the church as an organized society would stand outside the activities of the social 
and political life, its responsibility to society would be discharged by the responsible lives and 
actions of the laity who comprised the church. It was these persons for whom the church was 
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accountable for responsible formation spiritually, didactically and practically. The church in this 
relationship would, like the state, find itself in a unique societal position, acting not as an 
autonomous sphere of influence alongside other autonomous units, but as one with responsible 
oversight across society. It would be the laity, taking their diverse places within society, who 
would exercise this influence and oversight. As Oldham summarized, “The Christian laity 
participate in these activities [of social and political life]. Transformation from within is 
immeasurably more effective than any influence that can be brought to bear from without.”67  
Cambridge political scientist, Ernest Barker, warned that a church that sought to 
withdraw from the world, and to move its members into this renunciation of the world, was both 
anathema to the mission of God and to human freedom and could be considered a form of 
Christian totalitarianism. Human freedom required that an individual be free to engage 
community across multiple commitments and loyalties, each with different, and at times, 
competing duties. This was the reality of contingent historical action, as well as a requirement of 
Christian responsibility. It was the duty of the church to equip the individual with the moral and 
missional development “to conciliate different loyalties, and to bring different duties, when they 
conflict, into harmony.” Baker continued to outline the responsibility of the church and its 
members. 
If the church has a mission to the whole community, its members must take their 
place in groups other than the church and carry the mission of the Word into these 
groups. … The uniqueness of the church, as a society among the other societies of 
the community, is not the uniqueness of a self-contained and total society which 
peculiarly absorbs its members. It is the uniqueness of a society operating as a 
leader, through its individual members, in the service of other societies and of the 
whole community – a society which fulfills, through them, in those other 
                                                




societies, and in the whole community, the mission imposed upon it by its custody 
of the Word and the motion of the Spirit.68  
 
Here Oxford Responsibility situates the human actor, rooted in dignity and freedom, in 
historical context and contingency. In that situation the actor is confronted with relationship with 
the Other as indicative of human existence at the core of responsibility. This core component 
requires the church, in its responsibility to the laity, and its responsibility for their education and 
formation, to remain keenly and continually attentive to context and contingency of historical 
action as well, in relationship with other societies within community. While the church is not 
responsible for the economy or the states’ operations, for example, it takes a responsible place in 
moving the laity to realize and become equipped to accept their own responsibility for how the 
economy and state runs. Here the church acknowledges that God is active in history, and takes its 
role as that which sheds light on this activity, such that the laity can engage with missional 
imagination the incarnational work of God in the context of history.  
Christian Realism and the Oxford Conference 
Within the method followed by the Oxford Conference and in its output, one can see the 
significant influence of the work of Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian realism. Oldham’s interest 
in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr steadily increased as preparations for the Oxford Conference 
progressed, leading to an invitation to Niebuhr join the preparatory group and to submit an essay 
as a representative of younger theologians within the Conference discourse. Niebuhr, eight years 
into his position at New York’s Union Theological Seminary, had published several significant 
texts providing post-World War and post-Social Gospel arguments toward a new Christian 
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realism that would help shape the Oxford Conference. These texts included Does Civilization 
Need Religion? (1927); Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932); Reflections on the End of an 
Era (1934); and An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1935), the latter which was included on a 
recommended bibliography for the ongoing work of the delegates.69 
 The essay assignment was first considered for the volume on Church and Community 
and later for CFCL in which it ultimately appeared. Commenting on some dissatisfaction with 
the progress on the overall volume, Oldham wrote in February 1936 that Niebuhr’s work was 
resonating in Britain and his concerns were “among the most important that must be faced by the 
conference and for this reason we are extremely anxious to give him the opportunity of raising 
these issues in this volume.”70  
The Laws of Love and Justice 
In the essay explicating the elements of Christian realism, Niebuhr rejected the idea of 
total human depravity, allowing for the ability of the human actor to recognize the “law of love” 
as a foundational element of human existence and social harmony, “the basic requirement of the 
aggregate existence of humankind.”71 As established in Brunner’s work within The Christian 
Understanding of Man,” the human agent is able to act and to take responsibility for her actions. 
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Set against the so-called law of love, was the fact of freedom and human finitude within the 
actor, exemplified by the presence of sin and self-interest. Such paradox presents love as a 
possible impossibility in which love is rendered as an obligation that continually misses the mark 
of the law, replaced by laws of justice. Justice, then, accounts for the obligation of love and the 
reality of sinful self-interest, negotiating divisions between the interests of the self and the Other. 
In Christian faith, these perennially inadequate divisions are made subject again to the law of 
love. “Upon certain levels of life the requirements of justice are the highest imperatives. This 
paradox really contains the whole problem of the Christian faith and the common life. The 
problem is to establish tentative harmonies and provisional equities in a world from which sin 
cannot be eliminated and to hold these provisional and tentative moral achievements under the 
perspective of the Kingdom of God.”72 
Niebuhr’s Oxford colleagues, aware of the wider ecumenical movement’s criticisms 
regarding a lacuna within the Life and Work conference’s attention to theology, commented on 
the astuteness of Niebuhr’s submission, particularly on his account of sin in his anthropology. In 
a December 1936 letter to Oldham, Hans Schönfeld, while criticizing what he saw as a thin 
theology in William Temple’s submission, saw in Niebuhr’s essay for the volume a deep 
theological astuteness in which Niebuhr “adopts a much less optimistic position and … 
represents a wholly different insight into the demonic depths of human life.73  
Niebuhr’s work here places within our concept of Oxford Responsibility both the 
responsibility for the engagement with history, and the reality of history’s contingent nature. The 
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fact of human finitude and the resulting tentative harmonies that fall short of the judgment 
permits no lasting confidence in historical achievement of justice, and tolerates no acquiescence 
to continuing injustice.  
Niebuhr critiqued liberal Christianity’s inattention to the doctrine of sin, reducing it to an 
ethic of prudence in moving between self-interest and others. Instead Niebuhr placed the reality 
of sin as a constant and comprehensive aspect of human action that consistently must be viewed 
from the perspective of the Kingdom of God. “In every human moral act there is either an 
element of positive rebellion against God and against life in its total requirements, or a falling 
short of the highest possibility.”74 Yet within these moral acts within history, the ideal of love 
represented by the Kingdom of God was dialectically related to faith. The acts presented not only 
these perils, but also, according to Niebuhr, a promise for “possibilities of actions higher than the 
conventional and traditional customs and habits of men. … The love ideal is therefore not merely 
a transcendent impossibility which has no relevance to actual situations. There is no moral and 
social situation in which the love commandments does [sic] not present new possibilities of 
conduct.”75 The responsibility for historical action, submitted to the judgment of God, places a 
continuing call upon human action and imagination, abjuring absolutes and claims that love has 
been satisfied. In an address to the Conference, Niebuhr warned against the “religious 
profanization of truth which blandly appropriates the truth in Christ for every human vagary and 
prejudice, for every relative insight and temporal perspective.”76  
                                                
74 Niebuhr, “Christian Faith and the Common Life,” 73. 
75 Ibid., 81. 





Niebuhr had been given time on the Conference agenda for a plenary address in the 
evening of first full day of the Conference, July 13, 1937, where he presented on the topic of 
“The Church Faces a Secular Culture.” The lecture was described by Oldham in the Conference 
report as a “brilliant analysis of the present situation.” A summary of the address served as the 
report’s introductory section on “The Contemporary Situation.”77 
 In describing modern civilization in that address, later titled “The Christian Church in a 
Secular Age,” Niebuhr equated rationalistic and romantic humanism as a progression of self-
glorification, as exemplified in the Gospel story of the prodigal son, in which human freedom is 
grasped without recognition of human limits nor as the occasion for sin. The modern rationalistic 
impulse, Niebuhr claimed, sought an autonomy that provided its own meaning and ethic. “It 
mistakes the image of God in man for God Himself. It does not realize that the freedom by which 
man is endowed in his rational nature is the occasion for his sin as well as the ground of 
morality. It does not understand that by this reason nature’s harmless will-to-live is transmuted 
into a sinful will-to-power. It is by this reason that men make pretentious claims for their partial 
and relative insights, falsely identifying them with absolute truth.”78 Without a corrective 
grounding in the gospel, civilization was bound for the “mighty famine” of Jesus’ parable, “a 
catastrophe as so certain a consequence of the anarchy of its conflicting national passions and 
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ambitions.” It was only faith in a God revealed in the Cross of Christ that could move civilization 
to survive the “vicissitudes of history” and “rescue human existence” from despair. 79 
Drawing on the themes he would publish in his collection of essays following the 
Conference, Beyond Tragedy, Niebuhr echoed the arguments regarding history and the Kingdom 
of God that Tillich would plumb for the Conference, in which the church finds itself responsible 
as a historical actor, shaped by the transhistorical fulfillment of the promise of the Kingdom of 
God. “Christianity is a faith which takes us through tragedy to beyond tragedy, by the way of the 
Cross to a victory in the Cross. The God whom we worship takes the contradictions of human 
existence into Himself.” At the same time, while the Christian gospel offers the historical actor 
meaning through the myth of the Kingdom of God, it does not remove the actor, nor the church, 
from responsibility for history, “with all of its conflicts and tragic disappointments of arrogant 
hopes. We are in the world and God’s Will, His Judgment and His Mercy impinge upon our 
daily actions and historic problems.”80 Oldham summarized this for the Conference report. “The 
Gospel which transcends all particular and contemporary social situations can be preached with 
power only by a Church which takes its share of the burden of these situations. The Church 
cannot therefore evade the responsibility of seeking to establish peace and achieve and perfect 
justice.”81 
In his address and in his essay, Niebuhr squarely placed the responsibility for the 
historical burdens of working toward the values of justice and peace within society both with the 
church and the individual Christians who comprised the church.  
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 For the church, Niebuhr warned that it would be “truant to the obligation of religion to 
morality” if it counseled its disciples toward a withdrawal from the world as the antidote to sin, 
or if it relied on eschatological judgments as the sufficient remedy for social ills.82 The church 
was to be engaged in history, as he would argue in regard to faith’s relation to the Orders of 
Creation. For those of the Christian community with particular responsibility for the 
administration of society, such as business and the state, Niebuhr advised the church to prepare 
such actors against the temptation to disavow responsibility for the organizing of community. 
Such refusal could be brought on by what he would elsewhere characterize as the cynicism and 
despair sparked by recognition of human finitude and historical capriciousness.  
A Christian pessimism which becomes a temptation to irresponsibility toward all 
those social tasks which constantly confront the life of men and nations, tasks of 
ordering the productive labor of men, of adjudicating their conflicts of arbitrating 
their divergent desires, of raising the level of their sympathies, such a pessimism 
cannot speak redemptively to a world constantly threatened by anarchy and 
suffering from injustice. The Christian gospel which transcends all particular and 
contemporary social situations can be preached with power only be a Church 
which bears its share of the burdens of immediate situations in which men are 
involved, burdens of establishing peace, of achieving justice, and of perfecting 
justice in the spirit of love. Thus is the Kingdom of God which is not of this world 
made relevant to every problem of the world.83 
 
Oldham, in his correspondence to Van Dusen in July 1936 names the church’s 
understanding of the relationship with the concept of Orders of Creation as central to the work of 
the Conference and lauded Niebuhr’s attention to the issue. “It is the problem of the layman and 
in my view it is in many ways the most important issue before the Conference. Whether we agree 
with Niebuhr or not, the questions he raise [sic] in his paper seem to me quite central and 
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Christian opinion at the present time through the world is in the most hopeless confusion and fog 
regarding them.”84 
For Niebuhr, the Christian support of German nationalism and the country’s justification 
of Jewish oppression, as well as the United States’ long history of oppression against African-
Americans, was rooted in a misappropriation of the dialectical relationship between faith and the 
Orders of Creation. In his essay, Niebuhr defined the Orders – family, race, and nation, for 
example – as the “communities established by the forces of nature.” These communities are 
further shaped by human history, particularly by the limits of sin, resulting in “inchoate 
expressions of the law of love and a threat to its dominion.” Yet the human actor and community 
are responsible to engage the historical playing field in full awareness of this paradox. “Since the 
very genius of gospel ethics is that it makes no compromises and offers no philosophy or strategy 
for dealing with the relative requirements of a sinful world, it becomes necessary to supplement 
gospel ethics with some strategy for dealing with the immediate requirements, the day-to-day 
necessities of a world in which the anarchy of sin must be checked sufficiently to allow some 
degree of human co-operation.” 85 It would be the work of the Conference to provide the church 
and its laity such a strategy.  
True to Schönfeld’s assessment of the darkness of Niebuhr’s analysis, Niebuhr concluded 
his essay with a litany of the paradoxical reality of the historical playing field in which 
responsibility was exercised.  
The love as revealed in Christ is not some ultimate possibility of an eternal 
existence beyond this world. It lies at the very foundation of our world. But on the 
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other hand man is alienated from this law of his existence, not because he is 
temporal but because he is sinful. … In the contrition of this awareness and in the 
knowledge of the true situation, revealed in the Cross, it is always possible for 
man to make the Kingdom of God the norm of his behavior rather than to accept 
the distorted world as the norm. In that sense the love of the Kingdom is always a 
possibility. On the other hand the acceptance of the norm does not guarantee its 
realization. Even the redeemed man remains under the law of sin.86 
 
This understanding of the historical reality of sin and the transhistorical reality of the Kingdom 
set for the Oxford Conference the context for its practical work of social responsibility.  
Middle Axioms and Responsibility 
With its notion of ecumenical responsibility in relationship to the spheres of society, the 
core role of the laity that comprise the church, and the realist lens in which it viewed the 
application of responsibility, the Oxford Conference developed, presented and followed a 
methodology for responsible dialogue and engagement that Oldham named as middle axioms. 
Springing from the recognition of the church’s function in the political sphere, these axioms, 
though perhaps inaptly named, were intended to provide, not necessarily a middle way in terms 
of a compromise, nor static norms, but rather provisional and nonbinding guidelines for faithful 
response in society toward a decision within a particular historical and cultural context.  
Ronald Preston, in his extended article on the concept, explained their attempt to address 
the tactical problems of moral decision making in which, on the one hand, churches “stick to 
basic agreed moral generalities or principles, which cannot be disputed because they have no 
                                                




specific content,” and on the other hand, offer “detailed recommendations” for issues that are 
“too involved and the details too uncertain to warrant such a prescribed conclusion.”87 
It was Oldham whom provided the first formulation, referring to the concept of middle 
axioms as early as 1930 in a manuscript sent to Lambeth Palace regarding race relations, which 
revealed his understanding of historical context and contingency in the application of the 
concept. However, in this particular case regarding race, hindsight finds his explication 
troublesome, revealing as well the limitations and abuse of the idea.  
In the attempt to apply Christian principles in a concrete case, there is need of 
what may be called ‘middle axioms’, i.e., a formulation of what would appear in 
the light of the Christian view of life to be the governing principle of action in 
regard to a given situation. The idea of trusteeship for weaker peoples is an 
illustration. It is not an ultimate principle, since, with the advance of the backward 
race, trusteeship must give place in the end to a different relations, namely, that of 
partnership. But it offers definite guidance for action at a particular stage.88 
As presented in our introductory chapter, Oldham provided delegates a definition of the 
concept of middle axioms in CFS.89 While Oldham is credited with the naming of middle 
                                                
87 Preston, Ronald H. Church and Society in the Late Twentieth Century: The Economic and 
Political Task. London: SCM Press. 1983. pp. 142-143. 
88 Joseph Houldsworth Oldham, “The Christian Attitude to Racial Relations” February 2, 1930, 
2–3, Box 5 Folder 4, Oldham Papers, University of Edinburgh, New College Library, Edinburgh. 
89 “Such broad assertions as that Christians are bound to obey the law of love or strive for social 
justice do not go far towards helping the individual know what he ought to do in particular cases. 
On the other hand, there is no way by which he can be relieved of the responsibility of decisions 
in concrete situations. To give him precise instructions to be literally carried out is to rob him of 
his moral responsibility as a person. It is not the function of the clergy to tell the laity how to act 
in public affairs, but to confront them with the Christian demand and to encourage them to 
discover its application for themselves. Hence between purely general statements of the ethical 
demands of the gospel and the decisions that have to be made in concrete situations there is need 
for what may be described as middle axioms. It is these that give relevance and point to the 
Christian ethic. They are an attempt to define the directions in which, in a particular state of 
society, Christian faith must express itself. They are not binding for all time, but are provisional 
definitions of the type of behaviour required of Christians at a given period in given 




axioms, the ground for such thinking had been tilled in the mid-1920s by the work done by the 
British church at the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC), 
held in Birmingham, which William Temple had chaired. In its volume on The Social Function 
of the Church, COPEC discussed its process that was not unlike that followed by the Oxford 
Conference. COPEC referenced the “conference method” of the Student Christian Movement, in 
which persons together move from an understanding of fundamental issues of Christian doctrine, 
particularly the nature of God and humanity, toward an analysis of the social situation and a 
subsequent move toward action.90 In contrast to Oldham’s method however, COPEC served to 
provide particular recommendations for Christian action, whereas the Oxford Conference 
worked to leave space for decision making to those holding the particular responsibility for doing 
so within the various spheres of society.  
The Oxford Conference developed the concept of middle axioms beyond COPEC’s 
deductive efforts as a method to address the urgency felt by the organizers. For Oxford, the crisis 
faced by the world was theological in origin. Increasing insecurity brought on by the advance of 
technology, economic determinism, urbanization and increasing pluralism, had reduced the 
human being to an isolated individual in search for lost community. In such isolation the human 
would seek restoration of some form of community values within populist and autocratic 
movements.91 Oxford thus sought to move the church to accept its function as the promulgator of 
community values and the enabler of action upon those values against such movements. 
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Moving from Dialogue to Action 
In Oldham’s pre-conference pamphlet, Church, Community and State: A World Issue, he 
reflects on H. G. Wells’ The Shape of Things to Come as a portent of the future of society, 
calling the author, for whom Oldham had great respect, “a prophet of the world state.” Wells, 
according to Oldham, counseled that the future must be grasped by “‘an aggressive order of 
religiously devoted men or women, who will try out and establish and impose a new pattern of 
living upon our race.’” Oldham continues, “The new world government will be as relentless as 
existing dictatorships in suppressing contrary opinion. It will not brook the competition of rival 
religious systems. It will have no place for Christianity.”92  
Likely influenced by the work of Buber, Oldham saw Judeo-Christian anthropology as 
the answer to modern individualism. Writing in the same pamphlet he stated that the Christian 
view of the “supremacy of the personal … is the recognition of the bounds set to the infinite 
expansion of the individual self by the obligations owed to other selves. There is no way in 
which one can be a person except through the give and take, the claim and response, of personal 
intercourse. Persons can be persons only in mutuality. … The personal life is in its essence the 
acceptance of the responsibilities of community.”93 
This view of human dignity, freedom and relationship as integral to human personality 
and community, along with a Christian understanding of the nature and purposes of God, which 
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comprise Oxford Responsibility, shaped Oldham’s method of middle axiom as the responsible 
answer to a world in which church and faith were on the threshold of succumbing to modern and 
autocratic forces. The method sought to retain and restore the church’s voice in the world.94  
Oldham and the Oxford Conference did not necessarily delineate the deliberate steps 
involved in a middle axiom approach, yet Visser ’t Hooft in a later analysis of the use of middle 
axiom thinking in ecumenical social thought during the first decades of the WCC summarized 
what he perceived as the four steps that he called the “Oldham Method.” The first was to identify 
those persons who could best provide churches an understanding of the issues or crisis facing 
society, or what Visser ’t Hooft called the “Diogenes stage.” Second, which Visser ’t Hooft 
considered the first part of a “Socratic stage,” involved conversation with these persons, to 
further identify the fundamental issues to which the church might turn its attention as part of its 
mission to the world. Third, the second part of the Socratic stage, was to design an 
interdisciplinary approach to the issues under study, “particularly a dialogue between theologians 
and lay people.” Finally was the effort to present the results of this work to churches “for study 
and appropriate action.”95 This final point, while positing with the church the responsibility for 
engagement with and for society, did not retain for the institutional church the responsibility for 
decision and implementation, but moved that responsibility into the minds and bodies of the 
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women and men engaged in the work of society. It is these persons who were called to bring to 
these sources a critical evaluation in light of their context, to move toward a decision, and to 
implement a decision into action. Within the concept of Oxford Responsibility, the retention of 
this particular responsibility was grounded in the freedom and dignity of the historical actor in 
her context.  
Later commentator Duncan Forrester also identified various stages of middle axiom 
thought. These focused not on the procedure, as did Visser ’t Hooft’s method, but on what he 
identified as a deductive logic of the process. Forrester posited the first foundational level as that 
of a general understanding of “essence of Christianity” held in common by the church across 
denominations or confessions. Here Forrester referred to Oldham’s reference to the “ethic of 
inspiration” that was not about obedience to static norms but “faith in a living, personal God who 
has disclosed His grace and His will in Jesus Christ.”96 It is interesting to note that Visser ’t  
Hooft’s outline, as Forrester would later critique regarding middle axiom thought as a whole, 
does not adequately account for such Christian deposit or relationship. The Christian Realism 
that guided the process would come under the same criticism.97 The second level identified by 
Forrester was the identification of fundamental ethical principles generally shared throughout 
society. The third level he defined as the integration of principle and ends through mediation 
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within the context and contingency of history. “In other words, theology and empirical analysis 
must come together in the formulation of middle axioms.”98 The final stage, as with that of 
Visser ’t Hooft, is that of implementation in which the process has moved beyond the 
competence and responsibility of the church and theological academy to lay persons. Interpreting 
middle axiom thought in this regard, Forrester writes, “It is seldom legitimate or proper for the 
church as an institution to endorse a particular policy or programme.”99 
In pointing to what he claims was the Church’s return to the middle axiom approach in 
the late 1980s and 1990s during Scottish constitutional debate, William Storrar claims that the 
church moved from the deductive approach Forrester posited regarding the Oldham method, to 
an interactive approach in which concrete experience lead to retrieved ethical principle and 
theological tradition, “which together acted as the catalytic elements” in fashioning the 
appropriate middle axiom.100 Storrar’s characterization of an interactive approach for middle 
axioms in the late twentieth century coheres with the thought and process developed in 1937 by 
the Oxford Conference, accurately reflecting the organizers’ intentions. While the method 
certainly had deductive qualities, the focus at Oxford was on dynamic interdisciplinary 
relationships and contextual realities in which space was provided for a conversation between 
principles and experience, and where frameworks could continually shift as contingencies 
required. This becomes most evident in the final step in the process, in which the responsibility 
for decision and action devolves to subsidiary decision makers.  
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The dynamic and contingent nature of middle axioms was demonstrated, for example 
during the years of World War II with the Church of Scotland’s Commission for the 
Interpretation of God’s Will for the Present Crisis, chaired by John Baille of Edinburgh’s New 
College. The commission defined middle axioms as “‘secondary and more specialized principles 
which exhibit the relevance of the ruling principles to the particular field of action in which 
guidance is needed.’ These ‘are not such as to be appropriate in every time and place and 
situation, but they are offered as legitimate and necessary application of the Christian rule of 
faith and life to the special circumstance in which we now stand.’”101  
The Oxford Conference in its preparatory work, with its significant focus on the inclusion 
of a range of lay voices, sought to develop a system to lead toward such action-oriented axioms 
for contextual circumstances. One could not argue that delegates to the Conference comprised 
the range of voices later envisioned by Preston, who advised, as we have noted, that to develop 
middle axioms related to a particular area or issue, organizers must gather together a diversity of 
persons from various disciplines and stations of life, including those who have practical 
experience with the matters at hand. Rather the delegates in 1937 largely represented an expert 
class, as later critics, such as Ramsey and Forrester, have pointed out. Yet the volumes they 
produced were intended to be engaged – in Visser ’t Hooft’s final stage – throughout the church 
at its various levels – general, judicatory, congregational – as way of discerning further the will 
of God in a given context.  
                                                




Responsibility to History and to God 
In a memorandum regarding the work of the various sections of the Conference, Oldham 
acknowledged Barthian critique regarding positing the sanction of God’s will upon a human 
“ethic of inspiration,” over against an “ethic of ends.” He saw in the concept of middle axioms, 
however, a way to maintain a focus both on divine command in relationship to God across 
various contextual situations that required human decision and action, guided as well by the 
corrective of a realist doctrine of sin, that would be outlined by Reinhold Niebuhr throughout the 
work of the Conference.102  
 As we have said, middle axioms were not attempts to provide universal principles as a 
middle way between the general and particular, but were provisional at their core. These 
guidelines, rather than principles, were reached through a cross-disciplinary reflection among 
theology, ethics and what one might call the practical disciplines, whether social science, 
engineering, economics, etc. While criticized for their lack of theological foundation, they begin 
with a reflection on, as much as possible, what could be identified as foundational in theology – 
agape, freedom, concern for the poor, for example. This was followed by the interdisciplinary 
task of defining the practical and technical issues to be considered, the opportunities available for 
action, and the possible consequences involved. 
 This process sought to maintain a responsibility to the will of God, which would both 
illumine the process and judge the outcome. For Oxford this was found in an approach to 
doctrine and ethics that did not posit timeless and absolute norms, but approached doctrinal and 
ethical directives as elements of a dynamic process rooted in a relationship with God. In his 
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explication of the axial process, Oldham drew on the work of William Temple and his Gifford 
Lectures, delivered during the preparatory process. Temple had written,  
The living God is indeed at work – fully at work – in Nature, in human 
experience, and in the course of history. But He is at work as a Person, exhibiting 
the identity of His character in the infinitely delicate variations of adjustment to 
varying circumstance. He is not at work there as a static principle, always acting 
in the same way, though reserving in His transcendence a capacity to intrude with 
variation into the uniformity of His own immanent action; He is at work there as a 
living Person, expressing His constancy through appropriate variations, which are 
guaranteed against caprice or incoherence by that transcendent self-identity in 
which they are grounded.103  
 
As Buber had critiqued the obstacles presented by fixed doctrine, so too did Temple and the 
Oxford organizers, positing faith not as a strict orthodoxy, but as a “personal fellowship with the 
living God,” confirmed by doctrine.104 
 In his Richard Lectures delivered at the University of Virginia in 1945, Oxford 
contributor John Bennett also defined Oldham’s middle axioms dependent on Christian principle 
understood in relationship and context. Bennett conceived them as a Christian ethic to guide 
persons “in determining the goals which represent the purpose of God for our time,” clearly 
integrating a need to engage the mission of God in the context of history. “These are not absolute 
and all-inclusive goals but the next steps our own generation must take. The Kingdom of God in 
its fullness lies beyond our best achievements in the world but God does have purposes for us 
that can be realized. To live for them is to live for the Kingdom now.”105 
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 The seeming paradox of Christian mission coupled with a reluctance to declare universal 
principles opened the Oxford Conference’s middle axioms to criticism in ecumenical circles. 
Some perceived in the concept a dangerous gap between practical decision-making and the 
ethical norms of Christian faith, criticism not unknown to the wider concept of Christian realism 
that guided the Oxford Conference. Constantijn L. Patijn, a Dutch politician and ecumenist 
lamented in the study The Church and the Disorder of Society, published in 1949 following the 
First Assembly of the WCC in Amsterdam, that in dealing with decisions of a technical 
character, “(n)ot the intentions of the driving spirit, but the knowledge and skill of the 
responsible man are in many cases from an ethical point of view decisive. This prompted John 
Bennett to note within the text that Patijn did not “do justice to the place of the proximate norms 
that should guide the social strategy of the church,” providing examples of middle axioms that 
adhered to the “objectives of the churches” without prescribing the “institutions or the 
programmes by which they are to be made possible. One such example he provided was that “the 
Church should seek to overcome involuntary racial segregation.”106  
Responsibility in Context 
In the same volume, Reinhold Niebuhr pointed to the Oxford Conference, in its method 
and directives, as conceiving church as a “means of grace to all of us in more fully apprehending 
the meaning of the universal Christ, who speaks to each and to all nations and peoples.” 
Explicating this further in an extended note within the essay he wrote, “The Oxford Conference 
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sought to find a middle ground between a Christian view which offered no general directives to 
the Christian for his decisions in regard to social and political institutions, and the view which 
tried to identify the mind of Christ too simply with specific economic, social and political 
programmes. For the ecumenical movement, in the opinion of many, this middle ground is still 
the proper basis of approach.”107 
William Temple in his 1942 text, Christianity and Social Order, had also addressed the 
responsibility of Christians to be aware of Christian principles and “to denounce as evil what 
contravenes them, … (and) to judge how far particular evils are symptoms of a disease deeper 
than themselves, and … to ask how far the whole existing order is contrary to the Natural 
Order.” Like Oldham, Bennett and Niebuhr, and other co-organizers of the Oxford Conference, 
Temple made the distinction that it was not the particular duty of Christians to know the 
technical remedies, but it was the duty to call upon responsible institutions to pursue particular 
objectives within society for the development of “individual personality in the widest and 
deepest possible fellowship.” These objectives, many of which were the topic of the COPEC 
volumes, he named as the support of healthy family life; the provision of education; secure and 
adequate income; the space for individuals to have a voice within their vocation and labor; basic 
freedoms, including worship, speech, assembly and association; and stewardship of natural 
resources for the present and future of the human race.108 
In contrast to COPEC, the Oxford output preserved the differences within the process in 
its effort to maintain responsibility for the layperson in reflection and action. While some, such 
as Storrar, have described middle axioms as an attempt by the church to reach an interpretive 
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consensus on particular social or public issues through a synthesis of “relevant empirical 
evidence and Christian theological and ethical perspectives,” the Oxford Conference’s effort 
itself stopped short of seeking such consensus, opting to place interpretive tools in the hands of 
those close to the discernment and decision-making process.109 To do otherwise was to remove 
responsibility from the community. 
Ramsey, in his Who Speaks for the Church?, posited to the church the responsibility for 
clarifying the ethical grounds for considering various policy options, decrying ecclesial 
resolutions that labeled specific policy decisions as right or wrong, or as moral or immoral, 
which Ramsey dismissed as Protestant casuistry. Ramsey made the claim that the church acted 
responsibly when it acted as a theoretician, providing perspectives to consider and protections 
against the weaponization of “false doctrine” that threatened to “trammel policy choices or 
preclude decisions that might better shape and govern events.” Churches, he said, ‘should seek to 
clarify and keep wide open the legitimate options for choice, and thus nurture the moral and 
political ethos of the nation.”110  
The Conference sought itself, and advised the church likewise, to avoid making grand, 
authoritative resolutions, instead recognizing both the freedom and expertise of the laity to 
respond to particular tasks in obedience to God while providing the theological resources so to 
do. In addressing the “directions of advance,” the Conference report stated, as we noted earlier, 
that for the church to be an effective institution in a responsible society, its influence would be 
applied through “an endless multiplicity of ‘cells,’” comprising persons called to the particular 
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tasks in the particular time and context.111 The effort, while acknowledging the freedom to 
respond in obedience, recognized as well the realities and differences of culture, history and 
circumstance that, without such recognition, work to limit both unity and freedom. 
Middle axioms, then, were understood by the Oxford Conference as an attempt to provide 
guidance and a level of clarity that might lead to action toward a detailed policy conclusion, not 
the conclusion itself. By doing so, the moral actor is informed beyond his mere opinion. More 
importantly, his responsibility is maintained within the context of community, as space for 
decision-making is provided and protected. The provisional and contingent nature of the 
methodology protects the ecumenical responsibility of the churches as well, within the context of 
history. There remains a need for ecumenical response, and the need cannot, in the nature of 
cultural context and historical contingency, be considered settled or absolute. The process is 
dynamic and responsibility requires that it endure. The process must be done again and again, 
forcing the responsible church continually to be conversant with itself, with its laity and with 
society.  
As Preston outlines, “Once it is granted that churches as such have a social responsibility, 
and should give some guidance to their members in exercising theirs, there is a case for thinking 
that the method of seeking middle axioms in this broad and flexible way is usually the best 
method of doing so. … It takes the religious overtones out of politics whilst insisting that it is a 
necessary arc of Christian obedience.”112 
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In addition to the volumes produced for the church’s deliberative consumption following 
the sessions, the Oxford Conference issued five distinct reports published within the official 
report of the Conference, The Churches Survey Their Task. These reports addressed Church and 
Community; Church and State; Church, Community, and State in Relation to the Economic 
Order; Church Community, and State in Relation to Education; and The Universal Church and 
the World of Nations. The Conference also included within the volume longer reports on Church 
and Community, and Church and State, based on revisions to the original advanced draft of the 
report distributed to delegates, drawing upon extended discussions within the Conference.  
 The reports sought to bring together a report on the state of ecumenical social thought 
regarding the particular Christian values that provided the foundation of deliberation on the 
particular topic and context at issue, providing at its conclusion various suggestions for 
penultimate Christian action for the contextual development of middle axioms that would guide 
particular applications. They, along with the volumes of essays in the Oxford Conference series, 
worked to maintain a broad focus that would allow churches and Christians to retain the 
responsibility for discernment and effective action in the particular contexts of ministry where 
justice would be sought and achieved, taking into account respective history and culture. In a 
1966 reissue of the report, Harold Lunger of Texas Christian University wrote of the pioneering 
work of the Conference in establishing a pattern of ecumenical effort involving advance study 
and research, small group and plenary discussion, and commending of reports for further study 
and action by the church. He recognized that the output of the Conference “did not seek to be 
‘prophetic,’ pointing out the direction which Christian thinking ought to move, but rather set 




warfare, there was no agreement, this was frankly recognized and the divergent views were set 
forth as clearly and forthrightly as possible.”113 Such an effort respected the realistic and 
contingent nature of the process that Oxford saw as integral to the method of ecumenical social 
ethics.  
The popular reissue of the report three decades after Oxford occurred in the context of the 
ecumenical Geneva Conference on Church and Society of 1966 in which questions regarding the 
Church’s responsibility concerning social issues were of particular concern. In his critique of the 
Conference, Ramsey addressed the distinction and limits between the Church’s offering 
“direction” with “decision-oriented or action-related economic, social and political analysis 
following from Christian themes,” or “directives” aimed at particular formulations of policy, 
which Ramsey argued, as did Oxford, were beyond the responsibility and capability of the 
Church. 114 
In response to what he perceived at Geneva’s directives on the American conflict in 
Vietnam –“findings … zealously to be made into precedental determinations of responsible 
decision and action in the political life of this nation” – Ramsey perceived the Church as crossing 
a societal boundary that irresponsibly placed “religious fervor behind a particular partisan 
political point.” He argued that the church could not both speak with authority and responsibility 
on political or social questions and at the same time offer “particular prudential 
recommendations to the leaders of the nations.” 115 He argued for a return to the process that 
unfolded at Oxford that avoided both forced consensus and binding, directive pronouncements, 
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but worked toward directions of thought to guide prudential action, based on careful study of 
theology and technique. “(E)cumenical ethics needs to return to Oxford and begin again.” At the 
same time, thirty years later, Ramsey expressed concern of what he saw as the contemporary 
pragmatism of Christian realism “driving out justice from ecumenical consideration.”116   
Church and Community 
For Oxford, realism and justice were two sides of the same coin. The effort to provide 
realistic directions toward justice as a resource to the church, as we have mentioned, earlier had 
been modeled by COPEC, which sought to provide, in a phrase not used at Oxford, “definitive 
objectives” in its reporting on various topics. Like Oxford, however, COPEC saw these 
“objectives” as penultimate guides toward the development of practical objectives in context. 
Oldham’s method, however, resisted moves toward the level of specificity sometimes found in 
the COPEC recommendations and resolutions.117 
 As we have noted the Oxford Conference in its reports included two longer reports on 
“Church and Community” and on “Church and State.” In his analysis of Oxford’s work on 
church and community in relation to the WCC’s 2004 study of Ethnic Identity, National Identity, 
and the Unity of the Church, Eddy Van der Borght notes that the Conference’s decision to revise 
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and include these longer reports are indicative of their central importance to the Conference.118 
We will turn to the report on Church and Community, as a way to assess the output of the Oxford 
Conference in relation to our theory of Oxford Responsibility. 
 The “Longer Report on Church and Community” was based on the original draft 
document that had been prepared and distributed to delegates prior to the start of the Conference. 
Based on discussion within the section on Church and Community, chaired by political scientist 
Walter Moberly, the section report was revised and approved by the committee, giving Moberly 
authority to complete final revisions after the Conference. The shorter report was the version that 
had been approved by the plenary with final revisions by the section. A significant addition to 
the longer report was a section on “The Church and Race.” 
At the conclusion of the report, the section provided for the church “The Direction of 
Advance,” placing responsibility on the church for, first, further study, and second, immediate 
action. “There are problems in the relation of Church and community on which further 
oecumenical thinking is necessary before effective Christian action can be taken; and there are 
certain concrete steps which can be taken at once.”119  These preliminary, if not penultimate, 
middle axioms, encouraged further study and action pointed toward their continuing 
development in the various contexts of the church around the world. Before we delineate these 
results we will look at the work of the section that led to the directions, particularly in the areas 
of nationalism and the encounter with the secular.  
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Church and Volk 
 Oldham had set a tone for the Oxford Conference’s focus on Church and Community in 
his pre-conference pamphlet Church, Community and State: A World Issue, published in 1935, in 
which Bishop Bell wrote an introduction. In it he outlined the plan for the 1937 Conference and a 
program of study, including a list of books including Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society, 
and, in German, Buber’s Ich und Du and Brunner’s Das Gebot und die Ordnungen. The 
publication followed the Conference planning meeting at Fanø in 1934, during which the Life 
and Work commission confronted representatives of the German national church, declaring 
support of the Confessing Church. The commission stated “that autocratic Church rule, 
especially when imposed upon the conscience in solemn oath; the use of methods of force; and 
the suppression of free discussion are incompatible with the true nature of the Christian 
Church.”120 In his pre-Conference pamphlet, Oldham addressed questions regarding the place of 
the state in supporting community, “responsible for fostering the good life of the community,” 
while using its authority “not to suppress and limit, but to serve, promote and multiply 
freedom.”121 
  These questions, raised in the context of the rise of German nationalism and spreading 
totalitarianism, would engage the work of the section. Its work would proceed in solidarity with 
the Confessing Church. The Conference itself would issue a message regarding its support for 
the Confessing Church and the absence of a delegation from the German Evangelical Church. 
“We are greatly moved by the affliction of many pastors and laymen who have stood firm from 
the first in the Confessional Church for the sovereignty of Christ, and for the freedom of the 
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Church of Christ to preach His Gospel.”122 This theme of dedication to Christian values 
operative within life lived in social communities, including that of the nation, would focus the 
questions of the section’s efforts.  
 Important for the work of the section was to identify the context in which the church 
operated. In his essay within Church and Community, Ernest Barker worked to define for wider 
discernment the concept of community, an idea he saw as encompassing concepts such as 
society, people and nation, encompassed in the German conception of Volk, which had been 
outlined in Oldham’s pre-conference work. There Oldham had identified the complex term with 
“the reality of a communal life rooted in a community of blood and soil and historical 
experience.”123 Within the Conference’s Longer Report on the topic, Moberly and his committee, 
which included Barker, broadly defined community in the context of “the Orders,” described as 
“the web of organic corporate relationships which surround [each person’s] life in concentric 
circles of ever-widening radius – his family, his neighbourhood, his race, his people, his nation, 
all humanity.”124 Community in this sense constituted a whole in historical relationship with one 
another, sharing a common social life and form.  
In Germany, the context of national community, embodied in the concept of Volk, 
presented to the Conference’s work a particular urgency. In Barker’s essay he explained, “It is 
important to notice at this point that our world ‘community’ is a multi-colored sort of word. It 
has many areas of operation. The German word Volk is a unitary word,” before providing several 
                                                
122 Appendix A in Oldham et al., The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the Conference 
at Oxford, July 1937, on Church, Community, and State, 275. 
123 Oldham, Church, Community, and State: A World Issue, 26. 
124 Oldham et al., The Churches Survey Their Task: The Report of the Conference at Oxford, July 




pages of defining the term by way of describing what it was not, as compared to other nations’ 
conceptions of community.  
The report went on to describe a working context of social disintegration, exemplified by 
the rise of German nationalism. To assess the reality of Volk, the term needed to take its place 
within God’s economy, where it, within the notion of the Orders, could be viewed as both as a 
divine gift, and at the same time marked by sin.  
The ties of common blood, soil, tradition, culture, and purpose which constitute 
the national community … are given of God, who creates the individual life in 
and through the life of a specific community. On the other hand, it must be said 
with the greatest emphasis that, as with every divine gift, the gift of a nation has 
been and is being abused by men and made to serve sin. Any form of national 
egotism whereby the love of one’s own people leads to the suppression of other 
nationalities and minorities, or to failure to respect and appreciate the gifts of 
other people, is sin and rebellion against God.125 
  
The task of the church was to oppose the deification of Volk, which opposed and destroyed 
relationships across community boundaries. While the citizen owed loyalty to the nation, loyalty 
did not require absolute obedience, and, in fact, sometimes required “vigorous opposition to the 
general will.”126 
In his essay within the Conference volume, French cleric Marc Boegner added that while 
“God uses the nation itself … as a means of preserving humanity from worse disorders,” the 
church would abdicate its responsibility to God if  “she were to allow her members to believe, 
either that the service of the nation can be equated with the service of God, or that it has an 
absolute character, or that anyone save God has the right to determine what their patriotism 
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ought to be.” Echoing a theme heard during the Conference Boegner went on to claim the best 
service the church could offer the nation was in fact “to be the church.”127 
The controversy regarding Brunner’s conception of the Orders notwithstanding, here 
Christian values of the God who created humanity are operative. As we have seen, humanity, 
created in the image of God, is embedded with an inherent dignity, autonomy and responsibility. 
The human actor is responsible to the Other, and in that recognition confronts the dignity and 
autonomy of the Other. The section in its directions for advance included at the conclusion of the 
report would address such issues presented by the German use of Volk, as we will see below. 
However, future generations would find fault in the Conference’s compromise with nationalism 
in general, especially within the essays contained in Church and Community, and for the lack of 
specificity in dealing with what, certainly in hindsight, was a great evil perpetuated on humanity. 
While the organizers could not know the level of atrocities to come, their correspondence shows 
they were certainly aware of the direction in which Germany under Hitler was headed. Ramsey 
points to Thomas Derr’s work for the Geneva Conference in which he asks at what point the 
church might be justified in opposing or supporting specific policy objectives.128  In its social 
function, the church faces a danger that in the effort to be responsible, there may be a temptation 
to irresponsible timidity, or irresponsible overreach. 
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The Social Life of the Christian 
 Another theme within the report was how Christians as individuals and as a corporate 
body were to interact with community. “What duty had the Christian Church toward the general 
social life of the world, its institutions, civilizations, and culture?” Again, the report identified 
the Christian values that could begin to shape such an answer. First, they offered the declaration 
that for the Church, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ was “authoritative in every department 
of life.” At the same time, the report recognized with Brunner that Christian revelation did not 
necessarily displace ethical and technical knowledge from other sources. The witness of God 
could be perceived “in industry and commerce, art and literature, sport and many other spheres 
of social life.”129 Drawing on natural law thought, the report placed within the common life 
standards for justice and temperance drawn from secular sources.  
 The continuing question throughout the report that would be advanced further in its 
suggested directions, was that of the level of compromise permitted or required by the Christian 
in her dealing with society. The report drew from Niebuhr’s then unpublished work for The 
Christian Faith and the Common Life in outlining the paradox of the ideal of the law of love and 
an understanding of provisional justice. Within the report itself, the writers appeared to straddle 
the division among Christians, calling for continued reflection within its directions, yet the 
emphasis was certainly on the inevitability and responsibility of active engagement on this side 
of the Kingdom. The report acknowledged no “clear and simple solution” to the problem of 
compromise, drawing upon the history of the division evidenced by Ernst Troeltsch’s distinction 
between “church” and “sect” types, as well as the reality of human finitude that manifests as 
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compromise. “There is no such thing as a life without compromise, not only in the legitimate 
sense of adaptation to given conditions, but also in the deeper and sinful sense of avoidable 
failure in faithful discipleship.”130 Within this reality, the report posited a contextual 
responsibility for Christian communities to identify their duty more clearly, actually invoking a 
missional spirit to engage the “new and active centres of moral and social authority” that were 
rising within what the Conference already perceived as a post-Christendom world.131  
Directions for Advance 
In its recommendations for further discernment by the church toward “a fuller insight into 
the will of God for the common life to-day,” the report called for a deep process for 
understanding the mind of God, along side a realistic understanding of the realities of history, 
leading to the formulation of what can be called preliminary middle axioms to guide action. The 
report acknowledged that the Conference, even with the long and rigorous process, could only 
“clear the ground for such an advance, by bringing out as clearly and trenchantly as possible the 
issues which at present divide us. The work thus begun must now be carried forward.”132 
 The items identified for further study by the church and by groups of Christians 
demonstrate the influence of Christian realism on the work of the section. The first item called 
for work toward “(t)he Christian understanding of God’s intention for the common life. How far 
does the law of love which is to govern the inner lives and intimate personal relations of 
Christians apply also to their wider corporate relationships?” On this question it pushed further, 
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asking at what level Christians were responsible “to bring all social life into conformity with the 
mind of Christ,” how corporate relationships should be guided by the paradox of the “natural 
morality of justice” and the “supernatural morality of redemptive love,” and if “the sphere of 
these relationships is subject to no ideal standard but only to the inner necessities arising out of 
the need of preserving human life from chaos?” The second item broadly asked the churches to 
consider “(t)he problem of compromise for the Christian. Third, bringing the wider discussion to 
the various geographic and cultural contexts, bodies were to consider the “true significance of 
the claims of the “Orders,” especially “Volk” and “Nation,” and their relation to the claims of the 
universal Church and the family of God,” and, finally, on the nature of race, the trenchant 
question regarding “the desirability or unwisdom of intermixture of races,” a question that the 
report qualified, revealing the technical context of the time, as “partly scientific.”133 
 The report went on to identify 12 immediate steps that could be taken by the church as 
result of its work in identifying the place of Christian foundations and the realities of context. 
These were: 
1) For every congregation to respond to the work of the Holy Spirit by realizing in its own 
life unity across “all difference and barriers” of class, social status, race and nation, 
reminiscent of the work done in responding to the concept of Volk. 
2) For churches at various levels to join together ecumenically for worship and service. Here 
again, was the call for the church to recognize its responsibility to be the church, reaching 
across boundaries toward unity.  
                                                




3) For all Christians to demonstrate “a more passionate and costly concern for the outcast, 
the under-privileged, the persecuted, the despised in the community and beyond the 
community.” It called out for particular recognition the rise of anti-Semitism as a 
significant sign of social disintegration, calling for not only “the weak rebuke of words 
but the powerful rebuke of deeds.” This effort, the report continued, comprised the unity 
of the church as well. 
4) The Church should attend to the real conditions of human life at the various levels in 
which life is lived and in the contexts where life is lived. These included 
“misunderstandings between old and young, tension between men and women, health, 
housing, employment, recreation in their distinctive rural and urban forms. Thus the 
Church should seek to express God’s concern for every man in his own neighourhood 
and vocation.”  
5) The Church, and particularly, what it called “the younger churches” – located in nations 
in which Christianity was in a minority position – should pay particular attention to rural 
areas where opportunities for social transformation were particularly ripe. 
6) With a similar concern for the waning power of the church in various contexts, the 
section called for the Church to raise “the general level of conscience” in communities 
with “new, prophetic, daring social experiments.” 
7) The Church should engage society with its particular expertise, making itself available as 
a “healing and reconciling” agent in community and national “conflicts, 




8) For Churches who hold significant power within their national context, they should 
oppose persecution of other Churches and barriers to their development, again drawing 
upon the work done on the German situation. 
9) Churches should promote united study and action between various Churches. 
10) Christians within a particular vocation or industry were encouraged to gather for prayer 
and discussion regarding the respective issues and practical concerns of their common 
life. “Herein is a special responsibility of the laity,” the report continued, in its call for 
ongoing dialogue between Christians, which the Conference output was intended to 
facilitate. 
11) Individual Christians should seek to bring Christian values into the political sphere 
through their support of those representatives who do their work “in the light of Christian 
principles” and to themselves “undertake responsibilities in local and national 
government.” Here again was a particular responsibility of the laity to bring religious 
values into public dialogue and action. 
12) Offering a final broad objective pointing to the law of love, perhaps providing the hoped 
for answer to the Christian inquiries called for in the first set of directives, the report 
implored all Christians “to seek simplicity and discipline in personal living to go beyond 
the accepted standards of the community in the direction of the love revealed in 
Christ.”134 
One can see in these suggestions that the Conference did not seek to offer general 
directives, but to encourage the continuing formation of middle axioms at various levels of the 
church – individual, congregational, denominational, national, etc. The responsibility for the 
                                                




transformation of society rested in these conversations and decisions, based on what we have 
claimed as the content of Oxford Responsibility. Acting on the foundation of human value and 
freedom, with a provisional understanding of both the will of God within the limits of human 
finitude, culture and history, these responsible members of society would work toward the 





DIRECTIONS FOR ADVANCE 
In the early 1930s, Joseph Oldham and his contemporaries in the Life and Work 
movement came together to confront what they perceived as a dual crisis for the church and for 
the world. As we have seen, the Conference perceived the rise of totalitarianism and the advance 
of secularism as forces that would subsume the church to their own purposes, rendering it 
irrelevant and without voice. At the same time, the organizers perceived that the social concerns 
brought by the rise of these two forces, with detrimental effect on human value and freedom, 
could be answered most effectively, perhaps exclusively, through the doctrine and practice of 
Christianity.  
The organizers sought in the years prior to World War II to maintain and expand a vital 
space for theology and the church in a post-war world. They looked forward to a generation 
where the values of human dignity and autonomy would anchor a realistic worldview where the 
limits of history and human agency would be acknowledged over against political and rational 
idealism. While this was, in part, a response to the idealism of the Social Gospel movement and 
its confrontation with the tragic nature of World War I, the Conference may have retained a 
sense of optimism for its own work, which would prove tenuous as well in the face of the 
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the dropping of American atomic bombs, and later conflicts in 




Certainly, with its own grounding in Christian realism through the influence of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and others, its keen understanding of the contingencies of history, and the finitude of 
human agency, those gathered at Oxford did not have the naiveté to believe their work would 
result in the elimination of political and technical threats, however, they did labor that the church 
would regain and retain a place in which such threats could be ameliorated. Their work, for 
example, was integral to the formation of the WCC in 1948, which would continue for a time to 
use elements of Oxford Responsibility in its work before moving to other methodologies, as 
critiqued by Ramsey and others. 
In the midst of that collaborative work, several of the Oxford group were integral as well 
in garnering American support for the development of the United Nations in 1942 and its 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Historians have credited the Oxford Conference 
as the inspiration to John Foster Dulles in working with other Conference colleagues, including 
Edwin Aubrey, John Bennett, Georgia Harkness, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Henry Van Dusen, in 
forming, within the United States’ Federal Council of Churches, the Commission to Study the 
Bases of a Just and Durable Peace. The commission’s work has been recognized in helping to 
shape American support in the churches for the formation of the United Nations, particularly 
through what Dulles called the effort “to arouse Christians generally to their responsibility and 
opportunity.” Heather Warren notes the influence of what we are calling Oxford Responsibility 
in this effort. “These theologians’ realist analysis of the causes of the world crisis, particularly 




translated directly into advocacy for political measures to check governments that would violate 
basic human rights and the sovereignty of weaker countries.”1  
The social and theological leaders that comprised this self-named Theological Discussion 
Group, not unlike Oldham’s The Moot, worked to bring together theological grounding, political 
expertise, and an ecclesiology that posited responsibility with the Christian laity to engage the 
wider society.2 Their work not only sought to secure military victory in the European war 
through a repudiation of American isolationism, working to convince the United States of its 
own responsibilities, but looked forward to establishing a post-war order that would foster peace, 
freedom, democratic governance, and international cooperation which has lasted deep into the 
first quarter of the twenty-first century.3 
                                                
1 One particular liturgical development of this effort was the establishment in 1940 of World 
Communion Sunday, which embodied a sacramental global unity with political responsibility. 
Warren, Theologians of a New World Order, 100, 107. 
2 The Theological Discussion Group had been organized by Henry Van Dusen in 1933. As 
mentioned earlier, in contrast to Oldham’s effort, Van Dusen rejected the inclusion of a broad 
range of voices for fear that such diversity would doom discussions to vague generalities. Ibid., 
61. 
3 We have noted that the Oxford’s Conference positing of human freedom and dignity, along 
with its focus on the ordering of society in concepts such as sphere sovereignty, not only was 
manifest in a concern for human rights, but for the securing of religious freedom. In writing 
about the crisis of expanding totalitarianism and its deleterious effects on persons and affront to 
the sovereignty of God, Nils Ehrenström saw in the effort for religious freedom the roots of 
human rights. He wrote, “The struggle to delimit the sphere of the state … has been continually 
fought out, and the achievement of political freedom in the modern world is indeed a by-product 
of this struggle for religious freedom.” The focus of securing of religious freedom within the 
work of the Conference and the subsequent collaborative work by the Theological Discussion 





A Return to Context 
As we move toward the second quarter of the century, the foundation shaped in part by 
Christian responsibility for the post-war alliances and freedoms has developed visible fissures. 
Today, the church, in particular the western church, finds itself in a situation not unlike that 
confronting the organizers and delegates at Oxford, facing threats, both external and internal, that 
work to render its theological and practical voice impotent and irrelevant to its contexts and to 
wider culture. We might repeat the assessment offered by Joseph Oldham eight decades ago.4 
The foundations of human society are quivering. The fact itself none will dispute, 
but our minds become dulled by familiarity to its significance. We give it our 
indolent assent, and contentedly resume the tenor of our habitual attitudes. There 
can, however, be no true wrestling with the realities of the contemporary 
situation, except in so far as we allow their meaning to break through the crust of 
our customary thinking into those deeper levels of our being in which our 
experience is absorbed and organized.5 
 
At their risk of being accused of hyperbole, commentators have drawn attention to the 
parallels between the contemporary context and the situation faced by society in the early 1930s.6 
It will be the job of political scientists, sociologists and historians to offer the ongoing analysis of 
the contemporary situation that is beyond both the scope and the limited historical perspective 
possible within this paper. However, given that Oxford Responsibility emerged within an 
intentional understanding and response to its context, it is important as we consider its 
contemporary relevance to point to some significant social markers that can situate implications 
of Oxford Responsibility, particularly for the American church. While there are many such 
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markers, we will begin here with mention of two contextual issues – the rise of populist 
movements and changing demographic landscapes.  
Particularly in the United States and in western Europe, populist anxieties sparked by 
globalization – especially around concentration of capital and economic power, migration trends, 
the broad presence of political and economic refugees, and wide demographic shifts – have fed a 
variety of nationalist movements, including those in traditionally democratic states.7 At the same 
time populist politics and the rise of social media technology has provided wide platforms for 
identity politics that target persons based on gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, exemplified 
by a rise in white nationalism and other hate groups.8 The frameworks and alliances built to 
encourage human freedom through the growth of liberal democracy and international checks and 
balances, put in place following World War II, and the establishment of international 
organizations such as the WCC and the United Nations, which the Oxford Conference helped put 
in place, have been weakened. We will ask in these concluding pages if Oxford Responsibility 
and the Oldham method have any resources to offer in such a context. 
                                                
7 One such example is the 2016 British referendum, popularly known as “Brexit.” This called for 
the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, which traces its roots to treaties agreed 
upon in the 1950s, soon after the end of World War II and the establishment of the United 
Nations. Likewise in the United States, the current presidential administration has followed a 
policy that has destabilized international agreements and alliances, including, for example, 
withdrawal from the fledgling Paris Climate Accords in 2017, alongside unconventional 
overtures to traditionally autocratic leaders across the globe. 
8 According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks so-called hate groups in the 
United States, the total number of such groups rose to a historical high in 2018, growing 30 
percent in the previous four years. Identified white nationalist groups rose 50 in the previous 
year. Black nationalist groups, that the SPLC described as generally anti-semitic and anti-LGBT, 
rose 13 percent in the same 12-month period. Heidi Beirich, “Rage Against Change: The Year in 





Among the significant demographic trends relevant to our examination are the changing 
racial and ethnic composition of the nation; the aging of the American population; as well as the 
changing religious landscape of the United States and the world. Demographers have long 
reported the shift in American demographics toward increases in Hispanic and Asian ethnic 
populations, with predictions that by mid-century Whites will no longer constitute a majority in 
the nation.9 Furthermore, the religious landscape across the globe is shifting as well. The Pew 
Center projects that by 2050 the number of Muslims worldwide will equal the number of 
Christians, and that adherents of Hinduism and Judaism will also grow. A plurality of Christians 
will live in sub-Saharan Africa. Globally, those persons who do not affiliate with any religion 
will be on the decline, but will increase in the United States and in much of Europe.10 If the 
Oldham method within Oxford Responsibility is to have any footing within a contemporary 
societal framework, it would need to take more seriously than did its originators an expanded 
definition of diversity. Included in this shift would be an intentionality beyond that of 
ecumenical Christian and secular conversation, toward interfaith efforts, as well as multi-cultural 
efforts that eschew the subtle colonialism that was inherent in the 1937 effort.  
                                                
9 The Pew Research Center reports that population in the United States has grown more racially 
and ethnically diverse and predicts that by 2055 there will be no one racial or ethnic majority. 
This shift largely has been and will continue to be driven by immigration particularly from Latin 
America and Asia. The other shift will be an aging population. While the global population 
tripled in the last half of the twentieth century and the start of the twenty-first century, it is 
projected to slow with growth strongest among the elderly as a percentage of the population. 
D’Vera Cohn and Andrea Caumont, “10 Demographic Trends That Are Shaping the U.S. and the 
World,” Pew Research Center: Fact Tank, accessed March 12, 2019, 
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A Return To Oxford 
 The work done for the Oxford Conference was a substantial ecumenical undertaking 
spanning several years of intensive preparation and communication across international and 
cultural boundaries, pursued with an urgency, in all seriousness, to save the church and to save 
the world. Those who wrote, shared and debated essays; corresponded repeatedly across oceans; 
and sat in meetings during an Oxford summer, as well as those who pored over Oxford’s texts in 
denominational cabinet rooms, faculty offices, and church parlors, were energized to bring 
theology and faith to bear on real-world problems. They further worked to place ultimate 
responsibility for prudential decision making at the appropriate levels – outside of the church, 
with the laity, in the world – where actions were most relevant and effective. At its core, the 
Oxford Conference put theology in service to the church and the world.  
On an international level, the method and theme modeled by the Oxford Conference 
continued to drive the work of the WCC until the Geneva Conference on Church and Society in 
1966, which comprised wide international participation, including significant representation 
from third-world nations, as well as the presence of Roman Catholic religious and laity. In 
addressing the continuing responsibility of the church, controversies arose regarding how social 
ethics could appropriately relate to changing cultural conditions in society and the various 
models of ecclesiology that emerge through social action. Critics such as Ramsey and Preston 
have commented that at Geneva, the ecumenical movement began to move from a focus on 
middle axioms toward more prudential statements, which Preston described as “the disease by 
which the passing of resolutions produces a sense of significant achievement,” which Oxford, as 
a study conference, assiduously worked against.11 
                                                




 Ramsey’s criticism of the WCC as a “social action curia” is a criticism that has continued 
to follow the work of the Council.12 In recent years, the WCC has also faced budget pressures 
and staff layoffs, a situation that following its 10th Assembly in the Republic of Korea in 2013 
was called “bleak.”13 Its reliance on the church in the United States has also exacerbated 
financial pressures, as overall ecumenical support in the nation has faltered, particularly at the 
local and regional levels. The work of the Council is often lost, consumed only by those with a 
particular interest in the topic. Preston lamented the situation in his semicentennial look at the 
Oxford Conference. 
There is a large quarry of useful material from Oxford onwards. It is hard to 
believe it has been adequately digested. And the temptation is to overlook it and 
continually make fresh starts. It is the tendencies in the material which are 
important and have, I think, a good deal of inherent informal authority. The 
details matter less, especially the resolutions which tend to be grandiose and 
vaguely general, exaggerating the influence and practical possibilities open to [the 
WCC and the churches] … In its original form the material is accessible only to a 
minority. The WCC is entirely dependent on national Councils of Churches, and 
after that the churches themselves, to popularize it. On the whole they do not. … 
Ecumenical matters tend to come last in time and money when denominational 
interests have first been attended to.14 
 
It would appear that an ecumenical conference on the scale of the Oxford Conference –  
with its preparatory work, its publishing output, and that output’s utilization by the church in its 
context – would be prohibitive financially and logistically, although advancements in 
telecommunications might offer some effective possibilities. Certainly the core question is 
whether the churches have a will for such work. As mentioned at our beginning there are 
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resources from Oxford that provide thought and methodology for a world and church in crisis, 
even 80 years since. In our concluding pages, we will name some of those opportunities. What 
new expressions of ecumenical social ethics might be possible and at what level? 
Expanding the Table 
When contemplating an undertaking such as the Oxford Conference, one is immediately 
confronted by what would be various organizational challenges – financial and logistical, as well 
as theoretical. As we have mentioned, among those challenges would be the need for a greater 
attention to diversity. While the Oxford Conference worked to bring diverse voices to the table, 
particularly the technical voices from beyond the church professionals, there were voices 
missing. In a context driven by populist crises, income inequality, shifting demographics, and a 
multifarious religious landscape, one must ask who is part of a new ecumenical, or interfaith, 
dialogue and how can it be implemented?  
The Oxford Conference relied on experts – bishops, clerics, academics, nobles, political 
leaders, writers, scientists – who had the deep grounding in issues as well as the skills to engage, 
not to mention the time and money to participate. Oldham talked about including the “working 
man” but in large part, the working class, and the underclass, were not at the table. One might 
look to Buber, if not later liberation theologians, to consider which “Others” are excluded in 
ecumenical undertakings, and how this exclusion might lead to an ineffectual and irresponsible 
arrogance. In his analysis of middle axiom thought, Duncan Forrester writes, “Experts, civil 
servants, and ecclesiastics also have their interest, their prejudices, and their blind spots – 
particularly perhaps the frequent inability to understand their own limitations. … That is why it 




the people who are more the recipients than the makers of policy. These are the people who 
know where the shoe pinches.”15  
Another obstacle to the responsible practice of intentional diversity is a retreat into 
tribalism and continued colonialism. In an article on the vitality of mission within 
Hispanic/Latino Christianity, Carlos Cardoza-Orlandi cautions the church from retreating from 
faithful ecumenical efforts and moving into tribal affiliations defined by class, ethnicity and, 
even, ecclesial denomination. He also confronts ecumenical and mission efforts that objectify the 
“Other” as the needful recipient of the church’s offer of proclamation and salvation. “This 
pattern of mission and ecumenics is not adequate for the challenges that Christian churches face 
today. This pattern requires a geopolitical structure, provided by Christendom, that is no longer 
functional.”16  
 As we have noted from Graeme Smith’s work, the organizers at Oxford, while 
recognizing shifts and threats to the religious landscape, assumed such a geopolitical structure. 
Yet the notion of responsibility that informed the Conference, with its focus on context and 
relationship, enables ecumenical social ethics to advance in a new space with both an expanded 
sense of mission that recognizes the movement of God in various geopolitical contexts, and a 
cultivation of a posture of humble steadfastness that allows for and models continuing social 
intercourse across contexts and cultural boundaries. The options and implications regarding the 
application of social thought to the issues and concerns before church and society, while always 
remaining contingent, would require a new level of missional transparency. This transparency 
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extends beyond prudential decisions toward the development of related communities. In the 
crossing of boundaries, we are reminded of Buber’s understanding of authentic human existence 
that so influenced the Oxford Conference. Here, the human finds her existence in the subjective 
relationship with the Other. Who we meet and how we meet at the table, and what boundaries are 
crossed in so doing, is of theological significance.  
A Challenge to the Academy 
In considering the implications of Oxford Responsibility for our time, the question of 
how the table is set confronts the theological academy in particular. The contemporary context, 
with its shifting political and religious landscape, further informed by our notion of Oxford 
Responsibility, charges the theological academy to consider its mission, its curriculum, its 
pedagogy and its outreach.  
Oxford Responsibility confronts theology to consider its historical situation and context, 
and to examine the norms it brings to the discussion. The Oxford method brings in voices to the 
table that heretofore may not have been considered and uses alternative criteria to assess validity 
in the discourse. Forrester, in his argument for the middle axiom approach to move beyond a 
type of theological and political aristocracy, notes the difficulty, writing that “tensions and the 
disturbance” will be introduced in the process. At the same time, from his academic context, he 
notes with apparent prejudice that those on the underside “are often angry, muddled, and naïve,” 
often lacking the “capacity for rigorous, disciplined thought which higher education is intended 
to nurture.” Forrester, while seeking the instrumental “experience, insights, and attitudes” of the 
poor and powerless, here has set academic expertise as the established norm for social thought, 




“previously excluded” possess even the potential for critical thought.17 From the start, this 
privileges certain technical expertise and devalues, or, at least, qualifies, other technical 
expertise. What are the postures the academy takes toward the “sources” of theology and do they 
need repositioning? 
In further regard to the norms and sources for theological scholarship, Oxford 
Responsibility charges the academy to continue to pay attention to context in what is validated as 
appropriate scholarship and practice. This is a significant challenge, not only to the theological 
academy, but to wider academic culture, which would be asked by Oxford Responsibility to 
consider the recognition of a discipline’s composition that is shaped by cultural context, and, 
further, how a discipline’s overall practice, within a context, informs and is informed by the 
academy’s theoretical work. This is particularly relevant within a theological discipline that 
purports to engage in questions of the nature of God and humanity in the context of history. 
There are various examples of the privileging of certain theology and theological disciplines over 
against those considered “soft” or “contextual,” leading to the establishment of an accepted norm 
of what valid theological scholarship comprises and what is anathema to such scholarship.18 Yet 
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public, points to a divide between an accepted norm of what valid theological scholarship 
comprises over against practical or “contextual” theology. Dr. Anathea Portier-Young through a 
bulk email had invited faculty, students and staff to attend a workshop that would address the 
history of racism, with the intention of advancing work toward racial equity at the school. Dr. 
Paul Griffiths, in an email to the faculty, rejected his colleague’s invitation and exhorted his 
other colleagues to decline the invitation as well, that he characterized as opposed to the mission 
of the school, which he saw as requiring faculty to remain resolutely focused on orthodox 
scholarship and teaching. Condemning the proposed workshop as “intellectually flaccid,” 
“illiberal,” “totalitarian” and “anti-intellectual,” he reminded his colleagues that they “should be 
tense with the effort” of their scholarship, “thrumming like a tautly triple-woven steel thread 
with the work of it,” before ending his email with the title of the African-American-inspired folk 




Oxford Responsibility would claim a contextuality and dynamism to all theology. With 
Forrester, our work with responsibility reminds the academy that its experts are not the 
“Guardians dreamed up by Plato in the Republic, who know the Good, and therefore what is 
good for others as well as for themselves. They are rather men and women, with skills and 
insights which are of great importance, but occupying a place in society which can limit their 
insight and empathy, and subtly distort their values.”19  
This said, Oxford Responsibility does not ask of the academy to lessen its attention to 
scholarship, but to deepen it in service to the church. It further reminds, if not demands, of the 
theological academy, that purports to train not only scholars, but also leaders for the church of 
Jesus Christ, that pedagogy prepare students for the effective integration of theology and practice 
so that such leaders may work to prepare laity for their responsibility within society. The 
significant research undertaken by the organizers of the Conference, as we have seen, filled 
volumes. The doctrinal topics on which Oxford focused – the nature of God and humanity, 
history and eschatology, and ecclesiology – remain as critical for the church as they were in 
1937, yet the Oxford method also suggests a renewed attention to matters of soteriology, 
spirituality, social ethics, political science and the social sciences as they relate to the social 
function of the church. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Divinity Crisis: The Documents Are Out,” The American Conservative, accessed March 14, 
2019, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/duke-divinity-crisis-griffiths-
documents/. Certainly, the content of the workshop was appropriate for theological, sociological, 
political and pedagogical critique, yet Oxford Responsibility would ask the theological academy 
to consider and model practical engagement with the social issues of its context, and to bring into 
the discussion the fuller community in which scholarship is practiced. This dissertation’s author 
was at the time a staff member at Duke Divinity School and attended the workshop in question. 




David McAllister-Wilson, dean of Wesley Theological Seminary, in his text calling for 
the renewal of theological education as central to the renewal of the church, argued for increased 
scholarly attention to Christian apologetics, particularly regarding the authority of the Bible, the 
interaction between science and religion, and interfaith dialogue. He also called for seminaries to 
pay additional attention to the creation of missional leaders, who would serve as public 
theologians in their leadership contexts, and would be adept at empowering the laity, which we 
have seen was a core value of the Oxford Conference. Careful to distinguish empowerment from 
delegation, McAllister-Wilson wrote, “(W)e know from organizations as formerly rigid as the 
military, organizational structures are becoming flatter, knowledge is shared, and power – the 
ability and energy to do things – comes from the multiplying effect of everyone committed to the 
mission.”20 Oxford demonstrates that for the church, this is not a new idea. Yet Oxford 
sharpened this, claiming that empowering the laity was not merely instrumental to the work and 
mission of the church, but was inherently constituent of the mission of the church itself, 
particularly that mission that is beyond the physical and social boundaries of the church. The 
laity engage their responsibility to use their knowledge and power in the world where the 
institutional church, if it is to remain responsible, does not itself go.  
This work will require the academy to pay deep attention to the church, not to be directed 
by it, nor to direct it, but to engage as a partner in the endeavor in which theology and practice 
are subjected to common critique. As we have stated, Oxford Responsibility puts theology in 
service to the church and to the world. The question in our context is whether theology can be a 
                                                





partner in moving discourse forward for the mission of the church toward the establishment of 
justice in society.21 
A Challenge to the Church 
We have noted that Christianity’s growth has moved from the Occident to the Global 
South, including Africa, Asia and Latin America. It continues a precipitous decline in the West, 
where the landscape for mainline Christianity is shifting on a seismic scale. The Public Religion 
Research Institute, based in Washington, D.C., has reported on the rapidly changing racial and 
religious demographics in the United States, pointing to the “death” of the dominance of white 
Protestant Christianity in the country. Robert Jones of the Institute begins his data-rich text from 
2016 on the topic with an “obituary,” writing, “After a long life spanning nearly two hundred and 
forty years, White Christian America – a prominent cultural force in the nation’s history – has 
died.”22  
                                                
21 In 2016, while visiting Iona Abbey in Scotland, the dissertation’s author had opportunity to 
have breakfast with New Testament scholar and ecumenist John Drane, formerly of the 
University of Aberdeen and current co-chair of the Mission Theology Advisory Group of the 
Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England and of Churches Together in Britain and Ireland. 
During that conversation, Drane was asked what he might advise his younger self about his work 
as a theologian. He said, to paraphrase, “I would tell my forty-year-old self to pay more attention 
to the church, rather than focus only on the discourse of the theological academy.” Drane went 
on to critique what he saw as a continued narrowing of the academic conversation, in which 
guilds talk only to themselves. This sentiment, informed by Oxford Responsibility, suggests a 
continued needs for the integration of theological education, particularly in its pedagogy. 
22 The Public Religion Research Institute reports that while white Christians in 2014 still 
comprised a plurality within American religion, the group had decreased below the majority to 
47 percent, with nonwhite Christians accounting for 24 percent, followed closely by the 
unaffiliated at 22 percent; five percent listing affiliation with “Other religion,” and two percent 
choosing "Don’t know/refused.” Robert P. Jones, The End of White Christian America (New 




The crisis for the American church goes beyond the demographic challenges facing a 
once dominant white church. The Oxford Conference’s concerns about the threat of 
secularization within society and the possibility of the church’s powerlessness against its 
onslaught has seemed not simply to have come true, but to have developed into a reality in which 
one mimics the other. The church, seeking relevance in the face of crisis, has, in many 
circumstances, moved from a concern about mission and responsibility to a concern about mere 
survival in the marketplace. Robin Lovin has suggested that the Christian realism that motivated 
Oxford toward a responsibility for its social context has, in the face of increasing social 
fragmentation and polarization led to the church’s theological retreat from the world in one form 
or another.23 
In their popular and influential text, Resident Aliens, Duke University’s Stanley 
Hauerwas and William Willimon advocate for a “Christian Colony” shaped by an ethic of 
conviction over against the values of the world. “(T)he Sermon, if believed and lived, makes us 
different, shows us the world to be alien, an odd place where what makes sense to everybody 
else is revealed to be opposed to what God is doing among us.”24 Here the community that 
matters is the Christian community, in retreat from the world, responsible only to itself, albeit 
under the judgment of God. The Christian is to place herself in clearly-marked borders between 
the church and the world, within a clearly-defined Christian narrative that decides who is within 
                                                
23 Robin W. Lovin, “Church in an Amoral Time: Reimagining Christian Realism,” The Christian 
Century 136, no. 5 (February 27, 2019): 26–29. 
24 The authors here refer to Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5. Stanley Hauerwas and 
William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1989), 74; In his critique of Christian Realism in his Gifford Lectures, Hauerwas claims that 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s theology “reflects the loss of truthful Christian speech and hence, of faithful 




and without those borders, jettisoning an idea of Oxford Responsibility for the wider world. 
Those outside the Christian community do not, indeed, cannot, recognize the activity of God in 
the world.  
A lack of responsible engagement with the world has, ironically, helped push the church 
into the arms of the market, in which the church does not offer a Gospel for which one should 
give his whole being, as Oldham had insisted in the early preparations for the Oxford 
Conference. Rather the church seeks it own existence alongside competing elements of the 
marketplace, replacing both an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility with a business 
plan to attract its object of religious consumers. Journalist and United Church of Christ cleric G. 
Jeffrey MacDonald chronicles the trend of the church’s mimesis of market culture, using as 
examples North Carolina’s Forest Hill Church in Charlotte, which designed its Warehouse 242 
congregation for young adults, who had indicated via a marketing survey a preference for 
worshipping separately from older persons; as well as other “niche churches … catering to ever-
narrower market segments.” MacDonald also points out that executive pastors among the 
nation’s fastest growing churches often cite business texts as the most formative regarding 
ministry, including texts that explicitly position the church as “just another enterprise trying to 
make a sale.” Quoting from one such text, he writes, “Whether your product is a candidate, a 
hamburger, or the word of God, the challenge is the same. How do you connect with a fast-
changing public and get them to buy what you’re selling?”25 MacDonald also suggests that 
retreat into the market has seen a concomitant retreat from Christian values toward a further 
                                                
25 Quoting from Douglas Sosnik, Matthew Dowd and Ron Fournier. Applebee’s America: How 
Successful Political, Business, and Religious Leaders Connect with the New American 
Community  (Simon & Schuster, 2006) p. 2. G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Thieves in the Temple: The 





mimicking of the wider culture. Drawing upon the work of David Gushee of Mercer University, 
he proposes that what is required is a deepening of spiritual and moral formation, centered on 
engagement and dialogue with the Other. “We need a deepened commitment to prayer for our 
churches. We need to address the moral formation of our people and our clergy … and [we need 
a] deepening of the moral and spiritual vision of dignity and sacredness in every human life, 
especially those lives that we’re tempted to consider unworthy of such dignity.”26 
A New Oxford 
 A question to be considered is whether Oxford Conference thought can begin to restore a 
moral vocabulary that addresses dignity, freedom and responsibility, and to what extent have the 
demands of the market overtaken such imagination in policy and practice. As Robin Lovin 
observed, “(C)hurhces, universities, charities, arts organizations, and businesses are increasingly 
concerned about survival in a marketplace that is organized to satisfy desires, not to raise 
aspirations.”27 
In his attempt to clarify the proper meaning of responsibility within Christian moral 
discourse, Albert Jonsen takes counsel from Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, who, as we have 
noted, called for responsibility “to be brought back from the province of specialized ethics into 
that of lived life.”28 Here the term is put into use amidst the demands of ideology and the real life 
                                                
26 MacDonald cites a 2009 survey from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life on “The 
Religious Dimensions of the Torture Debate.” The research claimed that 71 percent of 
Americans saw the use of torture in interrogating terrorist suspects as justified, with 79 percent 
of white evangelicals making similar claims, along with 63 percent of mainline Christians. Ibid., 
90. 
27 Lovin, “Church in an Amoral Time: Reimagining Christian Realism,” 27. 




of humans in general, and, for Jonsen, Christians in particular. Writing three decades after 
Oxford, Jonsen posits the term as a push to members of the ecumenical church not simply to seek 
understanding between each other, but “to become aware together of the challenge posed to 
Christianity itself and of their common resources to meet the challenge.”29 This was the very 
challenge of Oxford in which its concept of responsibility emerged, in which responsibility 
serves not simply as a component of ethical thought but as a normative and central principle.  
The concept of Oxford Responsibility can serve the ecumenical church again, not through 
a restoration of a grand ecumenical council, although it might be welcome, but through an 
intentional restoration of study and dialogue across the church, and the church’s empowerment 
of dialogues across communities. We might call for the cultivation of “Little Oxfords” in the life 
of the church in its various contexts at the congregational, neighborhood, community, regional, 
and denominational levels, where these conversations can take place, and where laity can be 
inculcated with moral imagination for wider dialogue and action. 
In his text Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey Stout explored the place of religious 
conversation within a secular democratic community. While a study of how the work of the 
Oxford Conference might interact with the significant political and philosophical work regarding 
the place of religious reasons within democratic tradition is rich with possibilities, for our narrow 
purposes we focus on his insight into public conversation and the inculcation of morality in 
democratic discourse.30 Over against secular liberalism that finds no place for religious reasons 
                                                
29 Ibid., 8. 
30 Stout defines conversation as “an exchange of views in which the respective parties express 
their premises in as much detail as they see fit and in whatever idiom they wish, try to make 
sense of each other’s perspectives, and expose their own commitments to the possibility of 




in a public dialogue, and what he calls “new traditionalism” – in which he would include the 
work of Hauerwas – which refrains from the dialogue altogether, Stout argues that a democratic 
vision of morality emerges in a multitude of voices that form a community whose members are 
responsible to one another. That community must include religious voices as well. Within our 
concept of Oxford Responsibility, this places upon theology and the church that responsibility to 
enter into that dialogue, and to maintain the moral imagination to recognize in the diversity of 
voices a common revelation of God. Stout, in examining the contemporary relationship between 
the religious Right and political power, claims the return of religious reasoning into the public 
dialogue as a life or death issue, not unlike the urgency of the Oxford Conference. “If the 
religious Left does not soon recover its energy and self-confidence, it is unlikely that American 
democracy will be capable of counteracting either the greed of its business elite or the 
determination of many whites to define the authentic nation in ethnic, racial, or ecclesiastical 
terms.”31 
The call for “Little Oxfords” may be an opportunity for the restoration of the mission of 
the church in the face of commodification and secularization through the utilization of models 
that engage the community in dialogue and action in new and broad ways. 
One such innovation was Scotland’s Iona Community, founded the year following the 
Oxford Conference. The community began as a fellowship of Church of Scotland pastors 
following a rule of life for the renewing of the church’s work for justice and peace in the world, 
and in attending to the spiritual formation of the church. Oldham knew of the community and 
discussed the possibilities of its work and the work of other such new communities in 
                                                





implementing the responsible thought developed at the Oxford Conference. These communities 
he saw as integrating the work of faith into practice, in consideration of the opportunities and 
limitations of historical context. Oldham’s concern was how new imaginative communities, 
which were taking seriously both spirituality and engagement in society, could best be held 
together in a common faith.32 The community has sustained itself and today operates using an 
action-reflection model, integrated with intentional spiritual formation, for engagement with a 
wider community.33 
Communities such as that on Iona have come to be categorized within the Protestant 
tradition as neomonastic. This new monasticism comprises persons forming an intentional 
community that follows a “rule of life” and is focused on the formation of disciples, generally 
laity, through attention to doctrine, spiritual practice and intentional engagement with the world 
toward the establishment of justice. These communities are inward focused as to formation of 
                                                
32 During a meeting of The Moot in January of 1944, Oldham and Alexander Miller discussed 
the creation of new faith communities, such as the Iona Community, that dealt with “the total 
historical situation in the faith expressed in dogma” and how these varied communities might 
find explicit theological connection with one another. Miller, who would go on to serve on the 
religion faculty at Stanford University, at the time was working with the founder of the Iona 
Community, the Rev. George Macleod, Baron Macleod of Fuinary. Macleod had founded the 
Community in 1938 at the site of the ruins of St. Columba’s sixth-century monastery on the 
Scottish island of Iona, bringing pastors and laborers together for its restoration. Miller suggested 
that the theological academy was ignoring such communities and that, perhaps, there might be a 
“synthesis of theological thought with practical experiment” following the end of World War II, 
with Oldham suggesting that such new movements were “dependent on the Holy Spirit … and 
therefore hazy.” Clements, The Moot Papers, 658–59. 
33 The Community describes itself as “a dispersed Christian ecumenical community working for 
peace and social justice, rebuilding of community and the renewal of worship. We are … (a) 
community of men and women from different walks of life and different traditions in the Church 
engaged together, and with people of goodwill across the world, in acting, reflecting and praying 
for justice, peace and the integrity of creation; convinced that the inclusive community we seek 
must be embodied in the community we practice." Iona Community, The Iona Community, 




Christians for the purpose of outward action in the world in the contexts where its members work 
– as teachers, doctors, businesswomen, and students.34  
In contrast with the communities envisioned in the new traditionalism, these communities 
are positioned to respond to concepts such as Oxford Responsibility in rebuilding moral 
imagination at various levels of community. Lovin writes, “We have experienced a devastating 
loss of social capital in the very places that used to be best at creating it. … This is the point at 
which I begin to think that the idea of the church as an alternative community with its own 
distinctive values and virtues might be the best response to our situation.” Lovin compares such a 
community with Germany’s Confessing Church, which held space over against the Nazi 
destruction of church and society. In contemporary context however, Lovin sees such 
communities as a holding action to empower laity with a vocation to rebuild social capital where 
they live and work. 
It will require people who understand their religious identity and have a realistic 
assessment of the world around them. They will also need a special kind of 
commitment to each other that supports them when they venture to raise questions 
about goods and goals that most people no longer understand. … It would miss 
the point if all of these activities are seen only as alternative ways of doing and 
being, with no intention to change things beyond the community of faith. The 
Saturday morning service project and Tuesday evening Bible study need leaders 
who raise the larger question, “How do you share what is meaningful to you in 
this place, and in this work, in the other places where you spend your life?35 
 
                                                
34 See Elaine A. Heath and Larry Duggins, Missional. Monastic. Mainline. (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2014); and The Rutba House, ed., School(s) for Conversion: 12 Marks of a New 
Monasticism, New Monastic Library (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2005). 




Responsibility in the Neighborhood 
The creation of “Little Oxfords” where persons engage theology and context that enables 
responsible action and reflection are evidenced by the growth of neomonastic communities, as 
well as other intentional efforts, including continuing education programming, to empower the 
laity for effective ministry and vocation.36 In Oxford’s CFS, Oldham wrote about general lines of 
advance in relation to such preparation of the laity for responsible ministry. Oldham began with 
three directives. These were the effective relating of spiritual and pastoral ministries of the 
church to the realities of the common life; provision of a clearer understanding of the ethical 
implications of the Gospel, utilizing “fresh and constructive thought;” and the increase of small 
groups “for the purpose of mutual help in Christian witness and action,” including the formation 
of educational programming for functional groups, such as professional guilds. Within these 
directives, Oldham called for a move into the neighborhood.37 
No Christian congregation can escape its responsibilities to its immediate 
neighbourhood. If through the faithful preaching of the Gospel men and women 
commit themselves to war against the devil and all his works, the first duty is to 
find out what injustices there are to be removed and what miseries and want to be 
relieved in the immediate neighbourhood. The life of the Church would be 
revitalized if in every parish or congregation there were groups of Christian men 
and woman banded together for this purpose, and developing through the 
discipline of the conflict with social evil a growingly sensitive Christian 
conscience.38  
                                                
36 One such recent example of such an effort for laity is a nascent program called Neighborhood 
Seminary, a two-year program for laity that seeks to prepare persons to enter into mission in their 
context using a pedagogy combining monthly collaborative coursework from a theological 
scholar partnered with a local ministry practitioner; formative work with trained spiritual 
directors; and intentional community engagement with local leaders. The program was begun at 
Duke University in July 2017 before being released as an independent effort in November 2018, 
working with groups in western North Carolina and northern Virginia. The dissertation’s author 
is currently consulting to the program.  
37 Visser ’t Hooft and Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, 195–97. 





 These were the contextual spaces for middle axioms to be engaged and implemented, 
where setting and circumstance could be considered, action engaged, and God’s judgment 
discerned. These were the spaces from which laity would be formed for their vocational realities 
that could move toward the Responsible Society the ecumenical movement envisioned. The 
fervor Oldham had for such spaces is worthy of quoting at length. 
May not the formation of such cells of Christian witness and service be the 
distinctive Christian contribution to the social and political struggles of our time? 
To be effectively changed a social system must be changed from within in all its 
parts. … The only order which can be a really better order is one in which there is 
a greater sense of responsibility of men towards men, and that responsibility is 
something that grows through exercise and must be learned and practised in lesser 
spheres before it can be effectively exercised in wider fields. It has to be learned 
first in the family, in the neighbourhood, in local government, in professional 
associations, in various social groups. … If we try to envisage a Church fully 
alive to its responsibilities in the social and political spheres, ought not the picture 
in our minds to be on of the growth of a multitude of centres of spontaneous 
activity in which Christians associate themselves to bear the Christian witness in 
their neighbourhood or profession, to war against evil where they encounter it in 
daily life. … In proportion as such groups increase there would arise a force in the 
life of a people capable of transforming its institutions and of bringing about a 
true revolution.39 
 
However we might assess Oldham’s call for a Christian revolution, the Oxford 
Conference and its theologically-grounded concept of responsibility, operating with a realist 
foundation supportive of human freedoms and cognizant of human limits, provides a theology 
and methodology for a recovery of ecumenical, interfaith and trans-societal dialogue, beginning, 
as we have outlined in our concluding chapter, on the local level. Oxford Responsibility has 
within it the theological and missional imagination that can be a revitalizing force within 
Christian congregational life. Such a revitalization would comprise a move toward the 
restoration and expansion of broad dialogue and common action where Christianity and religion 
                                                




can take their proper place, encouraging an engagement with the Other as neighbor. In this 
responsible society, human dignity and value are continually reaffirmed over against those forces 
that seek to negate them. Further, the church may continue to speak to the reality of those forces, 
without a retreat from the responsible achievements toward justice on this side of the Kingdom 
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